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PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

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MARXISM EAST & WEST

ECONOMICS *J. Berliner*

DIALECTICS *C. Cohen*

REVISIONISM *E. Demaitre*

The "Cultural Front" in China *J. Simon / S. R. Schram*

Economic Problems in the Soviet Bloc *G. Kemeny / J. Chapman*

How Russians Rule Russia *S. Bialer*

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PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

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Marxism East & West

EDITORS' NOTE: The first of the three articles below examines the actual applicability of Marxian theories in the formulation of Soviet economic policies, and the usefulness of Marxist categories in analyzing the same. The second—a report on a debate between Soviet and American philosophers—offers a glimpse into Marxism as a dogma, while the third, by focussing on recent literary and philosophical discussions among Western and East European left intellectuals, demonstrates that where there is no police apparatus to enforce conformity, Marxism (or varieties thereof) may flourish as yet another legitimate form of intellectual inquiry.

Marxism and the Soviet Economy

By Joseph S. Berliner

There is a curious thing about the way in which treatises on the development of the Soviet economy handle the subject of Marxism. One is likely to find a chapter on the "historical and ideological background" dealing with such matters as surplus value, the falling rate of profit, and the industrial reserve army. The chapter on prices will have a section on the labor theory of value and why it is all wrong. But once the author gets down to a serious discussion of Soviet economic organization and policy, little more will be said about Marxism.

Surely this is cause for some puzzlement. For where, if not in the field of Soviet economic organization and policy, ought one to look for

Professor of Economics at Brandeis University (Waltham, Mass.), Mr. Berliner has written extensively on Soviet economic problems. Among his published works are Factory and Manager in the USSR *(Harvard and Oxford, 1957), and* Soviet Economic Aid *(Praeger and Oxford, 1958).*

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application of Marxian economic theory? And yet not only is the search mostly barren, but the question is often raised whether Marxian theory has any relevance at all to the understanding of Soviet development. It is with this problem that the present article is concerned.

Let us suppose that a political party that identifies itself as Marxist comes to power in a capitalist country. To what extent is Marxist theory relevant to the interpretation of its policies? The term "relevant" may be understood in the normative and in the analytical sense, and, accordingly, the question may be rephrased as follows: First, to what extent does the party's knowledge of and commitment to Marxism determine its decisions regarding economic policy? The main part of the article will deal with this issue. And secondly, if we view the party itself as governed by the prevailing social forces, can we find in Marxism analytical tools that would help us explain and predict the party's behavior? This is the issue to which the last part of this article is devoted.

If we are to take the notion of Marxian "influence" seriously, we must at the outset reject the trivial meanings of the word—that is, the identification of "influence" with name-labels. We would learn little if we proceeded on the assumption that any "Marxist" party must by definition base its policy on Marxian principles. If the discussion is to be of any interest it must be possible for us to accept, at least at the outset, the hypothesis that a "Marxist" party may, in its concrete policies, reveal very little or no influence of Marxian theory. If Marx himself could declare that by certain standards he was not a Marxist, it is surely appropriate to raise a similar question today with respect to "Marxist" parties.

Voluntarism and Marxian Theory

In the case of Marxian economics there is particularly good reason to suggest that the hypothesis not only merits consideration but may in fact be valid. There is the question, first of all, whether a theory consisting of a set of *objective* social laws can serve as the basis of policy for a party with the power to *make* and enforce decisions. Secondly, there is the question of whether a set of propositions defined in capitalist categories can be appropriate to a socialist system. And third, there is the matter of the relevance to an underdeveloped country of a theory that presupposes a high level of economic development.

Let us begin with examining the relevance of Marxian theory to a party that wields the power to allocate the nation's resources. Few would dispute the statement that, at a minimum, the policy *goals* of a Marxist party are influenced by its Marxist heritage. The nature of the influence, however, is socio-psychological, rather than scientific. A party that professes to be Marxist will accept as its own certain ends which are implicitly defined as good within the context of the Marxian system, such as social ownership of the means of production, industrialization, welfare of the masses, elimination of urban-rural differences, and the eventual withering away of the state.

Besides such broad goals, however, there are also certain specific policy issues, particularly those discussed by Marx in his *Critique of the Gotha Program,* which a Marxist party could be expected to endorse. But the more detailed the issue about which a decision has to be made, the greater the role of cultural and psychological factors and the smaller the role of Marxian theory. Should the land be nationalized? Should planning be centralized or decentralized? Should factories be under one-man management or worker control? How high should be the rate of investment? As the USSR Academy of Sciences textbook, *Political Economy* (3rd ed., p. 331), put it in discussing the nationalization of land, the matter must be decided

> *in accordance with the concrete conditions of each country. In Russia, where the peasant traditions of private property in land were weaker than in the West, the Soviet state, in accordance with the needs of the peasant masses, carried out the total nationalization of land at the very beginning of the revolution. . . . In those countries where small-scale peasant property in land has existed for a long time and where the tradition of private property is therefore strong, the working class, on coming to power, does not carry out the total nationalization of land.*

In other words the effective basis on which the decision is made is not Marxian theory, but specific cultural and historical traditions.

The difficulty in employing Marxian theory as a guide to policy is due also to the fact that Marxism is a true "sociological" rather than a "psychological" theory. It purports to analyze the social consequences of specific social arrangements and individual forms of behavior.

N.B. This paper is a revised version of a paper presented to the 1962 Warsaw Conference on the Marxian Theory of Development. The author is indebted to the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, for its support of the research.

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As a true social theory, it deals with the order "that arises as a result of individual action, but without being designed by any individual," as Friedrich von Hayek once put it. It deals with Engels' realm of necessity, the realm of the unconscious social consequences of conscious individual action. Like the theory of "perfect competition," the Marxian model applies to a society in which no decision-making unit possesses the power to influence the major economic variables, such as the price level, the rate of investment or the wage rate. And yet these are precisely the kinds of variables which a governing Marxist party must determine. What is required, therefore, is a theory that lends itself to normative use, one that can provide a basis for answering policy questions such as, "What should I do?" Marxism is rich in propositions explaining the behavior of economic variables that are determined by objective social processes, but is not concerned with the problem of finding optimal solutions and choosing among alternatives.

But, it may be argued, as a scientific theory Marxism does contain propositions of the form, "if X, then Y." It contains a model of an economic process which provides a basis for predicting the consequences of alternative courses of action—even though it does not provide a theoretical apparatus for evaluating the relative efficiency of the alternatives—and for a Marxist party this is surely a highly relevant feature of the theory. However, the economic process with which Marxian theory was concerned was that of a capitalist system. It is not at all self-evident that the same theory can deal with economic processes under socialist conditions. Our next question, therefore, is whether the capitalist and socialist economic systems have a sufficient number of common properties—whether, in other words, Marxian propositions about the former are relevant to decision-making in the latter.

Socialism in Search of Marxism

No respectable social theory presumes to be so general as to apply under all conceivable conditions. Classical Marxian theory deals with the dynamics of a society conditioned by such phenomena as private ownership of the means of production, classes based on their relationship to private capital, certain socio-psychological characteristics that constitute part of the data of the system, and so on. The same may be said of the theoretical systems of Marshall, Schumpeter, Walras, or any social theorist. But the special property of Marxism (shared to some extent by Schumpeter's system) lies in the fact that as a dialectical theory of change it predicts the destruction of the conditions under which it operates. Hence it may be asked whether the theory is analytically relevant to the next stage, with its different conditions, when the dialectical process of historical change has been consummated, a Marxist party has come to power, and capitalist conditions have disappeared. How, in short, does Marxian theory apply to the post-capitalist stage?

One of the basic decisions the party must make is the choice of some substitute for the defunct market-system of coordinating the production of goods. However, in its search for new organizational forms it will find very little guidance in Marxian theory. Such views as Marx and Engels occasionally expressed about the organization of a socialist economy, whatever their merits, were not derived from their theory of capitalist development. The party's final decision will therefore be influenced by such factors as the cultural traditions of the nation, the level of social development, the psychological properties of the party leaders, the political conditions of the time—and not by any segment of systematic Marxian theory.

Another problem the party leadership will have to solve is the organizational form of the basic production units. Again the possible forms range from full one-man management to complete worker control. Methods of distribution of the social product, incentive systems, techniques for enforcing factory discipline, all provide a range of alternatives. Marxian writings contain much valuable material on the ways early capitalism handled these problems: one recalls the vivid historical treatment of capitalist methods to increase surplus value (so as to offset the tendency of the rate of profit to decline), as well as the description of capitalist techniques in recruiting and training rural labor for the discipline of factory work. But when Marx described the use of piece-rates as a device for increasing surplus value, he was obviously not advising a ruling Marxist party to adopt a similar system for the same purpose. Indeed, if the party does in fact adopt those techniques, it is not to be ascribed to the influence of Marxism as a scientific theory; it is simply a matter of the party selecting from the historical storehouse of available methods those that it regards as most suitable to its purposes.

Equally limited in relevance to post-capitalist institutions are the Marxian behavioral propositions. Marx may have been successful

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in predicting the response of a capitalist to a change in the price of a factor of production; but a socialist manager with different material interests and working in a different socio-economic environment cannot be presumed to react in the same way. On the other hand, the technical relations of production, such as the relationship between consumption and investment, are likely to be sufficiently similar under socialism and capitalism to permit the adaptation of Marxian analysis to socialist conditions.

In fact, this is one area in which Marxian theory was once highly relevant to the problems of Soviet economic policy. It may be remembered that Marx's analysis of the process of simple and expanded reproduction [1] was the point of departure in the vigorous discussion of Soviet growth policies during the 1920's. However, Marxian theory has little to say about how to make the most advantageous use of economic resources under conditions of scarcity, which is a crucial problem for any socialist economy. It is precisely in this area that non-Marxian economic theory has in recent years made the most significant advances, and a Marxist party that neglected these theoretical sources would hardly be doing justice to its responsibilities.

The third serious difficulty with the applicability of Marxian theory is the fact that Marxist parties have typically come to power in countries in which economic development had not reached the level predicted by Marxist theory. Marxism assigns to the epoch of capitalism the historic task of accumulating a massive stock of social capital and the training of the masses in the social behavior and experience appropriate to an industrial society. This very process leads at that same time to a sharpening of the prevailing social contradictions, and culminates in turn in a revolutionary change of the system itself. By the time the revolution occurs, an industrial society has come into being.

For a variety of reasons, history did not follow the path foretold by Marxian theory, and the party has repeatedly been confronted with the awkward task of completing the economic transformation that, according to the rules, should have been completed in the preceding epoch. Since the very existence of an underdeveloped socialist society is evidence of the imperfect predictive power of Marxism, it is perhaps not surprising that that Marxian theory has not been a fruitful source of theoretical guidance for the party's policies. Indeed, as will be argued presently, it is the very fact of economic underdevelopment, rather than Marxian theory, that helps explain the distinctive economic policies of the socialist countries.

The Economic "Laws" of Socialism

The observation was made at the outset of this article that economists writing about Soviet economic policy and institutions rarely find it necessary to refer to Marxian theory. In the pages above some of the reasons for this remarkable phenomenon were explored. It could be argued, however, that writers in the West, on whose works this conclusion was primarily based,[2] neglect the role of Marxian theory because of their insufficient grasp of socialist economic practice. Let us therefore turn to a consideration of the treatment of Soviet experience by economists who have personally participated in the formulation and interpretation of Soviet policy.

The 1959 edition of the textbook, *Political Economy*, published by the USSR Academy of Sciences, serves as a good example. The book duly notes that with the establishment of socialism "the capitalist economic forms and their laws of development lose their governing power," and "new economic laws, appropriate to socialist conditions of production, arise and gradually expand the sphere of their influence" (p. 337). The authors then present the basic

[1] The model divides the economy into two sectors, one producing consumer goods and the other producing capital goods. Marx used the model to determine the relative amounts of consumer goods and capital goods that must be produced if the economy is to turn out the same output year after year (simple reproduction) or if it is to increase the output every year (expanded reproduction).

[2] From among the more significant English-language books on Soviet economic development the following were selected for a survey of index references to Marxism: Alexander Baykov, *Development of the Soviet Economic System*, New York, Macmillan, 1947; Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development Since 1917*, London, Routlege & Kegan Paul, 1948; Harry Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy*, New York, Praeger-Hall, 1954 (second edition); Robert Campbell, *Soviet Economic Power*, Cambridge, Mass., Houghton, Mifflin, 1960; Naum Jasny, *Soviet Industrialization*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1961; Alec Nove, *The Soviet Economy*, New York, Norton, 1962, and *Soviet Strategy for Economic Growth*, Bloomington, U. of Indiana Press, 1964. Excluding discussions of Marxism in a historical context and thus confining the survey only to analysis of post-revolutionary Soviet policy, the survey revealed that of all these books only two had more than five references to Marxian theory in the index and the majority had fewer. The two exceptions were Alec Nove's volume, which contains seven such references (all but one in a chapter devoted to a discussion of Soviet economic theorizing), and Nicholas Spulber's latest book, which contains many, mainly because it concentrates heavily on a topic to which Marx's scheme of expanded reproduction bears considerable relevance.

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operating principles of the Soviet economy in the form of a set of socialist economic "laws." The new "laws," it is said, like the laws of capitalist development, are objective, in the sense that they "emerge and act independently of the will of men. . . . They cannot be created, transformed or abolished by the will of men" (p. 440). Let us examine the form and content of the "laws of socialist development" in order to discover their relation to Marxian theory.

The first and most general is the "Basic Economic Law of Socialism," the characteristic features of which are "the steady expansion and improvement of production on the basis of advanced technique with the aim of the fullest satisfaction of the steadily increasing requirements and the many-sided development of the members of society" (p. 450). It is difficult to construe this "law" as objective in the meaning defined above for, clearly, it cannot operate independently of the will of men as the genuinely Marxian laws of capitalist development do. The test of a law-like statement is the question whether the "law" under consideration was operative before being discovered. Marx's law of value *is* such a statement; commodities would presumably continue to exchange at their labor-values even if Marx had never discovered the law. But we cannot imagine the Soviet economy continuing to operate according to the "Basic Economic Law of Socialism" without that "law" having been discovered; for if the "law" holds at all, it is because the party sees to it that it does. Indeed, it is not the kind of law that one "discovers." It is rather like a law that one "legislates," which is to say that it is not a scientific or sociological law at all.

But if it is not a true law in the Marxian sense, it may perhaps be rescued as a proper law in the teleological, or functional, sense. A law of this kind defines the conditions that must be satisfied if a given system is to be maintained; it also describes the mechanism that restores the system when the latter is disturbed. Teleological laws in biology, for example, define the organs functionally, in terms of their contribution to the preservation of the organism of which they are a part. The heart does not *have* to beat, but if it fails to, the organism will cease being that organism. Similarly, the "Basic Economic Law of Socialism" could be construed as a teleological law: the party may, through error or will, act in ways contrary to the law, but if it does, either some social mechanism will correct its actions or the system will not survive. However, in order to defend this construction, it would have to be shown that there exist social forces which would tend to eliminate the erring party leadership or restore its policy to one that conforms to the law. Unfortunately, the history of socialism fails to provide any evidence for the existence of such forces.

It is probably more reasonable to follow the interpretation of those who view the "Basic Law of Socialism" not as a law at all, in either the causal or teleological sense, but rather as a statement of the economic goals that a Marxist party ought to pursue. As a statement of goals, it does indeed reflect the influence of Marxism. The more interesting question, however, is the extent to which Marxian theory provides guidance for the attainment of these goals, but here again little satisfaction is offered, for the goals in the "law" are stated so generally that there is little to be said about their implementation.

Marx's Lucky Disciples

Everyone who judges Marxist-Leninist theory not at second hand and not from the caricature painted by its enemies is well aware that Marx, Engels and Lenin left quite unambiguous and quite specific instructions concerning the chief principles of socialist economic management. . . .

Marx called the saving of time and the planned allocation of working time among various branches of production the first economic law of socialism. It was this that Lenin had in mind when he enjoined us to keep careful and conscientious account of funds and to manage thriftily. The principle of thrifty management constitutes the pivot of the economic science of socialism.

—*L. Leontiev, Pravda, July 10, 1964*

The second "objective law" is the "Law of the Planned, Proportional Development of the National Economy." This "law" requires that "the development of all branches of the economy be subordinated to a unified planned direction by the society, and that proportionality among all the parts and elements of the economy be preserved" (p. 416). Like the "Basic Law" discussed above, and unlike the genuine law-like formulations of Marxian theory, this "law" is also expressed in the form of a desideratum. It describes a state of affairs not as it necessarily is, but as it ought to be. It is doubtful that any

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candid observer of socialist experience would insist that disproportions cannot and do not occur under socialism. The statement that one ought to avoid them is not the kind of statement that we usually think of as law-like. Nor can this "law" be rescued by suggesting that it be interpreted as a teleological law. As long as the disproportions are kept within reasonable bounds, the failure to achieve proportionality is hardly likely to lead to the destruction of the system. Nor is there anything distinctively Marxian in the exhortation that there should be no waste.

There are several other economic "laws of socialism," but one in particular is worth considering, the famous "Law of Value." Here is a law taken directly from Marxian theory. That it is alleged to continue functioning under socialist conditions is due to a variety of reasons, chiefly because products continue to be commodities in the Marxian sense. The "Law of Value" under socialism requires that "the production and sale of commodities be carried out on the basis of the concomitant socially necessary labor outlays" (p. 517). In conformity with this "law," price policy should be oriented toward socially necessary labor, but it should permit certain departures for such purposes as bringing demand into line with available supplies.

Here is a clear case of the potential relevance of Marxian theory to socialist economic policy. In fact, however, Soviet economic policy makers have not found it expedient to fix prices according to the requirements of the "Law of Value," and for excellent reasons. As has sometimes been pointed out, whatever the virtues of a labor theory of value for the analysis of large aggregates, it contributes very little to the clarification of the problems of microeconomic theory, which happen to be very real problems in economic administration.

It is also quite apparent that while the "Law of Value" as defined in the Soviet textbook has substantially the same form as the Marxian law, its quality is quite different. In Marxian theory, the law of value is a genuine scientific law, formulating a relationship that occurs under capitalist conditions independently of the knowledge or will of men. But under socialism, the "law" is voluntaristic in origin. All it states is that it would be a good thing to exchange commodities according to their socially necessary labor inputs. Very likely Marx himself thought that there was something natural or moral, in any exchange economy, about valuing commodities in proportion to their socially necessary labor, although there is some dispute about this among Marxian scholars.[3] In any case, it is worth noting that even in this instance of direct relevance of Marxian theory to socialist economic policy, the influence of the theory again asserts itself in the socio-psychological sense of an inherited attitude about what is good and just, rather than in the sense of a behavioral proposition or a social law.

In sum, the basic principles of Soviet economic policy, as interpreted by Soviet economists in their "economic laws of socialism," suggest that Marxian theory has had very little influence upon the solution of Soviet economic problems. The principal exceptions are Marx's growth model and his labor theory of value, which have had a substantial impact upon the thought, if not the practice, of socialist economics. It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that the labor theory of value has had rather unfortunate consequences for the Soviet economy since the fixation on labor time has inhibited the development of a more general theory of value that would take account of the scarcity of factors other than labor.

A Theory of Catching-Up

It is logically impossible, of course, to prove the absence of anything (how does one establish the non-existence of X?; how, for example, does one prove the proposition that there are no two-headed men?)—and that includes the absence of effective Marxian influence on Soviet economic practice. The evidence presented thus far should help to establish the *plausibility* of this proposition: to *prove* it beyond a shadow of a doubt would clearly be impossible. However, if it is true, as it is here alleged, that Marxian theory does not supply the basis of the real operating principles of the socialist economy, it may be useful to ask what in fact does? One may hope to support the case for the innocence of one man by establishing the guilt of another.

This brings us to a factor noted earlier, namely, the relative economic underdevelopment of the first countries to adopt the socialist system. It is the thesis of this article that the now widely-used slogan of "overtaking and sur-

[3] Ronald L. Meek (*Studies in the Labor Theory of Value*, London, 1956, p. 260) quotes Marx's parenthetical remark about equating supply and demand under socialism. But he does not cite the fourth following sentence, in which Marx wrote that "The exchange, or sale, of commodities at their value is the rational way, the natural law of their equilibrium." *Capital* (Kerr edition), Vol. III, p. 221.

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passing" the advanced capitalist countries is in fact the most fruitful basis available for explaining the actual policy of socialist economic development. To present the argument most sharply, let us imagine a socialist party that came to power in a relatively underdeveloped country. Suppose the party is socialist in the minimal sense of being committed to the social ownership of the means of production as an economically and ethically superior form of social organization, but that it is otherwise totally ignorant of the theoretical structure of Marxism. Suppose, secondly, that it is motivated by the wish to overtake and surpass the leading capitalist countries in as short a period as possible.[4] And finally, suppose that the party is determined to maintain itself in power under all circumstances in order to attain its objectives. In the opinion of this author, the party would very likely introduce all the policies and forms of economic organization that have actually characterized Soviet economic development, and with no recourse at all to Marxian theory.

First, a long tradition of economic theory from at least Adam Smith on points to the accumulation of capital as the crucial factor determining the differences in the wealth of nations. We may therefore expect that our socialist party would strive to expand the capital stock as rapidly as possible and maintain a high rate of investment.

Second, the source of accumulation may be, in part, foreign lending. If this should not be available, capital accumulation would have to come exclusively from domestic savings. Since the level of living is low and the voluntary rate of savings is likely to be correspondingly low, some form of compulsion will have to be introduced to achieve the desired rate of saving. This can take the form either of inflationary financing, or of direct controls on the volume of consumption.

Third, since the population is overwhelmingly agricultural, the mass of savings must be sought in the agricultural sector. Hence a form of agricultural organization must be introduced that would generate a maximally large agricultural surplus. If the party's ideological commitment to social ownership is relaxed and pragmatic, the party may select some combination of small-scale private and voluntary cooperative agriculture, relying on peasant incentives to generate the increased production and marketings. If the dedication to social ownership is total and uncompromising, the party will introduce some combination of state-operated and collective agriculture, trusting that its political control over distribution will offset any disincentives in production. The decision will be heavily influenced by historical and cultural traditions, as the *Political Economy* textbook notes.

Fourth, the abolition of private ownership of the means of production and of the profit incentive requires that a substitute system of economic organization be introduced; the socialist managers of economic institutions must be provided with some basis for making production and investment decisions. The possibilities of alternative forms of economic administration vary widely. At one extreme, a form of decentralized market socialism may be adopted in which the state limits its participation to such functions as price setting and supervision, while managers make the production decisions according to some pre-established rules. At the other extreme, the state may concentrate all decision-making at the center and simply require the managers to fulfill the plans. Again the choice will depend heavily upon the cultural traditions of the country. If the tradition is one of centuries of strong central government, and if the supply of technically expert and politically reliable managers is small, the party is likely to be attracted to the centralized form. Furthermore, the attraction of centralization will increase in proportion to the economic and political pressures required to achieve the predetermined rate of savings. In other words, the smaller the rate of voluntary savings in proportion to planned savings, the more will the economic system gravitate toward centralized forms.

Fifth, having opted for central planning, the party must work out a set of rules to govern the procedure. The most rudimentary requirement of such a system—a requirement readily apparent even to those untutored in theory—is that the planned production of each commodity must be at least equal to the planned uses of that commodity for consumption or for further production. (The party may, if it wishes, refer to this requirement as the "law of the planned, proportional development of the national econ-

[4] Either in order to defend the country against a "hostile capitalist world" or in order to enhance the "demonstration effect" of a successful socialist system. The conclusions will differ somewhat according to whether the one or the other motive is primary.

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omy.") But if it wanted to look for theoretical sources, it would find an abundance available, starting with François Quesnay (1694-1774), the celebrated physiocrat who first analyzed the economy in terms of the flows of commodities among the major production sectors. Another, even more important source of theoretical guidance could be Leon Walras (1837-1910), one of the founders of the "marginal utility" school, whose "general equilibrium" system was the inspiration for the modern "input-output" analysis of Wassily Leontief. Walras would not only remind the party of the obvious need for a balanced plan—which the Soviets strive to satisfy with their method of "material balances"—but, more important, he would also call the planners' attention to the fact that many different balanced plans are possible, and that certain conditions must be satisfied if the best, or "optimal," plan is to be carefully selected. It is only in the last half-dozen years, since the Soviets have turned from Marx to Kantorovich,[5] that their planning system has advanced beyond the naive stage of simple material balances.

Sixth, in the absence of the private-profit motive, some devices must be found for motivating managers to fulfill the planned targets and encouraging workers to exert themselves in their work and to improve their skills. A non-Marxist socialist party, uninstructed in the lessons of Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Program*, may resist introducing personal material incentives similar to those of individualistic capitalist institutions, but experimentation with other forms will quickly reveal that there is no other choice, at least for the time being. The commitment to a high rate of growth will exact the most effective incentive available.

The catalogue could be extended, but enough has been said to indicate the substance of the thesis here expounded: The influence of Marxian economics on the actual course of socialist economic policy may be tested by considering the probable behavior of a socialist government that has no knowledge of Marxism. It is reasonable to believe that such an imaginary regime would adopt policies similar to those actually pursued by existing socialist states. In sum, on the principle of Occam's razor, Marxian theory is redundant in interpreting the economic policy of these states.

One might pursue the argument further by considering the opposite case. Imagine a society with a highly developed economy in which power has been seized by a Marxist party. In other words, imagine that the historical dialectic has actually followed the course which Marxian theory predicts; namely, that the socialist revolution would appear first in the most advanced capitalist countries. It could surely be shown that in such a case the pattern of socialist economic (and perhaps social and political) development would be quite different from that which actually occurred. If this is so, then it follows that the truly distinctive explanatory factor in socialist economic policy is not Marxism but the fact of economic underdevelopment.

A Marxian Interpretation of the Soviet Economy

So much for the usefulness of Marxian theory to a socialist party in a position of power. But what of its usefulness when applied as an analytical tool by those wishing to understand the course of economic policy in a socialist country?

As the point of departure, let us take Marx's and Engels' formulation of the sociology of knowledge. In their view it is the prevailing social situation that determines men's consciousness. This formulation of the problem, just like their labor theory of value, is based on an analysis of social systems characterized by property-based classes. And as in the case of Marx's theory of value, the question may be raised whether the Marxian theory of knowledge is sufficiently general to be applicable to other types of social systems.

Marx and Engels determined a person's class identification by his relationship to the means of production—as owner or non-owner. From a modern, more general sociological point of view, such a criterion is but one of many that may be used in the identification of social groups. Thus in addition to biological criteria such as sex and age, there are other useful social criteria such as marital status, education, occupation, religion, and so on. Marx and Engels, of course, addressed themselves specifically to the relationship between consciousness and economic class—this on the theory that the latter factor is the unique or dominating determinant of ideas—and it would be rare to find a total denial of this proposition even today. Most of the current work in social psychology is devoted to the discovery of the ways in which membership in a group of any kind influences ideas, as well as how membership in

[5] See F. M. Montias, "Planning and Efficiency—A Note on L. V. Kantorovich," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1960, p. 61.

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specific groups determines particular ideas. There is no doubt that if one wished to predict the responses of a sample of people to a variety of attitudinal questions, knowledge of their economic class would be a most useful indicator. At the same time, if one could incorporate into the equation additional data such as age, sex, national origin, religious identification, level of education, etc., the prospects for successful prediction would very much increase. Moreover, the relative importance of each of the group identifications would be different for different types of attitude. In certain communities in the United States, for example, knowledge of a person's religion may be more useful for predicting his political affiliation than knowledge of his economic status.

For the analysis of a capitalist society, which was Marx's main concern, economic-class identification is indubitably a significant determinant of the range of ideas and attitudes associated with political and economic policy. But what about a socialist society? What happens when private ownership of the means of production is abolished so that the economic-class distinction in the Marxian sense is eliminated? Under a narrow construction of Marx's meaning, the problem of the sociology of knowledge would vanish. But under a broader socio-psychological interpretation, it would mean that, although that particular class distinction had been eliminated, the new class distinctions which any complex society must maintain would continue to generate differences in men's consciousness.

It is indeed not difficult to discover a set of social categories under socialism that correspond to the categories found by Marx in capitalist society. The basic categories are still classes, defined by their relationship to the means of production. If we construe that relationship not in its historically-specific form of "legal ownership" of the means of production, but in the more general form of "effective control" over the means of production, then we have at hand the framework for a thoroughly Marxian analysis of the historic stage of socialism.

But a new stage in history and a new alignment of classes must be preceded by a major change in the mode of production. And there has in fact occurred a massive change of this sort since the days of Marx: it is the revolution that has taken place during the last half-century in the means of transportation and communication, and the ensuing revolution in industrial and social organization. Developments in radio, television, aviation, and automation have contributed to the possibilities of controlling human behavior on a scale and with an intensity undreamed of a century ago. Under the impact of this massive change, the class organization of the old society has given way to new forms, specific to the new material relations. To the ancient social-relationship categories of master and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, capitalist and worker, there has now been added the historically new relationship of the party and the masses. Under capitalism, effective control over the means of production by the capitalists takes the legal form of "private ownership"; under socialism, effective control over the means of production by the party takes the legal form of "public ownership." Bourgeois democracy, in the Marxist view, is the ideological form under which the capitalists disguise the fact of the class nature of the old society and justify the alienation of the workers from the product of their labor. "Democratic centralism," it may be said, is the ideological form under which the party disguises the class nature of the new society, and justifies the alienation of the masses from the product of their labor.

National differences, of course, continue to persist. In the United States, the process of socialization has extended to the several millions of persons who hold directly or indirectly the shares of the corporations; labor union pension funds alone now amount to billions of dollars, mostly invested in corporate stock. In the socialist countries, socialization is already universal so that there is no need to take the trouble of issuing shares of stock. In both instances, however, ownership is so thoroughly diffused that effective management control remains firmly in the hands of small groups of people.

Optimization vs. Dialectics

But differences aside, the organizational revolution has led to an interesting convergence of development, namely, the emergence in both societies of a class of people who manage the resources of the nation, whose personal success depends upon the skill with which they manage their enterprises, and who are not themselves the lawful owners of the resources placed at their disposal. There is considerable evidence that the common class status of the managerial groups has led to a common form of consciousness, as manifested in various similarities of

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behavior exhibited under similar circumstances. There is a common consciousness of technical superiority, and resentment at dictation from the bureaucrats in Washington or Moscow who don't really understand local conditions, who never had to "meet a payroll," and who nevertheless presume to tell the managers how to run a business. There is the drive for personal success and the manipulation of the legal rules of the game in behalf of the special interests of one's own organizational unit. In short, there is enough evidence to suggest that the common features of industrialization and large-scale organization generate a significant degree of commonality in the attitudes and behavior of the managers. Thus the Marxian proposition that man's social environment determines his consciousness emerges as a useful tool of analysis of socialist economic organization.

It may be appropriate to conclude with a note on the relationship between men's interests and their perceptions of reality. One of the post-Marxian propositions of the sociology of knowledge is that men whose material interests are vested in stability and security incline toward a pluralistic view of social causation, whereas those whose material interests are vested in revolution and social destruction tend to view social causation monistically.[6] The leaders of a socialist society who have made their revolution should therefore be expected to view the process of social change differently from the way it was viewed by Marx and the revolutionary generation. With the revolution accomplished, the task ahead is one of introducing stability and promoting economic growth. One is still committed to change, but it is change that is characterized by quantitative magnitudes, with no evident qualitative change (or revolution) at the end of the process. One views change as a linear rather than a dialectical process.

It may be suggested in this connection that economists are the most likely group to lead the way toward perceiving change as a linear rather than a dialectical process. This is so because of the central role played in economic theory by the concept of optimization. The appropriate size of the firm or rate of output is some optimal magnitude which in general is rather less than the maximum possible. One substitutes the scarcer factor for the more abundant not to the extreme point of complete replacement of one by the other, but to some intermediate point that has the characteristics of the optimal combination.

Now the practice of solving problems by the search for optima is in sharp contrast to the practice of the dialectician who views the process of social change as one working toward some maximal consummation. Consider, for instance, how he views the class struggle: as something that must be pushed to the maximum, for only thus does the "qualitative" revolutionary change occur. But what if the final degree of desired change brings us to a point where the end state differs from the beginning quantitatively only? If the heating of water from 99 to 100 degrees will produce steam, there may be compelling advantages in applying the final degree of heat. But if the change from 99 percent collectivization to 100 percent entails a consequence no different than the change from 98 percent to 99 percent or from 68 percent to 69 percent, the urgency in pressing the process to its culmination is much less.

Clearly then, the policy problems of a socialist nation with its revolution behind it involve the latter type of process more generally than the former. What proportion of the incomes of collective farmers should take the form of fixed payments? What proportion of real personal incomes should take the form of free goods? How far should decentralization of planning and administration proceed? To what extent should personal material incentives be substituted for moral incentives? How long should a usable but obsolete machine continue in service? People who view the world dialectically tend to value maximal solutions. In the end personal material incentives must give way entirely to moral incentives. Temporarily we may have to limit the free distribution to goods, but in the end we should promote the process of free distribution from 99 percent to the ultimate 100 percent.

However, the sociology of knowledge suggests that with the change from an interest in revolution to an interest in stability, these dialectical views vanish and in their place comes an optimizing view. As Lenin would say, life itself forces the change. The first goods freely distributed, such as water or local transportation, involve very few problems. The next ten percent involve somewhat higher social costs, as heralded by the case of the collective farmer who bought low-priced bread to feed to his hogs. Each additional percentage of freely distributed goods adds to the problems and the costs, particularly as one approaches goods with larger

[6] See Robert Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1957, p. 486.

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income elasticity. Eventually someone must raise the question of whether the gains from an additional percentage of freely distributed goods are greater than the mounting social costs; whether, in other words, there is not some optimal combination of free distribution and distribution by purchase. And similarly with an optimal level of decentralization, an optimal combination of material and moral incentives, perhaps an optimal combination of private and state enterprises in agriculture and in trade and possibly also in small-scale industry.

Thus, it is reasonable to expect that Marxian economics, reflecting the consciousness of a revolutionary society, should give way to economic theories of efficient resource allocation, reflecting the consciousness of stabilized society. The renewed interest in profit as an indicator of managerial success, the search for new bases of price formation, the turn to mathematical models of economic planning and similar recent developments in Soviet economic theory are therefore fully understandable in terms of the Marxian proposition that changes in the social situation entail changes in men's consciousness.

The Poverty of a Dialogue

By Carl Cohen

One year ago, in September 1963, the Thirteenth Congress of Philosophy met at the National University of Mexico. Several of the participants from the United States, anxious to encourage a candid exchange of views between American and Soviet philosophers, suggested a private meeting of the two groups, a proposal which the Soviet representatives eagerly seconded. The meeting took place as agreed to—with the press excluded and no verbatim record kept—but in spite of these precautions candor failed to nourish the discussion and a meaningful scholarly exchange never took place.

Yet, the meeting remains of some historical interest in that it throws light on the quality and function of philosophy in contemporary Russia, as well as on the role of eminent Soviet philosophers at international gatherings. For these reasons (and since none of the speakers had compromised by their statements their professional standing at home) the conference is well worth reporting today.

Some two score persons gathered for the discussion, with about one half participating actively. At the head table sat the American chairman, translators from both parties, and some of the leading Soviet philosophers of the present day. Among these were the Vice President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Professor P. N. Fedoseiev; the Director of the Institute of Philosophy in Moscow, Professor Fedor V. Konstantinov; and an eminent Soviet philosopher, also from the Academy of Sciences, Professor M. B. Mitin. These three did most of the talking in defense of Soviet Marxism. The remainder of the group, facing the head table, consisted of both American and Soviet philosophers.

The interchange consisted almost entirely of questions, comments, and criticisms originating with the Americans, and replies delivered by the Russians. Let it be said that the Soviets displayed patience and good humor under what was at times a blistering philosophical attack, while the Americans who represented many

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philosophical viewpoints demonstrated a remarkable combination of good manners, acumen and integrity.

There was, of course, a serious language problem. Many of the Russians appeared to understand English, but only few of the Americans understood Russian. As a matter of procedure, everybody spoke in his own tongue, and the remarks were translated into Russian by a Russian translator and into English by an American translator. Since I do not speak or understand Russian, my account of those portions of the discussion that originated in Russian are based on what I heard from the translators. Furthermore, and this must be stressed, the entire account presented here is based not on a verbatim record but on notes I took at the time. The italicized questions and answers below represent therefore a careful reconstruction of the two-and-a-half hour discourse and not literal quotations.

The first question was put by Professor Howard L. Parsons, of Coe College, Iowa, Vice President of the Society for the Philosophical Study of Dialectical Materialism. He asked:

What are some of the fundamental philosophical problems—if any—in Marxism-Leninism which have arisen during the atomic era and which were not anticipated or dealt with in the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin?

This was clearly an exploratory inquiry intended to relieve the opening tension and help establish a cordial atmosphere. It succeeded only in part for in response came speeches on current intellectual activities in the Soviet Union. Professor Fedoseiev was the first to reply with a lengthy discourse, the essence of which was as follows:

Marx and Engels did the basic work in the diagnosis of social problems and the scientific analysis of economic and social progress. Their results are essentially correct, and the evolution in the sciences and in society, which has since taken place, has followed the fundamental dialectic which they set forth. But this evolution has resulted in the emergence of new qualities, new productive forces and new problems which Marx and Engels could not have foreseen. Thus Marxism-Leninism is now confronted by the following tasks, among others:

1) Working out the dialectics of the contemporary epoch and, particularly, the dialectical transition from socialism to communism.

2) Developing the dialectics of the growth of the sciences, both natural and social.

3) Developing the dialectics of knowledge.

4) Resolving philosophical questions which arise as additional consequences of new scientific advances in such areas as, for example, cybernetics, the nature of the cosmos, and the artificial synthesis of life.

5) Reexamining certain issues in the history of philosophy.

6) Examining philosophically the current problems of war and peace.

By now several things had become evident to most of the American participants: first, that if any of us expected significant departures from orthodox Marxism-Leninism, we were to be sorely disappointed; secondly, that, contrary to the intentions of the American philosophers, our Soviet colleagues were intent upon discussing issues of war and peace, of peaceful coexistence, and similar political questions, and would press for such discussion; and thirdly, that our questions would have to be clear and pointed, or we would get nothing but empty speeches.

Professor Mitin then insisted upon giving a further reply to the first question. He too spoke at length. He said in substance:

Marxism is not a dogma, but a guide to action. [Readers will recognize this as an often repeated phrase of Lenin's.] With it we must face new problems of which two are the greatest. They are:

1) The problems of war and peace. These Marx did foresee in large part, for his principle was "peace and labor." Engels, too, foresaw the development of modern weaponry, and some of the problems it would create.

2) The second great problem of today is that of social progress, which means the dialectical transition from the lower phases of communism (i.e., *socialism*) *to the higher phases. In predicting this inevitable development, Marx and Engels remain the most important philosophers in history.*

Apparently, from here on we had to expect the Soviet philosophers to repeat one another's speeches and declaim the standard lessons from the Marxist texts. The Americans were anxious to discuss Marxism in depth and with up-to-date philosophical tools, but—as it turned out—the Soviet Marxists were either unable or unwilling to do so.

The second question was offered by Brand Blanshard, long a professor of philosophy at Yale and one of the most distinguished Ameri-

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can philosophers. It went something like this:

I want to be frank without being discourteous. Professor Mitin and other Marxists have maintained that only those persons are truly free who have fully mastered and absorbed the philosophy of Karl Marx. Do you, Professor Mitin, seriously believe that, or honestly expect others to do so? As philosophers we know that genuine freedom is manifested in diversity—diversity of activity and diversity of opinion. As I look about this room and this congress and note the variety of philosophical positions defended by my American colleagues—some defending metaphysics and some attacking it; some engaged in the analysis of language and some ridiculing it; some pragmatists, some idealists, some logical positivists, and many with honest reservations about their own positions—I know for a certainty that such diversity is indicative of real intellectual freedom. [*Here Professor Blanshard actually named some of the better known representatives of several philosophical tendencies.*] *But as I look about this room and this congress at my Russian colleagues, I find that they defend always the same position, in the same way, and with almost the same words. I find them, in the philosophic sphere, forming an almost monolithic unity. Are we seriously to believe that you are free, and we are not? Is this absence of any genuine diversity indicative of real freedom? Do you suppose that intellectual freedom is catalyzed, at last, into one and only one view?*

There was no one present, I think, who did not feel the force of these questions. After translation the attitude of the Russians appeared glummer than it had been. But there was vigorous reply. Three Soviet philosophers wished to comment. First Fedoseiev:

Allow me to pose a counter question. Why is it better to have a variety of viewpoints in science? Would it be advantageous if there were schools of opinion on mathematical questions, say on whether 2+2=4, 5, or 6?

The same tack was pursued in a lengthy reply by Professor Kostantinov:

In its essence truth is one. There is but a single truth on any question. We believe that Marxism is a scientifically accurate account of the history and development of society and, therefore, there is no need among us for conflicting philosophical schools. Of course, Marxists recognize that there are genuine differences among individuals and that there is a need for debate and discussion among them. But in a clash of Marxist and the anti-Marxist world views we naturally defend Marxism. We do have discussion in our country, and we have argued these questions among ourselves at length. But we have come here as a group, to present and defend our general point of view.

If this was a naive reply, it was at least an honest one. It was evident throughout the meeting that the Soviet philosophers had come as a group, a unit. Their delegation had a chief, and a deputy chief; they answered always in support of one another, intending to fill out a general position to which they all were attached. In contrast, the Americans had come to the meeting as private persons; not one of them represented a governmental agency. They made their comments as individuals and were happy to expose not only their disagreements with the Soviet philosophers, but with one another.

At about this point in the discussion, a terminological question of importance arose. The answers just given had obviously played upon the vagueness of the term "science," and one of the Americans rose briefly to point out that the Russian word for "science" had the broad meaning of "learning" or "knowledge" and was, in that respect, more like the German *"Wissenschaft"* than the English "science." The question, he pointed out, of whether philosophical differences could be treated as scientific differences in the narrower sense had not been raised here, but an affirmative answer had been presupposed by the Russian speakers.

This comment might have opened the door to some illuminating inquiries into the Marxist position. The claim that Marxism is "scientific," that its results are "scientifically verified," and that therefore it is the only correct philosophical position, is one which even the most dedicated Marxist finds hard to defend in astute discussion. But these lines were not pressed. Professor Mitin, to whom Professor Blanshard's question was originally addressed, insisted upon an opportunity to reply, and again he spoke at length:

There is much misunderstanding about the question of individual freedom. Part of this misunderstanding arises from the great differences in the mores of the two conflicting world systems of the present day. But if we look at the actual practices of the two systems, we see that, first, there is much diversity of opinion in the USSR. There are sharp intel-

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lectual conflicts even in the fields of the natural sciences. And second, we see that the extent of freedom in the United States is exaggerated. There, the philosophical scene presents a range of different approaches, but they all are fundamentally just varieties of idealist philosophy, merely different forms of anti-communism. So you have many sects, indeed, but only one world view!

This latter remark, when translated, was greeted by the only outburst of ironic laughter at the meeting. Whatever the faults of American philosophy—and they are many—a unanimous fundamental attachment to philosophic idealism is certainly not one of them! The account given by Mitin of American philosophy was worse than mistaken because it was a mistake arising out of a dogmatic insistence upon the truth of Lenin's claim that all philosophy is basically either materialistic and on the right track, or idealistic and on the wrong track. Ever since Lenin's time orthodox Communists have clung to the view that anti-communism, idealism, superstition and religion go hand in hand because, the argument goes, the conflict of idealism and materialism is only another manifestation of the conflict of classes. The exploiting bourgeois will naturally adopt idealism; the exploited proletariat will adopt a scientific materialism.

Most of this is patent nonsense, but it springs from a Marxist viewpoint which has been deeply engrained, and is rarely questioned by Soviet Marxists. It was revealing, and depressing, to see the leading Soviet philosophers of the 1960's recite the old slogans of Marxism of half a century and even a century ago.

Many may have noticed, but none called attention to an extraordinary inconsistency among the several Russian answers to this question of freedom and diversity. By way of demonstrating Soviet freedom, Mitin was at pains to show that sharp disagreements exist in the USSR even on fundamental questions in the sciences. Fedoseiev and Konstantinov, on the other hand, attempted to justify the Soviet unanimity on philosophical questions by calling them "scientific," supposing that that would explain the absence of conflict. But surely they cannot have it both ways. If real freedom of scientific inquiry results in sharp and fundamental conflicts among scientists, then real freedom in the area of "Marxist science" should have the same result—as apparently it does not. But if, in a society where science reigns, there is no place for fundamental conflict (as Professors Fedoseiev and Konstantinov asserted), then there should be no conflict in any of the sciences—but there is, even in the Soviet Union. Nothing is more pathetic about contemporary Soviet philosophy than the burden of dogma it seems doomed to carry. The subject was dropped for a time, but it was to arise again later.

The next question was subtle, and it touched upon one of the weakest links in Marxist philosophy. It came from Professor Richard Hocking, a learned scholar in the history of philosophy, and Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at Emory University, near Atlanta, Georgia. He asked in substance:

My question is about the dialectic upon which Marxists rely so heavily. All of us here are familiar with the concept of dialectical growth in human history. We appreciate the dialectic as a process of development arising from the conflict and synthesis of opposing thoughts and ideas.

So considered the dialectic is helpful in interpreting the history of human society. But can you explain how the dialectic can possibly operate in any sphere where there is no consciousness and hence no possible conflict of ideas? In a context of human life, the dialectical method may be tenable; but how could it be tenable, considering its nature, in those natural spheres where there is no human life, and even where there is no life at all? The dialectic depends upon contradiction; but where there is no life or consciousness, there may be events, but there can be no real contradiction.

Marx and his followers have always proudly claimed that by adopting from Hegel—a 19th century German idealist—his dialectic, and by applying it for the first time to the material world (which, they say, is its only correct subject matter) they had acquired a profound and powerful philosophical method. Thus, Marx's famous remark in the preface to his *Capital:*

The mystification which the dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.

Appropriately, then, the position which Marx developed took the name of "dialectical materialism." But the dialectic means, essentially,

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growth through the opposition of concepts, and their eventual synthesis. Even assuming that it really has use in the realm of *concepts* (something most contemporary philosophers will deny), it still takes a long leap to suppose that the dialectic could also be applied to purely *physical* events—a leap, indeed, which Marxists have never successfully explained or justified.

The edge of this question was not entirely missed by the Soviet philosophers. The first to answer was Professor Konstantinov:

Dialectics is the science of the laws of development of all phenomena. Therefore, the dialectical pattern of opposition and synthesis is exhibited everywhere, in the world of the non-living as well as in that of the living. Indeed, the dialectic exists essentially in nature, in the material of the world; hence the dialectic of which we are conscious is only the reflection of that natural dialectical pattern.

We can speak correctly of contradiction even in a non-living world, for we can recognize the differences between what has evolved and what is evolving. And these very differences exemplify the contradictions.

It must have been evident to virtually everyone present that such a reply will not do. Konstantinov's answer begged the very question he was being asked. Professor Hocking wanted to know how the dialectic, if it is the pattern of the growth of life and concepts, could be generalized to govern the non-living and non-conceptual as well. Konstantinov's reply simply postulates that it is the absolutely general pattern of development—which is precisely what was being questioned. But no better defense was forthcoming, or perhaps even possible.

Konstantinov's remarks revealed a further source of confusion in contemporary Marxist thought. Dialectical philosophers like Hegel and Marx have insisted that growth and development result from inevitable contradictions, and the inevitable syntheses of these contradictions. But in their effort to show the universal applicability of the dialectic, the Marxists have had to manufacture contradictions where there are none. Now, there is a world of difference between a "contradiction," a "conflict," and a "difference"—but it is only by muddying these distinctions and using these terms interchangeably that the dialectic can be made to appear plausible and "scientific."

One of the Soviet philosophers in the audience felt obliged to rise and amplify the reply to Professor Hocking's question:

The careful working-out of dialectical development is connected with the problem of tracing the interpenetration of opposing forces. Now we do find such interpenetration of opposites at all levels, in physical events as well as in human life. This interpenetration of opposites is dialectical contradiction.

Of course, the question now arises what is the meaning of "interpenetration of opposing forces." It is a murky phrase, to say the least, and one who is a priori committed to Marxist dialectics will insist that he finds just that kind of "contradiction" everywhere. The speaker continued:

In the science of astronomy, for example, we find this interpenetration of opposites. Gradual quantitative changes result in eventual qualitative changes, and hence in contradictions. In chemistry also, and in the study of the formation of the stars, we find similar dialectical patterns.

Now Professor Fedoseiev broke in:

The example offered by crystal and crystallography further illustrates the natural course of dialectics. For in crystal what at one time appears implicitly, at another time appears explicitly.

Again the question was begged. Precisely where are the dialectical contradictions demonstrated by astronomy and crystallography and chemistry? A naive return to the dialectical principle which Lenin called "the law of transformation of quantity into quality" solves nothing. It is characteristic of Marxist-Leninists to assume this "law," but the problem is how to justify it; and even if justified, it still would not establish the supposed dialectical contradictions. Similarly, it is a Hegelian principle that the dialectic makes explicit what had always been implicitly there. "Explicit" and "implicit," however, are conceptual terms; their applicability in a purely physical context has not been explained, but assumed.

The fourth question was asked by this writer. It was in two related parts, the first of which sought some commitment on the nature of the ideal society the Communists seek, while

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the second sought an explanation of how that ideal and the dialectic were to be reconciled.

My colleagues and I recognize that contemporary Marxists see as one of their leading tasks the working-out of the dialectic of the transition from the lower to the higher stages of Communist society. It would be unreasonable, therefore, for us to insist now upon a detailed account of that ideal society which you hope to realize. Nevertheless, it would seem reasonable to ask for some more substantial account of the nature of that classless and stateless society than can be found in the writings of Marx, or Engels, or Lenin, or Stalin, or Khrushchev, or Mao. About half a century has passed since the October Revolution. Can you say anything of a concrete nature about how the ideal society you visualize will be managed or organized? How do you expect that the large-scale problems of transport, communication, and public health will be handled without the instrumentality of the state? How will the laws be made and enforced?

Furthermore, how is this ideal society to be reconciled with the never-ending series of dialectical stages? Does the dialectic simply stop? If it does not stop, how will it then manifest itself? If hitherto in history, in your view, the dialectic of society has been exhibited in the clash of exploiting and exploited classes, is it not likely that new exploiting classes will continue to arise?

It was extraordinary that in the ensuing replies the first half of this question was entirely evaded and left unanswered. Professor Fedoseiev was the first to comment, again at length. He said:

The problems of transport and communication and so forth are highly technical ones. As they become even more technical, they demand for their solution, even more insistently, social rather than private ownership. It has been said, with some truth, that the post office was the first large-scale experiment in social ownership. Private ownership is essentially incapable of dealing with problems of this sort. Modern life and the control of modern technology are now unthinkable without social ownership.

These remarks simply did not comply with my request for some concreteness, so I interrupted briefly:

Can Professor Fedoseiev say how even a public post office can be operated without a state?

Fedoseiev replied:

It must be understood that in our view the state is based strictly upon force used in the process of the class struggle. The state is only an organ of one portion of the population which uses force in oppressing and exploiting another portion of the population. The state is therefore an instrument of the class struggle, and when there are no classes there will be no need for the state; it will wither away.

All of this was a perfectly orthodox recapitulation of the *Communist Manifesto*, of Engels in the *Anti-Dühring*, and of Lenin in *State and Revolution*. Fedoseiev continued:

But the withering away of the state does not mean the withering away of social organization. The need for social planning, for social organization, will remain, of course.

My inquiry was aimed at discovering *how* it was thought this social organization and planning would be accomplished without states or classes. But nothing whatever was said about the real question raised. Fedoseiev then turned to the second half of my question:

Now concerning the future of the dialectic. We may say that so long as classes exist there will be, necessarily, a struggle between them. And recent history has shown that the price of the class struggle has already risen too high. After the achievement of the Communist society, dialectical conflict will go on, but it will no longer be between classes. Rather, the dialectic will manifest itself in the struggle of society against nature, the latter eventually giving way to socially controlled productive forces.

Professor Mitin now rose to make further comment:

The latter part of this question has great theoretical interest. Social dialectics is, after all, conditioned by the type of society in question. Therefore, as social conditions differ, the operation of the dialectic will differ. Now when the groups which remain in society are essentially non-antagonistic, the dialectic will appear quite differently than it has heretofore. In such a society individual differences will remain, but they will serve to enrich the society rather than impoverish it. New needs, new de-

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mands, will be born and fulfilled. In such a society there arise many new questions of high importance, such as the development and control of nuclear and other forms of energy, but their resolution need not take on the form of class conflict; they will be resolved in the dialectical interplay of man against nature.

I do not presume to question the sincerity of contemporary Marxists who make such predictions about future society. But even if one accepts the framework of dialectical analysis (which few beside Marxists do), it is an undeniable fact that dialectical analyses of the future—even those of Marx himself—have often been erroneous.

The next question was posed by Professor Carroll Hawkins, a political scientist from Michigan State University:

Like you, I view Marx as one of the most important social philosophers of modern times. My students and I study his works in order to benefit, when possible, from his contributions to political and social science. But there are those—Rosa Luxemburg and Plekhanov, for example—who have written that Lenin's interpretation of Marx is a betrayal of Marx's philosophy. In that view, recent Soviet history has not been a fulfillment but a betrayal of Marxism. I have never heard a Russian Marxist's reply to this complaint and I would be interested in your comment.

Fedoseiev replied:

What is here being introduced is an entirely different subject which would require another full meeting and discussion if it was to be treated adequately. Plekhanov, for example, had a determinate but complicated history. He was a Marxist until he went astray at the time of our revolution, mistakenly holding that it could not survive. Rosa Luxemburg presents an entirely separate history. Suffice it to say that Marxism consists, essentially, in the thesis that socialism will replace capitalism in accordance with inevitable dialectical patterns. That has been the position of Russian Marxism throughout; so it is *genuinely Marxist.*

Here Professor Hawkins interjected:

But what would you say to a remark I have heard (which is not the view of most Americans, I am sure) that the United States, in moving toward collectivism, is developing more nearly in accordance with Marx's general views than the USSR which has now embraced a form of state capitalism that is more severe and oppressive than private capitalism?

Professor Fedoseiev rejoins:

If you wish to engage in anti-Communist polemics, it is not worth our while to continue this discussion. We did not come six thousand miles to bicker at that level—that *we can do by radio!*

Professor Hawkins:

I make these statements as one who has some sympathy for democratic socialism, and I want the gentleman to understand this.

The next speaker was Professor Douglas Morgan, a political philosopher from the University of Texas. He prefaced his question by saying:

I would like my Russian friends first to understand that I do not represent the "American point of view." I cannot represent it because there is no such thing. I represent myself alone, not my country, or my university, or anyone else. I would like them also to know that I, and they, and I think all of us, share a common concern for peace on earth.

Professor Mitin earlier remarked that all American philosophy is one or another variety of anti-Marxism, and that all American philosophers are chiefly interested in combatting Marx. In that he is simply wrong. The students at our universities seek to understand Marxism, and to apply it if and when it proves worthy of application. They read and study Marx and his followers as they do all other philosophers, freely and openly.

Professor Morgan then turned to his question:

I have two questions, the first again about the dialectic. Suppose we allow, for the sake of the discussion, that the dialectic can help to explain how ballet dancers, chess players, or musicians, are what they are and do what they do. But could you tell us how the dialectic operates within *the several disciplines? Where are the dialectical contradictions and syntheses* in *dance and chess and music? Are the bass and treble clefs in conflict? Do black and white on the chessboard constitute a dialectical opposition,*

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and if so, how is it resolved? In ballet, is a pirouette *a dialectical interpenetration of an* entrechat? *Does it really make sense to apply the dialectic to* all *phenomena?*

My second question, or comment, again concerns dogma and dogmatism. Dogmatism enters a discussion when any party is committed to maintain a given position no matter what eventuates. If, for example, one maintains certain truths of religion, regardless of what happens, he is a religious dogmatist. If things work out well, he affirms that it was God's will; if they work out badly, he again ascertains God's will. Nothing whatever can sway him. Similarly, a dogmatic psychoanalyst would be one who will insist, no matter what, upon the application of certain psychoanalytical principles. If the patient displays affection for his mother or enjoys her company, the analyst will identify the operation of oedipal complexes. If the patient avoids his mother, or fights with her, that too, it will be said, is only the effect of oedipal complexes. The oedipal principle is not to be rejected. In a word, a dogmatically maintained position is one which any *event confirms. But genuine science implies the possibility of* disconfirmation. *Now I suggest that Marxism-Leninism can claim to be scientific only when it makes predictions which* may *be falsified. So long as Marxism-Leninism agrees with* all *facts it is no science and explains nothing.*

Furthermore, it is no reply to say that the differences and discussions among Marxists-Leninists prove they are not dogmatists. Members of a particular religion—say, Roman Catholics—may disagree among themselves, and yet stubbornly maintain the truth of certain principles, whatever the facts disclose. In doing so they are dogmatic. Russian philosophers may also disagree with one another. But in never allowing the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism to be questioned, they are dogmatic in precisely the same way.

These remarks were aimed at a recurring source of dissatisfaction with much of contemporary Marxist-Leninist argumentation, *i.e.*, the manipulation of facts to fit theory, sometimes to the point of outright intellectual dishonesty. Unfortunately, Professor Fedoseiev's brief reply entirely evaded both of the problems presented. The first of the two he simply shunted aside:

First, concerning the patterns of dialectical progression within music, chess, dance, and so forth. These are genuine questions, and one can examine them seriously from a dialectical point of view. But in the five or ten minutes available to us here, nothing serious can be said on this topic. I repeat, however, that a dialectical analysis of all fields can and should be undertaken.

In response to the second question, Professor Fedoseiev merely made a counter claim wrapped in an accusation:

As for the question of dogmatism, I will only remark that whatever we say, we will be called dogmatists! But I insist that Marxism, properly understood, is a living, flexible, intellectual structure, very far from dogma.

Professor Fedoseiev then proceeded to direct the discussion into the channels he had originally wished to pursue:

But after all, questions about the dialectic and dogmatism are not the most pressing at present. It is the problems of peaceful coexistence which are of chief importance now. The really interesting questions concern what is being accomplished by philosophers in this sphere. What is happening in America in this connection? Why is there so little interest among you in these questions? I invite questions along this line.

The next questioner called upon to speak was Professor George Kline from Bryn Mawr College. He said that even though he had several questions he would like to present, he would restrict himself for the time being to the requested topic of peaceful coexistence:

I want first to say that I welcome, as we all welcome, the expressed aim of the Soviet philosophers for a lasting peace. Let me then put my question in two parts. First, why, if your desire for peace is genuine, does your government repudiate the peaceful coexistence of ideas? I call your attention to the fact that Mr. Khrushchev has explicitly repudiated peaceful coexistence in this sphere and has called it a betrayal of Marxism. Second, why does your government block the importation of Western books, and the free exchange of ideas of every sort? How do you reconcile that behavior with your claim of interest in peaceful coexistence?

Professor Fedoseiev replied at length:

This is the kind of question worthy of detailed discussion here. The Soviet view is that

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it is impossible to stop the struggle of conflicting ideologies. We distinguish the ideological struggle, which does and must go on, from the struggle of states against one another. We must point out, however, that recognizing the inevitability of the continuation of the ideological struggle is not to be equated with allowing into the Soviet Union certain American philosophers and editorialists who exhibit purposes clearly inimical to our national welfare.

Our two systems are in severe conflict. This conflict exists, and will continue on the ideological level. But this is not the cold war, by which we mean, for example, the refusal to recognize certain nations, the imposition of economic blockades, the physical interference in the affairs of independent states. These are military and physical pressures, and are not part of the ideological struggle.

We oppose the cold war, but we do not oppose the struggle of ideologies which is inevitable. While this conflict of ideas and ideals continues, it is possible for the nations to coexist in peace. But if the cold war is continued it will sooner or later lead to a catastrophic hot war.

We cannot deliberately eliminate the ideological struggle, for that would be to say that one side will be compelled to think as the other does. I cannot compel you to think as I do; and you must not try to compel me to think as you do. If we are to live in peace on the same planet we must recognize that such coexistence will be accompanied by a continued conflict of ideologies. What must be eliminated is both the use of military weapons and the threat of their use.

We believe therefore that all philosophers, East and West, must be against war—hot war and cold war. But they need not oppose the struggle of conflicting ideologies.

This was clearly the speech that Professor Fedoseiev and his associates had come to make. While its political merit is doubtful, it was utterly barren as an effort to advance philosophical understanding between the Soviet philosophers and their American colleagues. Nevertheless, in the context in which it was made, the speech was revealing. The endeavor of Fedoseiev and his friends to pass over fundamental philosophical issues and to press the discussion into channels of more immediate political interest appears to have been the result of two factors mainly. The first and most basic is the intellectual dogmatism criticized earlier. If the most important philosophical questions are really settled, as the Soviet philosophers seem to believe, then one might understandably conclude that it is a waste of time for serious men to keep on discussing them.

The second and more immediate factor is surely the circumstance that the Russians came (as Professor Konstantinov had specifically admitted earlier) as a *delegation,* with a strategy and line of argument formulated in advance. Because that strategy and argument were devised to serve the political interests of the USSR, it is natural that the delegation should have attempted to direct the discussion into paths that might yield some political advantage.

Professor Morgan expressed the dichotomy of

Philosophers into the Fray

One day I asked an Institute official which Soviet philosophers were going to attend the forthcoming International Philosophical Congress in Mexico. No Soviet philosopher, of course, can decide simply on his own; he has to be chosen by the Academy of Sciences, and only after having been thus chosen is he allowed to receive the customary invitation and announcement which individual scholars receive, as a matter of course, all over the world. I said I hoped the Academy would send some of the young philosophers who were really interested in discussion with Western and Asian scholars, and whose own thinking was alive. I hoped they would not send a delegation dominated by some of those familiar official figures who had already made their appearance at the International Sociological Congress. The official replied with simple, straightforward bureaucratism. "You are wrong," he said. "Our delegation must be made up of men who can make decisions. Perhaps we can have some young philosophers accompany them, but above all we need experienced men who can make decisions." I said that no decisions were made at an international philosophical conference. The Soviet Academy, however, regards such congresses as international ideological skirmishes in which tactical decisions have to be made on the spot. Theirs is a "delegation," not a group of individual scholars who have decided entirely on their own to attend and who speak for themselves only. The Soviet delegation is organized hierarchically with a chain of command.

—*From "Meeting the Philosophers," by Lewis S. Feuer, Survey (London), April 1964*

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interests between our two groups well when, looking back on the meeting, he commented:

To the Americans there present, "philosophy" meant an intellectual enterprise; to the Soviet representatives, "philosophy" meant political propaganda. We wanted to understand their ideas; they wanted to alter US foreign policy. Many of us also question America's foreign policy, of course; but we thought that this was rather the time and place for some technical-theoretical analysis.

The Russians now requested that the meeting be adjourned by four o'clock, only a few minutes away. Since it appeared that there would be time for only one more question, Professor Dale Riepe of the State University of New York at Buffalo asked one obviously aimed at ending the meeting on a note of cordiality and good humor. He said he was struck by the paradox of hearing from Soviet critics that American philosophy was too idealistic, while hearing exactly the opposite from Far Eastern critics—that Americans were too materialistic. Amid some laughter he then went on to inquire whether the Soviet philosophers saw any hope at all for American philosophy. Reassuringly and with great seriousness Professor Fedoseiev replied that the Soviets found some very positive elements, even some progressive materialism, in American thought and that many American philosophical works had been translated and published in Russian.

There was still enough time left before adjournment to allow Professor Robert Wieman of Ohio University, Athens, to cite and ask a question about one of the most provocative and yet most puzzling elements in Hegelian and Marxist thought—the concept of alienation. The query was directed mainly to Professor T. I. Oiserman, who had earlier discussed this subject in a formal paper presented at the congress:

Professor Oiserman has argued that alienation results from the necessity of hard labor by an exploited class and the oppression and inferior economic conditions which are forced upon that class. But isn't alienation really the result of any exploitation in people's dealing with one another? And if that is so, isn't the elimination of alienation more than an economic problem, and one which cannot be resolved merely by increasing productivity and so forth? In short, isn't alienation a deeper affair than economic determinists are prepared to admit?

This was Professor Oiserman's first chance to speak; he did so vigorously and at length, but, unfortunately, he either did not grasp the question or did not care to meet it. He replied about as follows:

In the essay to which the questioner refers, published in the Proceedings *of the International Congress, I did not say that alienation is only an economic phenomenon. I discussed there the nature of the roots of alienation, showing that these roots are fundamentally economic, and that these economic fundamentals must be uncovered and analyzed. But the manifestations of alienation are not confined to the economic order, and appear as well in political, ideological, and other spheres. Eliminating alienation must therefore be a many-sided process, in which the several facets of alienation must first be carefully distinguished. But the root of the problem is of an economic nature.*

This last claim, of course, was precisely the point at issue, and the question of the relative importance of purely economic considerations remained unanswered. Thus the discussion ended as it had begun—with a willingness to talk, but little ability to communicate. Professor Paul Weiss, a distinguished American philosopher, expressed the Americans' appreciation for the amiability and patience of the Soviet delegates and the meeting was declared adjourned.

In retrospect, the gathering was both heartening and discouraging: heartening in the mere fact that it took place—and in a spirit of forbearance and shared concern for serious philosophical problems; discouraging in that it exhibited on the part of the leading Soviet philosophers a rigid orthodoxy of opinion that makes a fruitful interchange extremely difficult if not, indeed, impossible.

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The New Treason of the Clerks

By Edmund Demaitre

When in the mid-1920's Julien Benda published his famous book *The Treason of the Clerks*, he could hardly foresee that the problem he so brilliantly dissected—*i.e.*, the intellectual's position in the ideological conflicts of the 20th century—would continue to engage the attention of philosophers and political spokesmen for many years to come. Nor could he suspect that history would add an ironical touch to the charges of treason which Benda levelled at the "clerks" for their indifferent, if not outrightly hostile, attitude towards the humanistic outlook bequeathed by 18th-century rationalism and 19th-century positivism. Indeed, throughout the decades that followed the publication of his book, even the slightest tendencies towards a humanistic ideology, as interpreted by Benda, were to be branded as treason by a new orthodoxy that has refused to recognize any truth outside the narrow limits of an openly anti-positivist and anti-rationalist Marxist dogma.

Whatever the similarities or dissimilarities between the two outlooks, in both cases the treason of the "clerks" has been determined by identical causes. As creators and formulators of new ideas, intellectuals are bound, as a result of what might be termed the almost Calvinistic rigor of their predestination, to question, to remold or even eventually to abandon the very ideas they had brought into being. The intellectual is, paradoxically, a carrier of original ideas as well as of their transmutations; of faith and of heresy. It is this constitutional ambivalence that determines the intellectual's, particularly the Communist intellectual's, relation to the ideology which he tries to assimilate or has helped to promote. And this explains, too, why Lenin spoke so disdainfully of "the intellectual clowns who call themselves Marxists," and why Pierre Hervé (who was one of the leading intellectuals in the French Communist Party before his expulsion in 1956) later wrote that in joining the party "the intellectual enters a world of guilt and tragedy." [1]

The Heretical Intellectuals

Many attempts have been made to identify the specific reasons for what Hervé described as the "exclusivism" of the intellectual within the Communist party, and for the current intellectual crisis in the world Communist movement. The motive-force behind the heretical or schismatic attitudes of the Communist intellectuals has been variously defined as a conscious rejection of "the god that failed," [2] an emotional projection of a moral and psychological incompatibility,[3] a conflict between the rational and the irrational,[4] or a protest against the "spiritual reification" which results from the Marxist belief that human thought is a mere reflection of objective reality.[5] These are only

A long-time foreign correspondent of various European newspapers, Mr. Demaitre has written several books on international affairs, among them New Guinea Gold *(Boston, Houghton and Mifflin, 1935) and* La Paix de la Raison Pure *(Stockholm, L'Avenir, 1944).*

[1] Pierre Hervé, *La Révolution et les fétiches*, Paris, 1956, p. 50.
[2] *The God that Failed*, ed. Richard Crossman, New York, 1959.
[3] K. A. Jelenski, "The Literature of Disenchantment," *Survey* (London), April 1962.
[4] V. Brombert, *The Intellectual Hero*, New York, 1961.
[5] Pierre Fougeyrollas, *Le Marxisme en question*, Paris, 1959, Chapter IV.

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some of the theories that have been advanced to explain the causes of what an Italian Communist critic recently described as "the rupture between the cultural vanguard and the revolutionary workers' movement." [6]

The very diversity of the explanations suggests that the conflict between Communist intellectuals and the various forms of Marxism lies outside the range of ordinary argument and cannot therefore be explored by exclusively rational means.[7] But while a valid explanation of this motivating dynamism still remains to be made, one fact is clear: the problems now under debate in the Communist world may be very similar to those that brought about the defection of so many Communist intellectuals in the mid-1930's and the mid-1950's, but the *framework* of the current discussions is entirely different from that of the Stalin era. At that time no discussion of either the theory or the practice of communism was possible if it implied the slightest deviation from the principles embodied in party resolutions or in the pronouncements of the charismatic leader. Where the dissenting or questioning voices could not be silenced with the help of an all-powerful state apparatus, the party took drastic disciplinary measures to nip all possible heresies in the bud. Consequently, for the restless intellectual caught between his Marxist commitment and the pressures of his intellectual, or spiritual, integrity, the choice was reduced to the simple alternative of submitting to or breaking with the party. This happened to André Gide, André Malraux, Arthur Koestler, Paul Nizan and Eugenio Reale, to name only a few, although the experiences which undermined their allegiance to Marxism in general, and to the Communist party in particular, were very different. In Gide's case the catalystic experience consisted of his personal observation of Soviet realities, in Malraux's case the catalyst was the Spanish Civil War, in Koestler's the Soviet purges, in Nizan's the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in Reale's the crushing of the Hungarian uprising. In all these instances, the intellectual reexamination that followed the traumatic experience resulted in a break with communism that was final and irreparable. "Every effort to return everything and everyone to the same common denominator," Gide wrote when renouncing his Communist faith, "will always be reprehensible, pernicious and dangerous." [8]

The attitude of the Communist intellectuals caught in the current crisis as a rule lacks the uncompromising finality reflected in Gide's statement. As a result of the far-reaching impact of the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party and of the subsequent developments—above all of the Sino-Soviet ideological controversy—the world Communist movement, and particularly the Communist parties of Western Europe, have shed some of their monolithic and totalitarian features. In Communist countries terror is no longer the inevitable response to expressions of unorthodoxy. And Communist parties outside the Soviet bloc no longer automatically equate intellectual criticism or analysis with heresy and treason.

One of the first, and probably one of the most significant, consequences of these developments was what an Italian theoretician recently described as "the diplomatization of contrasts" between Communist intellectuals and the party leadership.[9] In the changing atmosphere it became possible for the intellectual to participate in a dialogue without being compelled to face the traditional alternatives of rupture or blind submission—even if, from the point of view of Marxist orthodoxy, the opinions he expressed had clearly heretical overtones. With dogmatism going out of fashion, its supporters were unable to enforce conformity as fully as before, even where they were successful in maintaining their positions in the party hierarchy.

It was against this background that the current debates between heretical and orthodox Communist intellectuals developed. These debates have reflected an ever-increasing malaise of the Communist intellect. Since destalinization implied a "re-evaluation of all values," the discussions have covered a vast spectrum ranging from the finer points of Marxist epistemology to the practical problems of management and labor. In the Soviet Union, Marxism as such still is beyond the realm of intellectual questioning: but other subjects, also until recently taboo, are now being tackled. Some intellectuals, such as Ehrenburg, have been involved in discussions on the nature and the social significance of literature, and Professor Kapitza has challenged orthodox opponents in an attempt to gain acceptance for cybernetics and Einsteinian relativity. In other Communist countries, far more daring discussions have taken place. Thus in Poland, the philosophers Leszek Kolakowski and Adam Schaff have engaged in protracted and brilliant polemics on the Marxist interpretation of truth and knowl-

[6] Ennio Calabria in *Rinascita* (Rome), Nov. 3, 1962.
[7] J. Monnerot, *Sociology and Psychology of Communism*, Boston, 1953, p. 137.
[8] André Gide, *Retour de l'U.R.S.S.*, Paris, 1936, p. 84.
[9] Alessandro Natta in *Rinascita*, Nov. 3, 1962.

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edge; in Czechoslovakia, an animated dialogue on socialist management and the international division of labor is still in progress between the Marxist economist Evžen Loebl and his conservative colleagues; and in Hungary, a group of Marxist critics and writers centered around the literary periodicals *Világirodalmi Figyelö*, *Kritika* and *Kortárs* is locked in battle with orthodox esthetes defending the ossified concepts of critical realism as formulated by George Lukács.[10]

Problems with the "Young Marx"

Conducted within the narrow limits of totalitarian tolerance, the debates in the Communist-run countries revolve around specific questions without openly touching upon the central problem, which is, of course, the need to recast many of the fundamental concepts on which the entire structure of Marxism-Leninism rests. In Western Europe, the situation is entirely different. There, the problem the Communist intellectuals face is no longer how to conceal the basic issues involved, but how to find the proper dialectical means that will enable them "to bring Marxism to a new level" without repudiating their fundamental allegiance. As the Italian Communist theoretician Allesandro Natta put it, in leading Marxism to a new creative phase, the task of the intellectual, and particularly of the Marxist student, consists of finding his way between two extremes: one involving a blind defense of the abstract purity of Marxism, and the other, a contamination of Marxism with eclectically chosen foreign elements.[11]

It is in the light of this antithetical formulation—purity versus contamination—that the significance of the current debates among Western Communist intellectuals becomes fully comprehensible. The formula clearly indicates that what is underway is a process of clarification arising out of intellectual doubt and uncertainty, rather than a scholastic exercise in Marxist-Leninist exegesis. As for the effects of this process, Communist intellectuals are the first to admit that "it would be absurd to negate the political implications which are inherent in any theoretical research and which result from it." [12]

A case in support of this statement is the continuing debate on "the young Marx." The controversy on this seemingly esoteric subject started way back in 1923 with the publication of George Lukács's book, *History and Class Consciousness*, in which Lukács, using the analytical method, demonstrated the close connection between Marx's and Hegel's thought. That Marx was deeply influenced by Hegel had been admitted by Marx as well as by Engels and Lenin. However, Engels declared that Hegelian philosophy "stood on its head" and that Marx set it right by creating a new philosophy different from all other philosophies that had ever existed. While Lukács did not contest the exceptional status assigned to Marxism in the history of thought, and in history in general, he tried to demonstrate that Marx was much closer to Hegel than had been generally admitted. There were, for instance, strong Hegelian elements in Marx's theory of knowledge, which is based on the principle of practice (*praxis*) as the touchstone of all truth.

Lukács paid particular attention to the Hegelian influences on the Marxist concept of consciousness, one of the key elements in Marxist doctrine. However, on this point Lukács found himself sharply opposed to the epistemological theories expounded by Lenin in his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. According to Lenin, consciousness was determined by the fact that matter has an objective existence independent of our sense impressions, or "sensations," by which it is reflected. This was what Engels too had taught. But Marx, so Lukács explained, assigned to consciousness an active role far beyond the narrow limits of Lenin's reflection theory. On this important point, Marx was thus closer to Hegel, the idealist, than to Engels and Lenin, the materialists. And since it was the question of consciousness that stood at the center of the Marxist theory of knowledge, on which the entire structure of Marxist-Leninism rests, Lukács' reading of the young Marx amounted to recognizing overtly idealistic elements at the very roots of Marxist dogma.

Consequently, Lukács was angrily denounced at the Fifth Congress of the Communist International by Bukharin and Zinoviev, and his book was withdrawn from circulation after he performed the traditional ritual of self-criticism. "Lukácsism" as an equivalent of "revisionism" remained for a long time one of the dirtiest words in the Communist vocabulary.[13]

Less than ten years after the Lukács incident,

[10] *Világirodalmi Figyelö*, Vol. IX, No. 4, 1963; *Kritika*, Vol. I, No. 1, 1963; *Kortárs*, Vol. VII, No. 3, 1964.
[11] Natta, *loc. cit.*
[12] *Ibid.*

[13] For a detailed analysis of the Lukács controversy see Morris Watnik, "Relativism and Class Consciousness: George Lukács," in *Revisionism*, New York, 1962, and M. Merleau-Ponty, *Les Aventures de la dialectique*, Paris, 1955.

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two fragments of Marx's writings, the *Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts* and the *German Ideology,* were first published under the title of *Historical Materialism.*[14] Written in 1844 and 1846 respectively, the two fragments provided strong support for the conclusions Lukács had reached, without reference to these writings, on the vexing problem of the Hegel-Marx relationship. Dealing with a great variety of subjects ranging from an analysis of consciousness to a critique of property structures, the fragments revealed that on many essential points Marx had expressed ideas which were either disregarded or differently interpreted by both Engels and Lenin when they attempted to turn Marxism into a unique, messianic and, at the same time, strictly "scientific" doctrine.

This was particularly true with regard to the young Marx's ideas on the relations between the individual and society. In the opinion of the young Marx, as in the opinion of Hegel, the ultimate goal of human existence was the realization of the "self," a realization that was to be attained by putting an end to man's alienation (about which more shortly). This emphasis clearly implied recognition of freedom and fundamental human rights. It was the young Marx's concern for freedom and his respect for the individual (a concern that is hardly perceptible in his later works) that made Lukács stress so emphatically what he described as "Marxist humanism"; and it was probably for the same reason that Adam Schaff admitted that the ideas of the young Marx contained certain elements tinged with bourgeois liberalism. Equated with outright revisionism by orthodox Marxists, these ideas were subsequently extirpated from the Marxist dogma as developed by Lenin and Stalin. It would indeed have been very difficult to reconcile the young Marx's Hegelian ideas on freedom and the individual's self-realization with the repressive practices of Communist totalitarianism. The whole problem of the young Marx was conveniently shoved under the rug with Zhdanov's declaration that "the question of Hegel was settled."

While orthodox Marxist-Leninists continue to agree with Zhdanov, many leading Communist intellectuals now believe that the debate on Hegel should be reopened and the issue of "the young Marx" clarified. Ironically, one of the most zealous representatives of this school of thought is Roger Garaudy, chief theoretician of the French Communist Party, who used to be, with Laurent Casanova, the most jealous guardian of orthodox purity. In a report submitted in June 1962 to a meeting of Communist philosophers, Garaudy described Hegelianism as "the richest legacy [left] to Marxism" and declared that "the exclusion of Hegel constituted a genuine break with authentic Marxism-Leninism."[15] According to Garaudy, there was nothing in either the *Manuscripts* or *The German Ideology* that would invalidate or even weaken the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of dialectical materialism. At another gathering of intellectuals in March 1964, Guy Besse, also a prominent French party theoretician, listed four questions to which Communists should direct their attention in trying to combat talk of "obsolete Marxism." The first of these questions was the Hegel-Marx problem, which Besse described as "the very essence of Marxism as a philosophy and as a science."[16] Similar opinions placing the Hegel-Marx issue in the center of current Marxist controversies have been expressed in the recent debates between the Italian Communist philosophers Cesare Luporini and Galvano della Volpe. In the course of these debates della Volpe, considered the most imaginative interpreter of the Italian brand of Marxism as developed by Antonio Gramsci, declared that the "Marxist mentality is still basically an 18th-century one, still leaning towards Hegelianism when it is not evolutionist."[17]

In accordance with the nature of the subject under discussion, the debate on "the young Marx" evolves in the rarefied atmosphere of Communist intellectualism; the participants are mostly philosophers, historians, critics and party theoreticians. Since the subjects discussed raise, at least by implication, delicate issues —concerning, *e.g.,* the scientific nature of Marxism or the problem of freedom in Communist societies—the disputants usually express themselves in a style that unites cautious obtuseness with the heuristic subtleties of Communist dialectics.[18] This explains why the average party member is hardly aware of the current debates, even though their outcome may ultimately become an important factor in determining the future orientation of both the philosophies and the policies of the Communists.

Based on dialectical and historical materialism, both Communist theory and practice rest on the axiomatically phrased assumption that truth is a concordance between knowledge and objective reality as reflected by human consciousness. If Marx was not so sure of that,

[14] *Der historische Materialismus,* Berlin, 1932.

[15] *Cahiers du communisme* (Paris), No. 7-8, 1963, pp. 72-106.

[16] *Ibid.,* No. 5, 1964, pp. 138-51.

[17] *Rinascita,* Sept. 15, 1962.

[18] For a good example see della Volpe's article in *Rinascita* cited above.

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as his early writings seem to suggest, one of the basic postulates of Marxism would be deprived of its uncontrovertible, categorical character. The classic Communist statement—Marxism *is* truth—would then elicit the questions: Which Marxism and which truth? The truth as enunciated by the young Marx, the old Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin or Mao-Tse-tung? And once the absolute validity of the basic truth is challenged or questioned (there being no agreement on the nature of the truth itself), all allegedly scientific conclusions deriving from this truth and pertaining to such portentous matters as the development of social classes, the evolution of capitalism and the structure and functions of the proletarian state could also be challenged and submitted to reexamination.

The Withering of Alienation?

Another issue closely connected to the debate about "the young Marx" concerns the problem of alienation. In his early writings Marx dealt extensively with this subject, and he dwelt on it again in his later works, including *Capital.* In this instance, then, it cannot be argued that Marx merely slipped in his younger years, or that he momentarily succumbed to the seduction of Hegelian idealism. Moreover, in dealing with alienation Marx was more explicit than he was in his early references to the problem of matter and consciousness. He explained that in a capitalist society, resting on private property, wage labor and division of labor, man becomes alienated from the world in which he lives. In other words, alienation, which Hegel attributed to an abstraction of mind and Feuerbach to religion, became in Marx's interpretation a scientifically identifiable phenomenon rooted in the process of economic exploitation.

For reasons that require no further elaboration, the Marxian concept of alienation turned into one of the most potent ideas that ever fired the imagination or excited the curiosity of Communist intellectuals. It showed up, in a somewhat modified form, as the *Verfremdungseffekt,* or alienation effect, in the theoretical writings of Bertolt Brecht and became the basis of his "epic theater." [19] It figures importantly in George Lukács's post-World War II effort to pick up the Hegelian threads in his reinterpretation of Marxist philosophy.[20] And, as we shall see below, the question of alienation acquired exceptional significance in the debates among intellectuals that followed the 20th CPSU Congress and the revelation of Stalin's crimes. (It has been pointed out that while in all the works of Lenin there is not one single reference to the problem of alienation,[21] in a recent work on Marxism 440 of a total of 640 pages are devoted to this subject.[22]) Finally, alienation was also one of the central issues in the controversies that preceded and followed the postwar defection from the Communist party of a number of prominent Communist intellectuals such as Henri Lefèbvre, Edgar Morin, Claude Roy, Jean Duvigneaud, Pierre Hervé and many others.[23]

The broad problem of alienation, which in its modern interpretation involves a fundamental reappraisal of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, esthetics, sociology, ethics, economics and politics, is far too complex to be thoroughly explored here. One can only touch in a rather summary manner upon some of its deeper implications as they emerge from the current debates. To place these in their proper context, one should recall that, according to the Marxian view, men living in societies based on economic exploitation become alienated, and as a result lose their natural productivity as well as their innate capacity for development. Man in the capitalist order thus becomes a "thing," a mere appendage to the machine he operates. One of the immediate consequences of this "reification" of man is the loss of his intellectual and moral autonomy as well as the concomitant destruction of individuality that results from specialization. For once man has become a "thing"—as he is bound to become in a capitalist society—he cannot escape specialization; he is a hunter, a carpenter, a shepherd or a boilermaker—and nothing else. The only way to put an end to man's alienation, and thus to enable him to regain his freedom and individuality, is to abolish private property and the exploitation of man by man.[24]

Both the philosophical and political implications of the Marxist concept of alienation are formidable—and this the more so since Marx, faithful to his habits, had neglected to define the

[19] Brecht, *Schriften zum Theater,* Frankfurt, 1957.

[20] See his *Der junge Hegel,* Zurich, 1948; *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft: der Weg zum Irrationalismus von Schelling zu Hitler,* Berlin, 1955; *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Ästhetik,* Berlin, 1956; and *Die Eigenart des Ästhetischen* (2 vols.), Neuwied am Rhein, 1964.

[21] Daniel Bell, "The Debate on Alienation," in *Revisionism,* New York, 1962.

[22] Jean-Yves Calvez, *La Pensée de Karl Marx,* Paris, 1956.

[23] A detailed analysis of some of these defections is to be found in David Caute's *Communism and the French Intellectuals,* London, 1964.

[24] Karl Marx, *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,* Moscow, 1959, pp. 73-74; *Das Kapital,* Berlin, 1952, Chapt. IV, pp. 406-415.

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categories that were to become, in a highly hypostatized form, the key elements of his doctrine (for instance, Marx never defined the concept of classes).[25] This may be one of the reasons why throughout the current debates the Marxist concept of alienation is used alternatively to attack or to defend Marxist-Leninist epistemology, sociology, esthetics and ethics. Nor does the concept become any less ambiguous when it comes to questions of a more pragmatic nature pertaining to the politics and the structure of Communist states.

One of the most vexing questions is the issue of specialization and personality. If technological progress fosters specialization and alienation, which results from it, why then should all Communist regimes place such heavy emphasis on industrialization? The usual answer to this question is that since in the Communist-run countries exploitation has ceased, the laws of alienation no longer apply. This argument, however, is rejected by many Communist or ex-Communist intellectuals such as Edgar Morin and Pierre Fougeyrollas. As the latter has pointed out, even though the situation of the working class everywhere is undergoing constant change along with transformations of the production process (in the West, the former proletariat is on the way to becoming a salaried class), the relations between men and machines are not necessarily modified by changes in the economic substructure. Nor do these changes result in the emergence of the "total, universal man" imagined by Marx. "A Marxist analysis of alienation demonstrates," Garaudy wrote, "that throughout the process of the building of socialism there are still in existence objective roots of alienation." [26] In other words, the Communist world today is still what Marx called an "alienated world." And this implies, in the strictest Marxist sense, that in the Communist countries men are not free.

That Marxist analyses of alienation do not necessarily yield identical results is further demonstrated by the writings and statements of Alfred Kurella, Garaudy's counterpart in East Germany. According to Kurella, "for the working class and other working strata of the population, the conquest of power and the practical building of socialism implies the effective and progressive elimination of what Marx summed up in the concept of alienation." [27] To which Kurella added that "for the worker who understood the nature of capitalist exploitation and has learned how to recognize the structure of bourgeois society, the state and the public sphere lose their alien, inexplorable, oppressive character."

Ironically, both arguments were bound to raise serious ideological problems. From the point of view of orthodoxy, Garaudy's assessment was a clear betrayal of the traditional principles of Marxism-Leninism as interpreted by the leftist theoreticians of the world Communist movement. If, indeed, people living in the Communist-ruled countries continued to be alienated, then one of the basic Marxist assumptions on the relations between substructure and superstructure was being proved untenable. If, on the other hand, alienation had ceased to exist, and men were as "totally and universally free" as Marx said they would be under Communist rule, how then could the Communist regimes logically justify the coercive nature of their rule? Garaudy extricated himself from the dilemma by explaining that the reason why men living under Communist governments continued to be alienated was that throughout the Stalin era Marxism-Leninism has been distorted both in theory and in practice.[28] However, neither Kurella nor the theoreticians of the so-called pro-Chinese factions of the West European Communist parties agree with this interpretation. While admitting that some traces of alienation may be detected during the phase of socialist construction in the Communist-dominated countries, they point to the survival of bourgeois ideological elements, but not to Stalinism, as the reason for man's failure to enjoy "total and universal" freedom in socialist societies.

Doctrinal Reexaminations?

The scope of the debate has widened considerably as a result of a meeting organized last year in Liblice, Czechoslovakia, to celebrate the 80th anniversary of Franz Kafka's birth. It should be recalled that until the late 1950's Kafka, considered by leading Communist esthetes, including Lukács, as a "decadent," "non-realist" writer, occupied in all Communist-run countries a prominent place on the index of forbidden authors. The situation changed a few years ago, due partly to the somewhat relaxed intellectual and political climate and partly to the efforts of influential Communist critics and literary historians such as Eduard Goldstücker and Hans Mayer. A former Oxford student and a veteran Czechoslavak Communist,

[25] In his *La Vocation actuelle de la sociologie*, Paris, 1950, the French sociologist G. Gurvitch has offered a definition he describes as "exhaustive"; it consists of some 109 words, using 11 different criteria (p. 137).

[26] *Ost-Probleme* (Bonn), Feb. 7, 1963.

[27] *Sonntag* (Berlin), No. 31, August, 1963.

[28] *Cahiers du communisme*, No. 7-8, 1963.

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Professor Goldstücker was implicated in the Slánský affair and sentenced to lifelong hard labor. Amnestied and rehabilitated in 1956, Goldstücker launched almost immediately an energetic campaign to rehabilitate Kafka in the Communist world. At the same time, Professor Mayer, Director of the Institute of Modern Literature at the University of Leipzig and after the defection of the philosopher Ernst Bloch and the critic Alfred Kantorowicz the leading party intellectual in East Germany, began discussing the Kafka problem in lectures delivered at the universities of Budapest, Belgrade and Prague.[29] In Vienna, another prominent Communist intellectual, Ernst Fischer, member of the Central Committee of the Austrian Communist party, added his voice to the ever-growing chorus of Communist writers and esthetes who demanded a radical revision of the position Communist parties have taken not only towards Kafka but to modern literature in general. When in May 1963 the Prague government invited about one hundred well-known Communist intellectuals and Communist sympathizers to the Kafka celebrations, the ground was fully prepared for a direct confrontation between the supporters of orthodoxy and their opponents.

The debates that began in Liblice, and continued in Prague, were centered on the problem of alienation, realism and the significance of the 20th-century avant-garde. The pro-Kafka forces lead by Garaudy, Goldstücker and Fischer, (Mayer was not allowed to join the East German delegation), demanded an overall re-examination of the concept of "socialist realism." They supported their arguments by quoting Engels to the effect that Marxism should be broadened whenever new scientific discoveries extend the limits of human knowledge. They pointed out that since realism, as an esthetic concept, is also subject to the laws of dialectics, it cannot today be adequately defined on the basis of criteria that had been established in a different historical context. But in the opinion of Kurella, Richter and Hermsdorf, who represented East Germany at the Prague meeting, such a view amounted to a "surrender to philosophical tendencies that cannot be reconciled with the spirit of Marxism." [30] Garaudy retorted by describing Kurella's statement as "a frightening example of dogmatism." [31]

In the course of the debates it became fairly obvious that the issues underlying the polemics on Kafka and alienation involved more important problems than identifying the mystical or existentialist elements in *The Trial* or *The Castle*. The basic issue, or at least one of the basic issues, was the freedom of artistic creation. This was clearly indicated by Ernst Fischer in his reply to Kurella in the Prague periodical *Literární noviny*. "What is decisive in a work," Fischer wrote, "is not the form an author chooses—and he can do this better than any authority that may control him—but his talent, honesty, and his strength gained through experience (*Erlebniskraft*). And Fischer concluded that "we can render socialist art and its potential the best service by unlearning the habit of giving artists prescriptions."[32] Garaudy expressed more or less the same opinion in a book published soon after the Prague meeting.[33] In three essays dealing with Picasso, Kafka and Saint-John Perse, he rejected the stultified concepts of socialist realism and reiterated his allegiance to what he currently describes as "Marxist humanism." [34] All this, replied Horst Sindermann, one of Kurella's supporters, was but an attempt "to push through a revisionist viewpoint" in relation to the problems of Marxist-Leninist esthetics and cultural policies.[35]

Considering Garaudy's and Fischer's status in the hierarchies of their respective parties, the reference to revisionism added particular sharpness to the ideological debates. It also underscored another important aspect of the discussions, namely the momentous question whether a reinterpretation of the concept of alienation would result in an eventual infiltration of idealistic elements, such as existentialism and phenomenology into the hitherto uncontaminated corpus of Marxist-Leninist materialism. It should be noted that one of the most articulate expositors of 20th-century idealism, Jean-Paul Sartre, has taken an active part in the polemics on Kafka. He has defended his existentialist-Communist interpretation of alienation in writing as well as at a meeting at the Gramsci Institute in Milan and in a public debate with Garaudy. While Sartre rejects *dialectical* materialism, he recognizes *historical* materialism as the regulating principle of social evolution. That existentialism is exerting a strong influence on contemporary Marxist thinking was perhaps best evidenced in the lectures which the physicist, Professor Robert Havemann, delivered at East Berlin's Humboldt

[29] In 1963, Mayer, following in the footsteps of Bloch and Kantorowicz, demanded asylum in West Germany.
[30] *Sonntag*, No. 31, 1963.
[31] *Literární noviny*, No. 40, 1963.
[32] *Ibid.*
[33] Roger Garaudy, *D'un Realisme sans rivages*, 1963.
[34] Roger Garaudy, "The Methodology of Marxism," lectures delivered in Ciudad Libertad, Cuba, published in *Principios* (Santiago de Chile), Nov.-Dec. 1963.
[35] Quoted in *Die Welt* (Hamburg), Feb. 25, 1964.

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University before being removed from his chair for propagating "a bourgeois version of the concept of alienation." [36]

In contrast to the orthodox Marxists who reacted vehemently to "the existentialist chatter heard during the debates on alienation," [37] both Garaudy and the Italian Communist philosopher Luporini agreed that even though existentialism could not be reconciled with Marxism-Leninism, Sartre's philosophy contained at least some positive elements which justified a continued dialogue between Communists and existentialists.[38] Other Communist intellectuals went even further in openly advocating a broadening of the philosophical bases of Marxism-Leninism. Thus, in reviewing Enzo Paci's book on the functions of science and the concept of man,[39] the Communist critic Norberto Bobbio referred to "the long-prepared union between Marxism and phenomenology." [40] While Bobbio expressed doubt that new "presuppositions" were necessary to strengthen the philosophical foundations of Marxism, he conceded that Marxism needed some scientific means of identifying the real nature of various phenomena by way of modern economic theory, sociology, social psychology and even psychoanalysis! He concluded that "Husserl with his discovery and utilization of phenomenology offers a better compass; but the navigation is still in the hands of Marx. . . ." [41]

In spite of the emphasis placed on Marxist commitment, the Communist intellectuals' insistence on the need of continuous doctrinal reexamination reflects very clearly the crisis resulting from what seems to be at the core of all the heretical tendencies—namely doubt about the scientific foundations of Marxist teaching. The more thoroughly the problem of the allegedly scientific nature of Marxism-Leninism is explored, the louder become the voices rejecting the apodictic assumptions of the Marxist dogma—even if they recognize the merits of Marxism as an effective instrument of criticism and methodology.

A typical case in point was Pierre Fougeyrollas' attempt to reclassify Marxism by reducing the Marxist theory on alienation to five simple postulates. According to Forgeyrollas' analysis, the Marxist proposition that humanity is bound to reach a stage of development where alienation will disappear, is an eschatological postulate; the claim that the abolition of economic alienation will result in the elimination of all forms of alienation is a materialistic postulate; the assumption that the collectivization of the means of production will put an end to the exploitation of man by man is an economic postulate; the prediction that the liquidation of capitalism would bring the end of exploitation or alienation in any form is the constitutive postulate of an *a priori* sociology; and the assertion that the working class is objectively invested with a liberating mission is a mystical postulate. While Fougeyrollas does not contend that all these postulates are necessarily useful in identifying the nature of alienation, he does conclude that "in presenting these postulates as demonstrated or verified facts Marxism betrayed its own scientific requirements." [42]

Considering the attitude of many prominent Communist intellectuals such as Fougeyrollas towards doctrinal orthodoxy, and in view of the recent statements on the need to recognize the "consistently developing nature of Marxism" by party leaders such as Togliatti and Waldeck Rochet, the Western debates on Marxist theory and practice are likely to continue. The question remains how these debates will affect the party status of intellectuals who persist—as most of them now do—in their efforts to "demythisize" Marxism and move toward an increasingly syncretic position. As far as the two largest Communist parties in the West—the Italian and the French—are concerned, there is at present no indication that the supporters of orthodoxy will succeed in putting an end to the new "treason of the clerks." Nor is it likely that the party leaderships will either discipline or muzzle the intellectuals as long as the latter do not transgress the extreme limits of ideological tolerance. Judging by certain signs, such as the recent meeting of French Communist philosophers and the activities of the Gramsci Institute, the intellectuals might even receive party encouragement in their efforts to rejuvenate the doctrine by a systematic clarification of the philosophical, sociological, political and economic contradictions inherent in classical Marxism. Indeed, this trend towards an overall reexamination of Marxist thought may explain why the repeated references to "neo-Marxism" now seem to be acquiring a significance they would certainly not assume were "neo-Marxism" merely one of the obtuse generalizations one so frequently hears in philosophical debates.

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[36] Robert Havemann, "Sehenlernen und Denkenlernen," in *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), May 29, 1964.
[37] *Nuova generazione* (Rome), Feb. 3, 1963.
[38] Luporini in *Critica marxista* (Rome), March-Apr. 1963, pp. 102-110; Garaudy in his lectures delivered in Ciudad Libertad, *loc. cit.*
[39] Enzo Paci, *Funzione delle scienze e significato dell'uomo*, Milan, 1963.
[40] *Paese sera* (Rome), April 17, 1964.
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] Fougeyrollas, *op. cit.* p. 143.

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Ferment Among Intellectuals

By Joseph Simon

In the summer of 1963, a quiet but intensive debate began in the pages of the newspaper *Kuang-ming jih-pao* and various academic journals of Communist China, centering on how and to what extent the cultural legacy of pre-Communist China can be related to the present needs of the Communist regime. This debate has produced overtones of more than academic import, suggesting as it does that some of the country's scholars, who as a group are assigned the task of molding China's cultural legacy to support the regime's struggle against "revisionism," have been found to be doing just the opposite—that is, reviving from Chinese antiquity humanist, "supra-class" values that are virtually indistinguishable from those which Peking ascribes to the "modern revisionists" in Moscow and Belgrade. There are also elements in the controversy which suggest that the debate is double-edged: *i.e.*, that some intellectuals, behind a veil of Marxist orthodoxy, have in fact been maligning or satirizing the regime's policies.

Ostensibly reflecting a continuation of long-standing friction between hard-core Marxists and intellectuals oriented more towards classical Chinese traditions, the debate has featured charges against a number of prominent scholars taxing them with too generous an assessment of the motives and morality of China's former "ruling classes." Historians have been accused of reviving and venerating a "feudal" morality, dramatists of propagating "feudal" values. While not basically new, the charges have been pressed with unusual intensity in party propaganda. And in the context of the Sino-Soviet rivalry, the scale and content of the debate reflect a new dimension to the chronic problem posed for the Chinese Communist regime by dissidence in its academic community. Insinuations in recent Chinese propaganda that traditionalist scholars are espousing the values of the Soviet "revisionists" give evidence of heightened concern in Peking over the presence of seeds of impurity at home at a time when the Chinese party is bidding for the mantle of

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arbiter of Marxist-Leninist purity in the world Communist movement.

The Case Against Wu Han

One of the first indications that a relatively big fish had run afoul of the party line came on August 15, 1963, when Wu Han, a vice-chairman of the Peking municipal government, was attacked in *Kuang-ming jih-pao* for holding incorrect views as to what could properly be inherited from the "ruling classes" of pre-Communist China. Wu promptly replied to this attack on August 19, but over the next couple of months the same paper published four more articles sharply critical of his views. In its November 1 issue, the paper published an editorial purporting to summarize the views contained in fifty other manuscripts claimed to have been sent in by contributors—again for the most part critical of Wu Han. The attack continued into December, with other journals joining in. On December 24, the central party organ, *Jen-min jih-pao*, published another roundup of the debate. While the official propaganda tried to depict the attack on Wu as a lively academic exchange, it appeared that he had few defenders.

In addition to his post in the Peking municipal government, which he has held ever since the Communists came to power, Wu Han has been a prominent front man for the party, both among Chinese intellectuals and in contacts with foreign countries and visitors. He is, for example, a vice-president of the China-Asia-Africa Society, of which Chou Yang is president. In his own right, Wu also has been prominent as a classical historian: he is chairman of the Peking Historical Society and has directed the compilation of Marxist-Leninist studies on ancient Chinese history. He apparently had been held in high esteem by the party and was not known to have come under attack before last summer. In 1957 he took part in criticizing alleged "rightists" among fellow members of the China Democratic League, one of the several ostensibly "democratic" (*i. e.*, non-Communist) parties retained by the Chinese Communist Party for show purposes.

In July 1961, however, Wu had appeared to go out on a limb in maintaining that there was no need to be afraid of incorporating satirical forms of classical drama into the new socialist repertoire, even though such drama was often cunningly directed against the ruling classes of the past. His professed confidence that satire could not be turned against the party may have been ill-advised and possibly served as the genesis of the recent debate over the use and abuse of the classical cultural legacy.

While the "discussion" with Wu Han, according to the Chinese propaganda accounts, has been carried out in "comradely" fashion, there seems little doubt that his political stature has been seriously damaged. Moreover, that the debate over feudal morality was directly connected with current political issues was brought home in a *Kuang-ming jih-pao* article of December 9, 1963, which referred to "landlord" types who "vainly try to overthrow the leadership of the party and the dictatorship of the proletariat in order to achieve their criminal goal of counterrevolutionary restoration. Many of their activities are carried out precisely under the banner of feudal morality."

One of Wu's critics warned that confusion over inherited morality may cause people to "fall into a trap laid by bourgeois ethics." Another said that Wu "obviously ignored Marxist-Leninist analysis." Still another associated Wu's outlook with that of Feng Yu-lan, one of the most prominent of Chinese contemporary philosophers but a favorite target of party critics, who have repeatedly accused him of bourgeois-idealist errors. That Wu himself was aware of the net dropping around him could be surmised from his August 19, 1963, denial that he had ever thought of "eulogizing the feudal ruling class."

The attacks on Wu were fairly blunt despite the fact that they apparently originated from men of lesser stature than his own. The first critique, in *Kuang-ming jih-pao* of August 15, 1963, took exception to two articles Wu had written in 1962 for *Chien Hsien* (Front), a theoretical journal of the Peking municipal party committee. It set the pattern for subsequent criticisms in charging that Wu's main weakness lay in his assumption that there were some elements of feudal or bourgeois morality that could be put to use by the party today. While Wu acknowledged that the morality of any given period is fundamentally the morality of the ruling class, said the article, he failed to recognize that the morality of the ruled class was diametrically opposed to that of the ruling class, thereby ignoring the essential matrix of the class struggle which dominates the politics of any historical period. This and subsequent articles accused Wu of quoting—and completely misinterpreting—Marx, Engels, and Kalinin on this issue. Engels, the critics argued, had seen the ruled and ruling classes almost as "two separate races," and Kalinin had warned that it was an old trick of the ruling class to pretend that its own morality was the people's morality.

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Wu's assailants further complained that his outlook was vague, abstract, and extremely harmful to socialist progress; that it blurred the dividing lines between classes and might even spread the "reactionary toxin" of the "exploiter classes" among the people; that it tended to obliterate class struggle, contributing to a climate of morality transcending class, and catering to a spirit of coexistence, "mutual absorption" and containment between classes. More specifically, Wu was charged with preaching the heretical view that the proletariat can inherit loyalty, honesty, and diligence from the feudal period, and the art of "careful planning" and "making money" from the bourgeoisie. The critics contended that none of this was tenable because the so-called honesty and diligence of the feudal ruling classes never served anything but their own narrow class interest: feudal landlords were diligent only at oppressing the people and putting down peasant rebellions.

Wu's response to the criticisms, printed on August 19, brought an abatement of the attack. It was obvious that he was squirming, just as it subsequently became obvious that his critics were not above distorting his views to keep him on the hook. Wu had written that some ruling classes had displayed positive characteristics in their "ascendant stage," that is, when they were struggling against reactionary predecessors. But this, retorted the critics, was a purely relative phenomenon since what might have been "progressive" then had become reactionary today.

The attackers also claimed that Wu had improperly ascribed a "dual nature" to the feudal ruling classes. Writing in the *Kuang-ming jih-pao* of September 21, 1963, one of their number, Li Chih-hsi, declared flatly that the ruling classes of the feudal period had no good side, and that there could have been nothing but "irreconcilable" and "unalterable" struggle between the ruled and ruling classes. Wu actually had written that, because of the "dispersed" character of economic production in ancient times, a small number of the ruled class did not develop a collectivist outlook; and that, conversely, a small number of the ruling class did not develop exploitative characteristics either and thus were able to display selfless qualities worthy of inheritance. However, the implication apparently read into this by the critics was that not just a small number, but the vast majority, of peasants making up the ruled class had probably adhered to—and certainly not struggled against—the concept of private ownership of the means of production. Commenting on this point, *Jen-min jih-pao* of December 24, 1963, observed that "many people" did not agree with Wu's reasoning.

The campaign against Wu Han was undoubtedly a weathercock of the Chinese Communist Party's prevailing attitude toward the intellectuals as a class. Chou Yang, deputy director of the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee and a longtime party hatchetman in the literary field, made it clear in October 1963 that the party now intended that all "hundred flowers" should bloom red. This was the gist of a speech delivered by Chou before a gathering of philosophers and social scientists of the Chinese Academy of Sciences on October 26. The pronouncement was curiously released in Peking broadcast media only on December 26 and published the following day in the Central Committee's ideological organ *Hung Ch'i*, marking the first time in this journal's existence that an entire issue was an article by a single author.

Chou's address was an appeal to Chinese intellectuals to fulfill their role as theorists for the "new, great . . . socialist renaissance" of which China was to be the leader; he called upon them to enter the fight against revisionism, to help clarify the lessons of contemporary struggles, and to "sort out" China's historical legacy. Summing up what he called the historical and contemporary "betrayal" of Marxism, Chou asserted that revisionists of all hues shared a common desire to expunge class struggle from the Communist movement. Although most scholars had begun to acquire "good work habits," he stated, there were still those who were reluctant to apply class struggle to cultural research, while others had even relapsed into a pre-1919 work style of "venerating the ancients"—a tendency which he said must be rooted out. "Partiality for the classical world combined with contempt for the modern world," Chou warned, "would lead our research work astray."

This was not the first time that Chou and other party spokesmen had intimated that certain elements among the intellectuals were not to be trusted. A keynote theme of the literary congress which the party had convened in the summer of 1960, soon after the launching of the Chinese offensive against "modern revisionism" that spring, was that troublemakers in the literary ranks would seek to use the study of classical and foreign literature as an instrument for undermining socialist literature. Now again, in his October 1963 speech, Chou warned that the revisionists, though they would not dare to attack the party openly, would attempt,

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by "covert and cunning ways," to "smuggle in" reactionary views designed to emasculate the revolutionary cause. In this context he invoked the example of Kautsky and other German revisionists who, he said, had conspired behind Engels' back to delete references to the "use of force" in the latter's works, as well as in a history of the socialist movement. Ironically, just two days after Chou's speech, Peking radio reported on October 28 that the first five volumes of a new history of ancient China, compiled under the direction of Wu Han, had appeared in print. In view of Wu's then already apparent predicament, it seems highly possible that his role in the compilation of China's historical legacy may since have been subjected to re-examination.

The Case Against Liu Chieh

While the party's struggle against wrong evaluations of feudal morality has centered around Wu Han, its parallel case against veneration of Confucius has converged upon Liu Chieh, an obscure but stubborn history professor from Sun Yat-sen University in Canton. Liu's forthright views on the enduring merits of traditional Confucian philosophy evoked nationwide protests in academic journals, party newspapers, and ideological forums throughout 1963, all climaxed by Chou Yang's stiff warning against "idolizing the ancients" at the October meeting of philosophers and social scientists.

Unlike Wu Han, Professor Liu is evidently a scholar who bears the marks of his bourgeois past. He has appeared to reject the relevance of class analysis to ancient history, and his critics have claimed that the socialist camouflage behind which he promotes Confucian idealism is both transparent and meaningless. Liu has not helped matters any by maintaining that socialism is, after all, the natural goal of mankind, that the Confucian sense of righteousness helps man toward this goal, and that the principle of class struggle only impedes progress. The propaganda accounts of the struggle against Liu Chieh indicate that he has adamantly refused to be "rectified," and that—unlike Wu Han, who pleaded innocent to the charge of departing from Marxist scripture—he has defiantly declared the scripture to be wrong.

Liu, it appears, dared to express the view that class analysis is not really applicable to China's ancient history, and that class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat are either irrelevant or regressive forces in history. The teachings of Confucius, he maintained, were not restricted to the ruling class but belonged to all the people; Confucian ethics held Chinese society together for over two thousand years, and Confucian laws of benevolence and righteousness remain as universal and eternal as Newton's law of gravitation. Liu has further insisted that mankind must recover the harmony that Confucius saw existing between man and the right reason of heaven. In his view, the doctrine of class struggle, in pitting man against man, denies the reason of heaven, has provoked "wild and wrongful acts" harmful to man's chances of comprehending the heavenly way, and is simply an "overexertion of man's self-centered wisdom." [1] Liu seems even to have hinted that the natural calamities and other difficulties which China has suffered in recent years were the result of the party's violation of the will of heaven. In classical Chinese political thought, it should be noted, the appearance of successive years of drought and flood was regarded as evidence of a ruler's loss of the legitimate mandate to rule.

Criticism of Liu Chieh's heretical views seemed to grow progressively sharper during 1963. In January, party propaganda voiced a general warning against "unhealthy tendencies" towards "venerating the ancients blindly." On June 11, *Kuang-ming jih-pao* published an article which personally attacked Liu for his rejection of class analysis as a research tool; it called class struggle the soul of Marxism-Leninism and of Mao's thinking, and the only scientific basis for historical research. A week later, *Jen-min jih-pao* (June 18, 1963) struck out still more sharply at Liu's "unequivocal opposition" to the concept of class struggle, clearly intimating that it was his intent to serve bourgeois, not proletarian, politics. During a forum of the Peking Historical Society in July, the professor from Canton was again assailed for saying that the method of class analysis was the polar opposite of "seeking truth from facts," and his views were declared to be identical to those of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, "the father of bourgeois history in our country." [2]

Finally, a lengthy two-part article published in *Kuang-ming jih-pao* on August 17-18 linked the views of Liu Chieh with those of past instigators of counterrevolution and treason. The article recalled that in 1911, after the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty and the establishment of the Chinese Republic, the

[1] Article by Yang Jung-kuo, *Kuang-ming jih-pao* (Peking), November 10, 1963.
[2] *Kuang-ming jih-pao*, July 31, 1963.

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royalist restoration clique had invoked a "venerated Confucian doctrine" to further its counterrevolutionary aims, and that this "cultural-ideological adverse current" had become the "precursor of the restoration of the system of monarchy." The major thesis of this earlier doctrine, as outlined in the article, was that Confucian morality was the fountainhead of all civilization and that to abandon it would mean the downfall of the whole social order, "the overrunning of the world by wild beasts," and universal chaos. The author contended that this doctrine had been exploited to convert civilian and military officers as well as local warlords into militant Confucian disciples overnight in an effort to destroy the republic and restore the old order.

Liu Chieh's "rediscovery of the fine traditions of ancient times" was thus declared to shield an ulterior purpose essentially the same as that of "modern revisionism"—namely, by promoting "bourgeois humanism," to overthrow socialism," and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and restore bourgeois rule. This is precisely one of the lines of argument that Peking has used in attacking Khrushchev since the fall of 1962, warning that to lower the revolutionary guard by abandoning class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat would make the counterrevolutionary restoration of capitalism

The Great Debate on "Cultural Inheritance"—A Humorist's View

The drawings reproduced here, done by Peking's leading cartoonist, Hua Chun-wu, and published in the newspaper *Kuang-ming jih-pao* during October 1963, satirize the extremist positions taken in the debate then in progress over the issue of "cultural inheritance" from the past. The cartoon at right pokes fun at the party dogmatists who would rather make a clean cut with the past than try to comb out the snarls; the one below satirizes the traditionalists who would preserve the past intact and serve up wool along with the meat.

Above: The seated figure, labeled "research on the cultural legacy," is having his queue cut off by a man wielding scissors labeled "restricted historical viewpoint." Caption below reads: "If it can't be analyzed clearly, it might as well be cut off."

Left: Man at left is putting wool, labeled "dregs," and man at right is putting mutton, labeled "essence," into a cooking brazier inscribed "research on the legacy." Caption below reads: "What are they cooking—mutton or wool?"

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possible in socialist countries, as—the Chinese claim—has already occurred in Yugoslavia.

It should be interjected here that until the spring of 1964 Peking had remained wary of admitting the existence of a "restoration" threat in China itself. CCP propaganda made only generalized references to remnant capitalists and landlord elements which needed to be "weeded out." However, in the ninth of its series of replies to the CPSU "open letter" of July 14, 1963, published simultaneously in *Jen-min jih-pao* and *Hung Ch'i* on July 13 of this year, the CCP quoted Mao himself as warning that the restoration of capitalism would become inevitable in China if Khrushchev's revisionism were ever to take root there. Mao's apparent implication that wrong-thinking Chinese intellectuals might make common cause with "modern revisionists" abroad in order to promote counterrevolution at home lends a new and far-reaching dimension to the ostensibly academic controversy in China over the Confucian heritage and feudal morality.

While Chinese propaganda has sought to make it appear that Professor Liu Chieh stands alone in his deviant views, the extent and intensity of the attacks on him suggest that he represents a larger body of opinion, and that his arguments for a return to traditional morality and an end to class struggle are considered a potential rallying point for nationalist and anti-Communist sentiment. The very intensity of the party's propaganda campaigns to boost morale, to raise vigilance, and to perpetuate class struggle in recent years testifies to Peking's concern that its authority and its ability to marshal popular energies may be subject to erosion.

Although Liu Chieh and Wu Han have been the principal targets of the party's recent maneuvers against academic deviations, other historians and philosophers, particularly philosopher Feng Yu-lan, have come under attack for propagating individualism, idealism, and bourgeois historical methods at the expense of historical materialism. But of even greater concern to the party have been the manifestations of extreme nationalism which have cropped up in cultural research, and which—the regime now seems to fear—might, if not checked, relegate Marxism to an ancillary role in the development of the Chinese revolution.

Paradoxically enough, the party in 1961 had appealed to the historians to go beyond Marxist-Leninist formalism in an all-out effort to Sinify Marxism and shatter the thesis that Europe was the fount of world culture. It appears, however, that some historians were overzealous in their pursuit of this task. *Kuang-ming jih-pao* of November 25, 1963, summed up the case against one scholar who had carried his research back to the 12th century B.C. and come up with the discovery that Chinese ancients already were propagating all the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism—including even the creative embellishments hitherto credited to Mao. The errant scholar claimed, for example, that the ancients were knowledgeable on the law of the contradiction of things, on quantitative and qualitative change, and on the unity between the theory of permanent revolution and the theory of revolution by stages. He even pictured them as having anticipated such Maoist maxims as the "correct handling of contradictions among the people" and "taking agriculture as the foundation of the national economy." Those who criticized this "extremely harmful" viewpoint, according to *Kuang-ming jih-pao*, held that this approach to cultural research virtually "obliterates" the latter-day significance of Marxist philosophy—presumably indicating that it was not the kind of Sinification the party had in mind.

Again, the regime had previously encouraged historians to prove that the "peasant wars" of old China were the highest form of class struggle. But so well did they perform this task, apparently, that complaints were later voiced that the peasants of the past were being given too much credit for having developed class consciousness. In response to these complaints, an article in the December 1963 issue of the publication *Li-Shih Yen-chiu* (Historical Research) defended historians against the charge that they had embellished "peasant state power" to the point of equating peasant dictatorship with proletarian dictatorship. Meanwhile, there have been other complaints—doubtless party-inspired—that to call the famous Han Dynasty historian Ssu-ma Ch'ien a people's historian, or to equate the T'ang Dynasty poet Tu Fu with Lu Hsun, Peking's Gorki, clearly constitutes excessive praise of the ancients.

Veiled Attacks on the Party

The Wu Han affair seems open to another, somewhat speculative interpretation. Specifically certain aspects of the attack on Wu suggest the possibility that some of the scholars who took part in it may actually have been taking veiled swipes at the party itself in the guise of defending a Marxist analysis of history.

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Obviously, a discussion of what the present Communist regime may have inherited, or should inherit, from the "decadent" past has sensitive implications for the incumbent "ruling class," and the evident relish with which some elements of the intellectual community answered the party's call to criticize Wu would not be inconsistent with a sly and guarded attack on the party itself insofar as the intellectuals may have held Wu in contempt for having long since sold out their interests in return for party favors.

The argument over whether or not feudal loyalty can be beneficially inherited today, for example, could well be double-edged. The critics who raised this issue in attacking Wu could hardly have been unaware of its awkward implications for the cult of Mao Tse-tung—the more so since the Soviet Union had injected this very topic into the polemic with Peking.[3] The party would clearly be uncomfortable about the airing of too many parallels between the past and the present, and would even, perhaps, attempt to stifle such discussion entirely. Wu Han, in fact, seemed anxious to dismiss this touchy issue; yet his attackers returned to it repeatedly. In his August 19 apologia, Wu had written:

When today we say we must be loyal to the party's cause, to the motherland, and to the cause of socialist construction, I do not think anyone would mistake it for the loyalty of the past—that is, loyalty to the sovereign, to one family and to one clan.

Writing in the journal *Che-hsüeh Yen-chiu* (Philosophical Research) of September 25, 1963, however, one of Wu's critics, Ai Chen, flagrantly distorted his remarks on this subject, demanding to know how he could conclude that feudal loyalty and proletarian loyalty are "not two different things." Does he mean to say they are "essentially the same thing?" the critic asked.

Another of Wu's antagonists, T'ang Yu-yuan, picked up the argument again in *Kuang-ming jih-pao* of November 16, 1963, recalling that feudal loyalty meant absolute obedience, the sacrifice of life itself on the emperor's behalf. It seems unlikely that those who criticized this type of loyalty could have been unaware that the first thing their remarks would probably bring to the minds of many readers would be the robot-like obedience of Comrade Lei Feng, the simple soldier and socialist martyr who in 1963 was the object of a nationwide propaganda campaign picturing him as the ideal Chinese Communist hero. Lei Feng had dedicated himself body and soul to Chairman Mao and the party in the self-effacing manner of a "rust-proof screw." But, T'ang persisted, how could anyone say that the narrow loyalty of feudalism had any possible relation to the noble socialist virtues of today?

Another issue of possible double relevance that was raised in the debate concerned peasant rebellion. In the context of the pent-up restiveness in the countryside of Communist China over the past several years, evidenced by sporadic reports of local riots, peasant resistance to state collection of grain and taxes, the exodus of peasants from the farms, and the party's efforts to appease rural discontent, a "historical" debate concerning the merits of peasant rebellion would seem to be in questionable political taste. However, an article by Kao Chung-t'ien in *Kuang-ming jih-pao*, October 7, 1963, ostensibly taking issue with Wu Han, pointed out that whenever the ruling class in the past had levied oppressive taxation on the peasantry, it had not only caused damage to productive forces but also forced the peasants into revolt, frequently threatening the very existence of the dynasty. Clever feudal rulers, Kao recalled, had sometimes managed to restore productive forces and prolong their rule by making concessions to the peasants: for example, they had reduced taxes and other levies, parceled out small plots of wasteland for the peasants to farm, and lowered state grain assessments following natural disasters, all in an effort to "induce vagabond peasants to return to farming." Kao added, however, that it was neither benevolence nor concessions on the part of the ruling class which had improved things, but rather the peasants' courage to rebel.

In his earlier-mentioned article of November 16, T'ang Yu-yuan also took a similar line in rejecting the Confucian doctrines of filial piety and fraternity. They were, he said, doctrines calculated to stifle rebellion against superiors, and to preserve such a legacy today would only "put new shackles on the minds and bodies of the peasants just liberated from slavery."

[3] Among the "rightist" university students in Peking who spoke out against the party in the spring of 1957, at least one had referred to Mao as an "emperor" who made the most redoubtable of China's ancient rulers seem like an "obscure dwarf." This anonymous student had written that, in suppressing the people, Mao had "done many times better than Ch'in Shih Huang-ti, who 'burned the books and buried the scholars alive.'" Union Research Service (Hong Kong), Vol. 29:13, Nov. 13, 1962, p. 202.

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Finally, one of Wu's seemingly less severe critics, Chiang Feng, pointed out in *Kuang-ming jih-pao* of October 7, 1963, that one of the CCP's recent slogans was, after all, a legacy of the Sung Dynasty (960-1270 A.D.). The slogan, "Worry before the world worries, and enjoy happiness after the world does," has alternately been used by Peking to taunt the Soviet Union for being remiss in fulfilling its obligations to world communism and to express collectivist spirit at home. With careful qualification, Chiang Feng cited the party's current application of this ancient saying as evidence supporting the view that it would be wrong to negate everything in classical research. At the same time, by attributing the origin of a current Chinese Communist slogan to a representative of the "middle and small landlord class" of the 11th century, he implicitly challenged the narrow frame of reference in which the party views the question of cultural inheritance.

China's Problem Dramatists

The "critical inheritance" of traditional literary and dramatic forms has also been the subject of intense debate in the Chinese Communist press since the summer of 1963, and apparently the discussion has sometimes been difficult to control. In June of last year the editors of *Kuang-ming jih-pao* announced that the paper was discontinuing its "literary legacy" page because of ideological errors. Shortly afterwards it opened a vigorous attack against defenders of traditional drama, the debate carrying over into 1964.

In the spring of this year, the party was at special pains to remind "Peking Opera" companies that they, too, were committed to the service of socialism—that their operas must either become weapons of class struggle against feudalism and capitalism or face extinction. Speaking in June at the opening of a festival devoted to operas on contemporary themes, party propaganda chief Lu Ting-i warned that whenever the party was in difficult straits, counterrevolutionaries would seize the opportunity to make trouble. Thus, he charged, many opera troupes around the country had staged "harmful operas" at a time when the party was struggling against imperialism, revisionism and natural calamities.[4] Lu's warning was echoed by an editorial in *Hung Ch'i* (June 30), which called it "inconceivable" that a stage full of emperors and kings could ever promote proletarian ideology. The journal complained that there were still "quite a number of people" who were marking time or even resisting the party's efforts to make literature and the theater serve as weapons in the struggle for socialism.

For the most part, the party's criticism has been directed at dramatists who preserve "dregs" and discard "essence" in selecting from the traditional repertoire. One by one, the traditionalist arguments for retaining old drama forms have been rejected. It is no longer to be maintained, for example, that old drama is folk drama which needs no reform, that reforms have been "completed," or that measures calling for reforms constitute "administrative decrees" violating the "hundred flowers" spirit. Indeed, some dramatists have been accused of flooding the market with "feudal dregs" in a deliberate abuse of the "hundred flowers" maxim. Considerable official anguish has been expressed over the slow pace of drama reform, and there has been grudging acknowledgment that not only dramatists but also actors, critics, and public audiences—including party-members—have resisted changes in the traditional repertoire. The party seems concerned, with good reason, over the influence being exerted on large, semi-literate audiences by myriads of scattered dramatic troupes which are not as easily controlled by official censorship as is the press.

The party's debate with the dramatists also has brought forth some double-edged arguments on the question of what traditional dramatic forms may be properly inherited. A case in point is the discussion of whether ghost and mythological plays, both highly popular with Chinese audiences, can be successfully adapted to the requirements of the socialist theater. The party has been especially sharp in its condemnation of ghost plays on the ground that they encourage the survival of religious superstition and fatalism. Thus, in his speech opening the Peking opera festival last June, Lu Ting-i referred to the revival of "ghost operas" around the country as evidence of "an unbridled attack against socialism by the bourgeoisie and the feudal forces." The vehemence of Lu's denunciation suggested that the party was upset with more than the mere nurturing of religious passivism.

On the other hand, the party has shown more tolerance towards mythological plays, many of which are said to depict the rebellious spirit of the people against the ruling classes of ancient times. On occasion, however, the champions of such plays have defended them with arguments which might have been inspired by some-

[4] New China News Agency (NCNA) report of Lu's speech, June 5, 1964.

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thing other than devotion to the Communist regime. For instance, an article in *Kuang-ming jih-pao* of November 17, 1963, maintained that mythological plays were just the opposite of ghost plays because they rejected fatalism and repudiated "the power of gods in heaven as well as of rulers on earth," encouraging people to act in order to reform reality. The author defended, for example, the adaptation of the "White Snake" myth, in which the young heroine, symbolic of the people's longing for freedom, suffers the fate of rebels in her era—imprisonment beneath the Lei Feng Pagoda. Whether or not the play's symbol of suppressed freedom, the Lei Feng Pagoda, bears anything more than a coincidental relationship to Lei Feng, the party's well-advertised model of Communist virtue, it nonetheless seems odd that Chinese dramatists and writers should be so ardent in championing traditional plays which glorify rebellion against constituted authority.

Indeed, the party censors must at times look askance at dramatists who, even though writing in good Marxist-Leninist terms, uphold the educational value of plays on such themes as civil disobedience and revolt—the more so since the debate on the classical legacy has allegedly confounded the lines between the old and new ruling classes in China. In addition to this, mythological plays are known to have been used as vehicles of satire against the former "ruling classes"—a factor which possibly explains the real reason for the party's concern over the revival of traditional dramas on the socialist stage. With perhaps a touch of irony, a writer in the April 11, 1963, issue of *Wen I Pao* (Journal of Literature and Art) observed:

Since writers of preceding generations were restricted by the social life and ideological understanding of the times, they had no recourse but to embody their hopes of protest in obscure, ghostly figures . . . [But] with today's writers being more or less armed with Marxist-Leninist ideology, what reasons would they have for reverting to the ideological level of former writers and adopting the same world outlook as theirs?

* * *

In part at least, the debate on China's cultural legacy seems to reflect a state of mind which the CCP itself helped to create by the tactics it has employed in its quarrel with Moscow. The party's appeals to nationalist spirit, cultural pride, and self-reliance appear to have had something of a boomerang effect among those intellectuals who would rally quite naturally to the banners of xenophobia and cultural nationalism. In attempting to curb this renewed intellectual preoccupation with nationalism, the party leadership is probably not unaware of the threat that such a tendency poses to its own power base in China. It demands that the intellectuals remain loyal to a foreign ideology, yet at the same time denounces the source of that ideology, the Soviet Union. Ironically, iconoclasm could come full circle. Just as the Chinese Communists criticized Khrushchev's destalinization policy on the ground that it damaged the international Communist image and precipitated the Hungarian revolt in 1956, so they now tend to undermine their own image at home by defaming the first temple of world communism.

In recent years Chinese intellectuals have enjoyed some limited leeway in their pursuits, perhaps as a result of a liberal application of Mao's formula for inheriting traditional culture, or possibly because they have been able to take advantage of differing views within the party as to how far they could be trusted. Now, however, with Peking's growing sense of encirclement and isolation—dramatized by its professed concern that Washington and Moscow are conspiring against Communist China and by the charge that the CPSU is catering to anti-party elements in the CCP—there will probably be less disposition on the part of the Peking leadership to tolerate unorthodox thought in the academic community.

Perhaps reflecting a natural reluctance to admit the emergence of a humanist heresy in the citadel of "true" Marxism-Leninism, the party has not yet branded the errant intellectuals as outright revisionists or linked them explicitly with heretics abroad. Whether or not it will eventually do so may depend on how successfully they can be brought back into line. Against the background of the bitter Sino-Soviet feud, dissidents who are slow to recant may find themselves in an increasingly difficult position. Party tests of intellectual loyalty may become more exacting, and witch hunts more oppressive.

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Mao As A Poet

By Stuart R. Schram

Although opinions may differ concerning Mao Tse-tung's stature as a poet, no serious observer would deny that we can learn something about the man from his poetry. The mere fact that he chooses to write in the traditional forms is, in itself, significant as a manifestation of his propensity to link his role with China's past. Beyond this, however, the content of his poems is also invariably revealing of his personality and often includes explicit or thinly-disguised political statements. This is particularly true of the ten poems published in January of this year in all of the principal newspapers and periodicals of Communist China. So far, no official translation of these new works has been issued by Peking. No doubt one will be forthcoming eventually, but in view of the topical political references which the poems contain, it seems worthwhile to make them available to English-speaking readers more promptly, and to point out some of the more striking reflections of Mao's attitudes in recent years to be found in them.

Every line of a Chinese poem does not always convey a clear and unambiguous meaning even to educated Chinese. Obviously, therefore, I cannot pretend to put forward a definitive rendering. On the whole, however, I am convinced that the translations offered in the following pages are resonably accurate as far as the literal meaning is concerned; the political implications of the texts are, of course, more debatable. In preparing the present article, Chinese commentaries on some or all of the poems have been consulted as a check on both translation and interpretation, and it is noteworthy that the commentators disagree among themselves about the significance of several passages.[1] But if there is thus some uncertainty about the implication of a line here and there, the general picture of Mao's reactions to events since 1959 that emerges from the collection as a whole is clear and unmistakable.

A word is perhaps in order regarding the style of the translations. The extensive use in literary (and even colloquial) Chinese of stylized images invested with conventional meanings places one continually in a dilemma. If one translates literally, the result may be

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[1] The most authoritative of these commentaries are one by Communist China's top-ranking cultural bureaucrat, Kuo Mo-jo, dealing with the first poem in the group and published in *Hung Ch'i* (Red Flag), No. 1, 1964; and another by Tsang K'e-chia covering all ten poems and published in *Shih K'an* (Poetry), No. 1, 1964. Also consulted were commentaries by An Ch'i, in *Wen-i-Pao*, No. 3, 1964; by Ts'ao and Wang, in *Wen-hsüeh P'ing-lun*, No. 1, 1964; and by Ch'en Chih-hsien, in *Szuch'uan Wen-hsüeh*, March 1964; as well as anonymous notes published in *Chung-kuo Fu-nü* (Chinese Woman), No. 2, 1964. I should like to express my gratitude to my friend David Roy of Princeton University for his kind assistance in revising and correcting my translation of the poems.

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at worst meaningless, at best an unnecessary and artificial exoticism; but if one replaces all the images by abstractions, much of the poetic quality of the original may evaporate in the process. In general, I have tried to steer a middle course between these two dangers. To give only one example in each sense, both from the first poem, I have kept "the crouching tiger and the coiled dragon" in the third line to designate Nanking, adding an explanatory note; but in the last line I have preferred simply "radical change" to "the replacement of oceans by mulberry groves," which is merely a cliché meaning the same thing. Because of space limitations, I have not tried to exhaust the meaning of each poem, but merely to underscore some of the most important ideas.

POEM I: *The Taking of Nanking by the People's Liberation Army*

(April 1949)

Around Mount Chung[2] *a storm of change has arisen,*
A million courageous warriors cross the great river.
The crouching tiger and the coiled dragon[3] *are more majestic than ever in the past,*
The universe is in turmoil, we are all exalted and resolute.
Let us gather up our courage and pursue the broken foe,
It is not fitting to seek praise by imitating the Tyrant [of Ch'u].
If heaven had feelings, heaven too would grow old,
The true way that governs the world of men is that of radical change.

This poem, the only one in the new group written before 1959, is one of the clearest and most straightforward. Written a few days after Nanking fell to the Communists on April 23, 1949, it expresses Mao's natural exultation over that event. From the standpoint of the significance of the poem today, the most important lines are the fifth and sixth. Although a great admirer of Sun Tzu, Mao here takes issue with the classical Chinese master of military strategy, who wrote: "When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard."[4] Mao justifies a contrary course by suggesting that the Communists should not repeat the error of "the Tyrant of Ch'u." This is a reference to Hsiang Yü, who spared the life of Liu Pang, the future founder of the Han dynasty, when he had him in his power, only to be ultimately destroyed by the rival he had allowed to live.

In his lengthy commentary on this poem (see footnote 1), Kuo Mo-jo writes:

Before and after the campaign for the liberation of Nanking, there were some well-meaning friends, both within and without the country, who said that we should be content with separate regimes in North and South China and should not provoke the intervention of imperialism, especially of American imperialism.

It is evident that among these "well-meaning friends" were none other than the Soviet leaders, for Stalin himself admitted to the Yugoslavs that in the late 1940's he discouraged Mao from adopting an uncompromising policy. But there is little doubt that Mao, in publishing the poem today, does not wish merely to emphasize that fifteen years ago he was right and Moscow was wrong; he also probably seeks to transpose this moral to the wider scene of the world struggle against "imperialism" in which, to his mind, the Soviets are once more showing the same timorousness that they manifested in China in 1949.

POEM II: *A Visit to Shao Shan*

(June 1959)

My memories of the past are vivid still, and I conjure the stream of time to flow backwards,
I am in my native village thirty-two years ago.
Red flags fly from the spears of the enslaved peasants,
Black hands brandish high the lash of the tyrannical landowner.
Only because so many sacrificed themselves did our wills become strong,
So that we dared command the sun and moon to bring a new day.
I love to look at the multiple waves of rice and beans,
While on every side the heroes return through the evening haze.

[2] Mount Chung is situated to the east of Nanking.
[3] In speaking of Nanking, Chinese military strategists have traditionally likened it to a crouching tiger overshadowed by a coiled dragon (Mount Chung).
[4] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Giles translation, Chap. VII.

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In the introductory note accompanying this poem, Mao reminds the reader that he had last seen his native village of Shao Shan, in Hunan province, in 1927. It was at that time that the province was swept by the upheaval described in Mao's famous "Report of an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan." In the poem translated above, Mao clearly views the peasants' revolt against the landowners as the starting point of the Communist victory in China. The "heroes" mentioned in the last line, according to all the published commentaries, are the labor heroes of the present, *i.e.*, the peasants returning from work, but Mao's sometimes rather un-Marxist imagination may also have peopled the landscape with the shades of the heroes of past revolutionary struggles.

POEM III: *Going up Lu Shan*

(July 1, 1959)

The mountain peak soars abruptly beside the great river,
Its summit is reached by winding four hundred times through the verdant nature.[5]
Unconcerned I turn toward the sea and gaze at the world,
A warm breeze scatters rain over the river,
Clouds cover the nine branches[6] *and sail over the Yellow Crane Pavillion,*[7]
White mist rises from the waves rolling down the Yangtse.
Where has Magistrate T'ao gone now?
Can one cultivate the land in the Peach-Blossom Spring?

The key to this poem is to be found in the next-to-last line. To understand it, we must remember that according to the Chinese the Soviets, on June 20, 1959, unilaterally tore up the 1957 Sino-Soviet agreement under which the USSR had alledgedly pledged to help China develop an atomic bomb. This event, which took place just ten days before Mao wrote the poem quoted above, was apparently one of the first explicit gestures in the Soviet campaign to bring the Chinese to heel through economic and political pressure. The "Magistrate T'ao" of the poem refers to the great poet T'ao Yuanming (died 427 A.D.), who in fact was a magistrate only once in his life, and then only for a period of some 80 days. At the end of that time, he was called upon to receive a superior official with all the pomp and obsequiousness required by the customs of the empire, but he refused to do so, preferring to abandon his office. "How can I bow my back before a petty rustic fellow for five pecks of rice a day?" he is reported to have said. It seems highly probable that in this poem Mao sees himself in the role of T'ao and Khrushchev in that of the "petty rustic fellow." The last line is an allusion to the title of a famous poem by T'ao describing a kind of Arcadia reached by passing through a peach-blossom spring. No doubt Mao was thinking here of the China of the communes and the "Great Leap Forward" as an earthly paradise. However, as subsequent events showed this judgment to have been premature, to say the least, Mao's later poems reflect a noticeably different mood.

POEM IV: *Lines Written on the Picture of a Member of the Women's Militia*

(February 1961)

Lively and ardent, she carries a five-foot gun,
The first rays of the morning sun illuminate the drill field.
Many a girl in China displays a remarkable will,
Preferring the uniform to red garments.

The term "red garments" in Chinese suggests not only beautiful clothes in general, but such garments as a young woman might wear in order to enhance her feminine allure. So this poem is not merely militaristic, but anti-sex. Mao has obviously traveled a long way from the attitudes of his youth.[8]

POEM V: *Reply to a Friend*

(1961)

Above Mount Chiu-i[9] *white clouds are flying,*
The daughters of Emperor Yao[10] *drift down from the blue-green hills, borne by the wind,*

[5] The road leading to the top of Lu Shan, in Kiangsi Province, was opened in August 1953. It is approximately 20 miles long and has about 400 bends.

[6] Near Lu Shan, to the east, a number of tributaries flow into the Yangtse. These are commonly referred to in classical poetry as "the nine branches."

[7] This pavillion, situated on a height overlooking the Yangtse, to the west of Wuchang, is linked to a legend about a Taoist who is said to have passed the spot mounted on a yellow crane.

[8] See the author's *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, New York, F. A. Praeger, 1963, pp. 227-28, for Mao's early writing on "the freedom to love."

[9] Mount Chiu-i is located in Hunan Province. According to legend, the Emperor Shun was buried here.

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Each branch of dappled bamboo has been sprinkled with a thousand tears [11]
Innumerable rose-colored clouds cover the slopes with manifold garments.
The waves on Lake Tung T'ing [12] *boil up like snow reaching to the heavens,*
The people of the Long Island [13] *sing earth-shaking songs.*
Inspired by all this, I would dream a dream equally vast,
And see the Land of the Lotus [14] *wholly illuminated by the light of dawn.*

All the places and images figuring in this poem belong to Mao's native Hunan. The poem does not appear to express any political idea more precise than that beauty is born out of adversity, but it breathes Mao's confidence in his country and himself. It also strongly underscores his sentiment of continuity with the legendary heroes of China's past.

POEM VI: *On a Photograph of the Cave of the Immortals on Lu Shan, taken by Comrade Li Ching*

(September 9, 1961)

In the dim evening light one sees a mighty pine tree.
Unconcerned it stands, despite the disorderly clouds which sail by.
Heaven has created a cave of the immortals,
It is only from a jagged peak that one can gaze far into the distance.

Like the foregoing, this poem suggests that success is achieved only through difficulties. According to one of the Chinese commentaries on the poem, the "dawn of communism" will become discernible only after a mountain of difficulties and sacrifices has been surmounted, step by step.

[10] The two daughters of the legendary Emperor Yao are supposed to have been the wives of his successor, Shun. During a journey to the south, Shun died near the Hsiang River, in Hunan, and his two wives came and wept on the banks of the river.
[11] This variety of bamboo is supposed to have originated when Shun's two wives shed so many tears on the bamboo that the leaves were permanently discolored.
[12] Lake Tung T'ing, the largest fresh-water lake in China, is situated in northern Hunan.
[13] The Long Island referred to here is located in the Hsiang River, west of the city of Changsha, where Mao spent his student days.
[14] This is a literary name sometimes given to Hunan province and is derived from a T'ang poem.

Pravda on Mr. Schram and POC

The January-February 1964 issue of this journal carried an article by Mr. Schram, entitled "The 'Military Deviation' of Mao Tse-tung." Here is what a Soviet correspondent, S. Vishnevsky, had to say about this article (*Pravda,* April 30):

The latest issue of the magazine Problems of Communism *lies in front of me. This organ of the US Information Agency usually sets the tone for American and foreign propagandists. And here this magazine's professional anti-communists are publicly complimenting Peking. "It is clear that a profound identification with Chinese nationalism continues to inspire Mao Tse-tung's thinking and policy," the magazine writes. The author of the quoted article, Stuart Schram, slaps the Peking leaders on the back and calls their course "a completely rational policy."*

The first sentence quoted by Mr. Vishnevsky is an elliptical version of the original, yet with no serious change in its meaning. As for Mr. Schram's (and this magazine's) ostensible enthusiasm for Peking's policies, we should like to quote two sentences from the article in question, the first containing the phrase singled out by *Pravda's* correspondent:

Moreover, in an economically backward and overpopulated country, the "mobilization of the masses" in some sense or other in order to supplement a limited quantity of machines by massive human effort is a perfectly rational policy.

And the final sentence of the article:

The tragedy is that, to the extent that the leaders of these {i.e., underdeveloped} countries allow the spirit which animates their political opposition to the West to permeate their efforts to achieve modernization and industrialization as well, to the extent that, like Mao, they put political zeal ahead of technical competence, and mass mobilization ahead of the effective organization of production, they are likely to fall farther and farther behind the West and thus prolong the very situation against which they are rebelling.

Peking has plenty of allies—why, one wonders, must *Pravda* invent new ones?

—The Editors

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POEM VII: *Composed in Response to Kuo Mo-jo* [15]

(November 17, 1961)

No sooner had wind and thunder risen from the earth,
Than a spirit came forth out of a pile of dead bones.
The monk is a simple fellow, yet he will respond to instruction,
The demon is a treacherous creature who can only cause calamity.
The golden monkey, resolutely lifting his massive club,
Cleansed the universe of ten thousand leagues of dust.
Today, if we praise the example of the great Sun,
It is because the miasma of seduction has once more grown thick.

The film which inspired Kuo's original poem was explained, and its political significance correctly evaluated, in an article by Mr. Arthur Cohen, published in an earlier issue of this journal.[16] As Mr. Cohen suggested, the monk in the story represented Khrushchev, a simple fellow, yet teachable—or so Mao apparently believed in 1961, despite the events which had just taken place at the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. The demon trailing a "miasma of seduction" is, of course, American imperialism. Mao's poem would seem to suggest that, if he did not directly inspire the film, he at least took an active interest in it.

POEM VIII: *Ode to the Plum Blossoms* [17]

(1961 or 1962)

The wind and the rain mark the end of spring,
Flying snow welcomes spring back to our midst.
While the mountain precipices are yet encased in endless sheets of ice,
Already the lovely flowers are blooming.
But their beauty does not compete with that of spring,
It only announces the spring.
When the time comes for flowers to gleam on the mountains,
The plum blossoms will smile in their midst.

According to Kuo Mo-jo, this poem was actually written in November 1961 when the economic situation of China was at its worst, but was not circulated outside a narrow circle until the following year, when conditions had improved.[18] In the group of ten poems published last January, however, it is dated December 1962 and appears in a corresponding position in the chronological sequence. In it we once more see Mao, the eternal optimist, replying figuratively to the pessimists in the party.

POEM IX: *Winter Clouds*

(December 26, 1962)

Winter clouds are heavy with snow, which flies like willow catkins,
The myriad blossoms have all faded, and flowers are rare for the moment.
High in the heavens frozen currents whirl impatiently,
On the earth warm breezes are blowing imperceptibly.
Only the hero dares pursue the tiger
Still less does any brave fellow fear the bear.
The plum blossoms rejoice in the snow that fills the sky,
It is not surprising that the cold should kill the flies.

This poem again expresses Mao's optimism. We may assume that in these lines, written on his 69th birthday, Mao's thoughts turned toward himself, and that he is the "hero" (or at least one of the heroes) referred to. It is equally certain that the "tiger" is the (paper) tiger of imperialism, and the "bear" the Russian bear. Khrushchev will no doubt be pleased to learn that he is even less frightening than a paper tiger.

POEM X: *Composed in Response to Kuo Mo-jo* [19]

(January 9, 1963)

In our tiny world
A few flies smash into the walls,
They buzz,
Some loudly complaining,
Others weeping.

[15] Written in response to a poem by Kuo Mo-jo, entitled "On seeing the Film 'Sun Wu-k'ung Thrice Overcomes the Dead-bones Spirit.'"

[16] "Peking's Picture Puzzles," *Problems of Communism*, No. 4, 1962, pp. 59-60.

[17] Mao says that he modeled this poem after Lu Yu's "Ode to the Plum Blossoms" but "reversed the idea."

[18] See Kuo's article in *Jen-min jih-pao* (Peking), March 15, 1964.

[19] Written in reply to a poem addressed to Mao by Kuo Mo-jo. Kuo's poem was also highly political, breathing confidence in China's destiny and Mao's leadership.

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The ants climb the flowering locust, boast of their great country,[20]
But for ants to shake a tree is easier said than done.
Just now the west wind drops leaves on Ch'ang An,[21]
Whistling arrows fly through the air.
How many tasks
Have arisen one after another!
Heaven and earth revolve,
Time presses,
Ten thousand years is too long,
We must seize the day.
The four seas rise high, the clouds and the waters are angry,
The five continents are agitated, wind and thunder are aroused.
We must sweep away all the harmful insects
Until not a single enemy remains.

This last poem is written to the melody "A Red Glow Fills the River," traditionally considered appropriate for poems dealing with themes of a certain grandeur. Whereas the preceding poems appear on the whole to relate more to China's internal problems, this one expresses Mao's vision of the revolutionary struggle on a world scale.

The world is "tiny"—according to one Chinese commentator—because it is small in the eyes of the proletarian revolutionary, who is capable of transforming it by his action. The walls are presumably those of true Marxism-Leninism, against which the flies of "imperialism" and/or "modern revisionism" hurl themselves in vain. The ants of the following two lines are clearly the Soviets, as the Chinese themselves have indirectly but unmistakably confirmed. Denouncing Soviet attacks on Mao Tse-tung and his thought, an editorial in *Jen-min jih-pao* of April 27, 1964, declared: "In their vain effort to vilify Comrade Mao Tse-tung and his ideas, the leaders of the CPSU are like ants trying to shake a great tree, ridiculously overrating themselves." [22]

Ch'ang An, referred to in line eight, probably stands for China in general. According to the Chinese commentaries on the poem, the "leaves" represent the reactionary forces withered by the revolutionary blast, but Mao may also have been thinking here of the propaganda of the Soviet and other "revisionists," all of whom are to the west of China. (It should be noted that this poem was written two days after *Pravda* had for the first time attacked the Chinese by name, instead of referring only to the Albanians.) The "sharp arrows" apparently represent China's counterattack against her enemies.

Lines ten to fifteen express once more the impatient temperament which inspired both the economic experiments of the Great Leap Forward and Mao's uncompromising revolutionary policy in the world at large. As for the conclusion, there is scant doubt that both Soviet and American "imperialists" are included among the harmful insects which must be crushed.

The general impression that emerges from this group of poems taken as a whole is so clear and striking that it hardly requires a lengthy exposition. The all-pervasive and probably most important note is Mao's overwhelming belief in the grandeur of China, and in his own greatness as the leader of China. We find here, in poetic and metaphorical form, the two great claims that are put forward more explicitly, if less eloquently, in Mao's political writings: the Chinese people are supremely civilized and supremely endowed with revolutionary energy. The implied corollary is the inferiority of the "petty rustic fellow," Khrushchev, who is neither civilized nor revolutionary.

Although Mao's political ideas are, of course, to be sought first of all in his prose writings, the poetical form allows him to express sentiments which could not be conveyed equally well in straightforward prose. His poems are particularly revealing with respect to the synthesis of Marxism-Leninism and the Chinese tradition to which Mao professes. He has indeed written about the "Sinification" of Marxism in various contexts, but none of these prose discussions is as convincing as the manner in which he juxtaposes the two disparate intellectual worlds in his poetry. His commentators in Peking claim that he does not merely juxtapose them, but actually fuses them into one. Whatever the opinion of the official interpreters, it is true that Mao conveys an identification with the

[20] Allusion to a story by Li Yung-tso, a T'ang dynasty writer, about a man who dreamt that he visited the country of the Great Flowering Locust Tree. The king of this country gave him his daughter's hand and showered him with honors. Upon awaking, he discovered that there was an ant-hill at the foot of the locust tree outside his window, which represented the reality behind his dream.

[21] Inspired by a passage in a poem by Chia Tao, of the T'ang dynasty period, which refers to the autumn wind dropping leaves on Ch'ang An, the ancient capital.

[22] See English translation in *Peking Review*, No. 18, p. 14.

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poets of the past, at the same time transmuting the elegiac spirit of their verses into revolutionary optimism.

In these most recently published of Mao's poems, Chinese Communist commentators have seen the highest expression of that combination of "revolutionary realism" and "revolutionary romanticism" which is currently regarded in Peking as the ideal of literary excellence. A final judgment on the poems might perhaps be that they do indeed contain both "realist" and "romantic" elements, and that these elements are to some extent in conflict with one another, just as Communist China as a whole is a mass of discordant traits. The poise born of a long historical view and the impatience of the revolutionary for whom "ten thousand years is too long," the narrow, doctrinaire fanaticism and the pragmatism and sense of humor of an ancient and very civilized people—these are contradictory tendencies which have not been reconciled either in China or in Mao himself, and which may lead to many surprises in the future.

The Soviet CP on Maoist Esthetics & Versification

The denial of truthfulness in artistic creativity has naturally led to a departure from socialist realism [in Communist China]. The Chinese estheticians have trumpeted about the discovery of a "new" artistic method. What is this method? It turns out to be a combination of revolutionary realism and revolutionary romanticism. . . .

An article titled "Romanticism and Realism," by Kuo Mo-jo, President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (*Hung Chi*, No. 3, 1958), helps one to understand exactly what this method is. . . . Kuo Mo-jo's article is basically devoted to poems by Mao Tse-tung that were published at that time. It might have been possible to pass over these poems in silence, were it not for the assertions by Kuo Mo-jo and other Chinese estheticians that they are precisely the embodiment of the "new artistic method," that "they are a model of the combination of revolutionary realism with revolutionary romanticism."

A poem by Mao Tse-tung, written to the melody of "The Butterfly Does Not Part from the Flower," afforded Kuo Mo-jo especial delight. [Here follows a Russian translation of the poem—Ed.] It is difficult to understand such a symbolical-allegorical poem, written in the style of ancient Chinese poetry, without a special commentary. Kuo Mo-jo gives it the following explanation: "The central theme of this poem is . . . the preaching of revolution. Hence it follows: 1) the spirit of the fallen heroes of the revolution is immortal; 2) revolutionary optimism is inherent in the revolutionary . . .; 3) people who possess a sense of justice . . . are filled with unlimited respect and sympathy for the revolution . . .; 4) the ties between revolutionary cadres and the masses must be the same as between comrades: cordial and unbreakable."

Speaking frankly, such an interpretation of the poem is astounding. It is hard for a simple person to see such a multitude of revolutionary ideas in it. But apparently this is a characteristic of "romantic exaggeration," of which Kuo Mo-jo says further on that it requires special "deciphering." After expressing the most boundless delight over the poem and declaring that he "venerates Comrade Mao Tse-tung," Kuo Mo-jo comes to the following conclusion: "If we want to find out how we can and should combine revolutionary realism and revolutionary romanticism in artistic creativity, the poems of Comrade Mao Tse-tung are the best possible model for us."

It is not hard to understand the "romantic exaggeration" we are dealing with here. In fact, it is symbolical-allegorical romanticism, far removed from reality. . . .

Six more poems by Mao Tse-tung were published in 1962. Kuo Mo-jo . . . again showered forth expressions of rapture, nonetheless he was forced to admit: "Although everyone loves to read the poems of the Chairman, it is not obligatory that each of us understand them." . . . When ten new poems written by Mao Tse-tung in recent years were published early in 1964, they were so incomprehensible that Kuo Mo-jo and other commentators differed in their interpretations of several passages in them.

We mention all this for the sole purpose of emphasizing that no matter how much the Chinese theoreticians genuflect before the words "revolutionary realism," realism has in fact been crossed off their esthetic program. What they preach is an openly subjectivist concept of artistic creativity, disguised under the code term "revolutionary romanticism."

—From "Against Dogmatism and Vulgarization in Literature and Arts," Kommunist (Moscow), June 1964. Full English translation in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press *(New York).*

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How Russians Rule Russia

By Seweryn Bialer

EDITORS' NOTE: The January-February 1964 issue of this journal carried a symposium "Soviet Colonialism: Does it Exist?" (for a Soviet reaction to this symposium, see "From Russia sans *Love," this issue, p. 80). Among the topics discussed at that time was the russification of the minority peoples in the USSR. In the article below, Mr. Bialer offers some additional data on how this weapon of Soviet control has been wielded under both Stalin and his successors.*

Throughout its history, the Soviet regime has operated within the framework of Tsarist national expansion. This is nowhere more evident today than in the nationality question. Nearly 80 percent of the non-Russian minority population inhabits 15 Republics of the USSR; the smaller minority groups are found in 38 autonomous republics, provinces and *okrugs*, (districts) 31 of which are within Russia proper (RSFSR). Despite the increased dispersion throughout the country of ethnic groups during and after World War II, the Soviet Union's demographic structure remains basically unaltered, with homogeneous and compact minority communities surrounding the central land mass of Great Russia. Further, despite the regime's "Russianization" drives, the national distinctiveness of the various minority groups is as marked today as it was in 1939.

The multi-national character of the Soviet Union is reflected in the composition and recruitment pattern of the power elite. One observer has said that the regime's nationality policy "has constituted a forceful imposition of social, political, and economic forms by a powerful center upon a host of colonial subjects." [1] This paper will deal with the influence of this policy on the structure of Soviet rule. It will examine the extent to which the various nationalities share in the direction of society, and in the process of government. More precisely, it will attempt to determine how far an individual's national identity affects his opportunities of entering and remaining a member

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[1] Alex Inkeles, "Soviet Nationality Policy in Perspective," in A. Brumberg, Ed., *Russia under Khrushchev* (New York, Praeger, 1962), p. 321.

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of the Soviet power elite. In order to do this it is necessary to look at the composition of the present elite, and to trace its evolution from the prewar period.

First, a word about the sample of the elite used in this paper. In Western societies it is a task in itself to determine who makes up the power elite. Not only does one have to consider the institutionalized organizations of government, but one has to take into account all the independent and parallel centers of power on both the national and local levels.

In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the task of determining the effective decision-making group is much easier. While there is no other country with so great a discrepancy between the constitutional forms of government and the actual pattern of governmental behavior, in no other country is the power elite so clearly defined and institutionalized. It is no exaggeration to say that the Central Committee of the Communist Party (CPSU) includes in its ranks the overwhelming majority of the Soviet power elite—*i.e.*, those who make the final decisions, those who have the greatest influence on the decision-making, and those responsible for the execution of the decisions at the highest and intermediary levels.

It is the contention here that while the functions and power of the Central Committee have fluctuated throughout Soviet history, its membership has at all times provided the highest political and social strata. Therefore a study of the national identity of this membership will be a study at the least of a representative sample of the Soviet elite and at best of its entire composition.

Some Basic Statistics

As might be expected, individuals of Great Russian origin form the absolute majority of the present Soviet elite. Together with the two other major Slavic Soviet nationalities—Ukrainians and Belorussians—they account for 85 percent of the Central Committee elected by the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in October 1961. The remaining 12 major nationalities which form the basic population of the non-Slavic republics have a Central Committee membership of 12.3 percent. Of these the major na-

TABLE I

National Composition of the Soviet Population, the CPSU, and the Soviet Elite: 1939-1961

Nationality	USSR % of population 1939	USSR % of population 1959	CPSU % of membership 1959	Central Committee of the CPSU, full and alternate members—% of membership 18th CC 1939	19th CC 1952	20th CC 1956	22nd CC 1961
Russian	58.4	54.5	63.0	66.9	71.5	67.1	62.7
Ukrainian	16.6	17.7	14.5	7.9	6.8	15.5	18.5
Belorussian	3.1	3.8	3.0	0.7	1.3	2.8	3.4
Uzbek	2.9	2.9	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.2	2.1
Kazakh	1.8	1.7	1.5	—	0.8	0.8	1.0
Azerbaijanian	1.3	1.4	1.1	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.7
Armenian	1.3	1.3	1.7	3.6	2.6	1.6	1.7
Georgian	1.3	1.3	1.8	4.3	3.0	1.2	0.7
Lithuanian	0.02	1.1	0.5	—	1.3	1.2	1.0
Moldavian	0.2	1.1	0.3	—	—	0.4	0.7
Latvian	0.1	0.7	0.4	—	0.8	0.8	1.0
Tadzhik	0.7	0.7	0.4	—	0.4	0.4	0.7
Turkmen	0.5	0.5	0.3		0.4	0.4	0.7
Estonian	0.1	0.5	0.3	—	0.8	0.8	1.0
Kirgiz	0.5	0.5	0.3	—	0.4	0.4	0.7
Others	11.2	10.3	8.9	12.9	6.8	4.8	3.9
(of this Jews)	1.8	1.1	—	10.8	3.0	2.0	0.3
Not known				1.4	0.8	—	—

SOURCES—On population of the USSR: *Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naselenia 1959 goda, SSSR—Svodnoi tom*, Gosstatizdat, Moscow, 1962, pp. 13, 184-89; *Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopedia*, 1st edition, supplementary volume—USSR, Moscow 1947, p. 61. On CPSU national composition: *KPSS—Spravochnik*, Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1963, p. 6. On composition of the Central Committee of the CPSU, see footnote 2.

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tionalities from the Caucasus account for 3.1 percent; the major nationalities of Middle Asia for 5.2 percent; the nationalities of the Baltic republics 3 percent and the Moldavians 1 percent. The remaining 2.9 percent is made up of individuals of 13 nationalities which provide the core of the population of the autonomous republics and provinces or, as in the case of the Poles and the Jews, are dispersed throughout the USSR. There are 28 nationalities in all represented on the Central Committee.[2] (See Table I.)

How does the national composition of the Central Committee compare with that of the total Soviet population and of the CPSU membership? Representation of both Great Russians and Ukrainians on the Central Committee is higher than their proportionate numbers in the total Soviet population. That of the former is relatively higher than that of the latter. However, the Ukrainians are the only group in the elite who are also proportionately over-represented (by 25 percent) in relation to their membership in the CPSU, while the Russians in this regard are slightly under-represented. The Tatars fare worst of all the nationalities in elite representation; they make up 2.5 percent of the Soviet population, but only about 0.3 percent of the Central Committee membership. It is thus clear that the elite reflects the nationality composition of the CPSU more clearly than it does that of the total Soviet population.

There is a marked difference in the relative strength of Russian and non-Russian elite representation in the periods from 1939 to 1952 and from 1952 to the present day. Between 1939 and 1952 the relative strength of the Great Russians increased considerably, while in the post-Stalin era this trend has been reversed. The increase in strength in the first period was achieved primarily by the rise in membership of the Central Committee itself. With one exception, all other nationality groups' representation did not decline in absolute numbers. The high point of relative Russian representation was reached shortly before Stalin's death; at the 19th CPSU Congress in October 1952, only 30 percent of the members of the Central Committee were non-Russian. In each successive election since 1952, the relative weight of Russians in the Central Committee membership has declined by six percent.

The decline of Russian influence has been the result, most of all, of the "Ukrainization" of the Central Committee. The number of Ukrainians on the Committee rose from 16 in 1952 to 39 in 1956 and 59 in 1961—from 6.8 percent of the membership in 1952 to 15.5 percent in 1956 and 18.5 percent in 1961. This expansion is particularly striking in view of the de-Ukrainization that took place under Stalin. Relative Ukrainian representation on the Central Committee fell from 7.9 percent in 1939 to 6.8 percent in 1952.

The combined Russian-Ukrainian strength in the Central Committee has grown since 1952, as shown in the following table.

TABLE II

Combined Russian-Ukrainian Membership in the Central Committee

(*% of total membership*)

1939	1952	1956	1961
75.5	78.3	82.6	81.2

SOURCES: See footnote 2.

The Ukrainians have, therefore, risen to a position of influence not quite as high as that of the Russians, but decisively above that of all other nationality groups. Together these two groups dominate the elite to a greater degree today than they did under Stalin.

The rise in Slavic domination was accompanied by a parallel decline in the representation of the non-Slavic nationalities. Table III shows that at no time in the post-Stalin era have they approached their relative strength of the period from 1939 to 1959.

The general decline in the relative non-Slavic representation conceals, however, differing trends among the various non-Slavic groups. First, the representation of the twelve major nationality groups which achieved Union-Re-

[2] In tables I through IV and throughout this article, figures and statements concerning the nationality of members of the CPSU Central Committee are based primarily on official Soviet sources. It would be excessive if not indeed impossible to explain in each instance what sources were used and how calculations were arrived at. Following is a list of the chief sources on which the author relied: *Deputaty Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR piatovo sozyva*, Izdatelstvo Izvestia, Moscow, 1959; *Deputaty Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR shestovo sozyva*, Izdatelstvo Izvestia, Moscow, 1962; *Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopedia*, 2nd edition; *Yezhegodnik BSE*, 1958-63; *Ukrainska radianska entsiklopedia*, 1st edition; *Sovetskaia istoricheskaia entsiklopedia*, 1st edition; *Politicheski slovar*, 2nd edition; *Zapisnaia knizhka partiinovo aktivista*, 1958-63; and numerous articles in central and republican Soviet newspapers.

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TABLE III

Non-Slavic Representation in the Central Committee

(*% of total membership*)

	1939	1952	1956	1961
Total non-Slavic Representation	22.9	19.4	14.8	15.9
Of this: 12 non-Slavic Union Republic Nationalities	10.0	12.6	10.0	12.0

SOURCES: See footnote 2.

public status increased by about 25 percent between 1939 and 1952. This was the result of the representation for the first time of the Baltic Republics, which at the time of the 1939 election had not been incorporated into the Soviet Union. In 1956 the relative gains in the representation of the major non-Slavic nationality groups were lost. But in the 1961 election their representation again approached the 1952 level. Between 1956 and 1961 both the relative strength and the absolute numbers of the major non-Slavic groups, with the exception of those from the Caucasus, increased.

The Caucasus groups, in marked contrast, lost 50 percent of their relative strength between 1952 and 1961. The most notable decline was that of the Georgians, whose representation fell from 2.5 percent in 1939 to less than one percent in 1961. But even more significant is the decline in *absolute* numbers of both the Armenian and Georgian representation. In 1939 the Georgians were represented by six Central Committee members, in 1952 by seven, in 1956 by three and in 1961 by two.

The Jews are the only nationality whose relative weight *and* absolute numbers in elite representation declined consistently in both the Stalinist and post-Stalin eras. The trend, started under Stalin, intensified under Khrushchev. In 1939 the Jews were second only to the Russians on the Central Committee. Their 10 percent representation was higher than that of the Ukrainians and Belorussians combined, or that of the combined groups from the Caucasus. In the elections for the Central Committee in 1952 there was a marked decline. If the number of Jews in the 1939 Central Committee is taken as 100, the figure for 1952 would be 47; for 1956, 33; and for 1961, 7. In fact, in the present Central Committee there is one Jew among its 330 members.

It is this almost total eclipse of Jewish representation, together with the reduced representation of both Armenians and Georgians, that has paved the way for the rise of Slavic domination of the Soviet elite.

The nationality profile of the Soviet elite presented here is based on biographical identification found in official Soviet sources. Very frequently, however, such identification is unreliable. Soviet biographical sources do not disclose the criteria on which their national identification data are based; in most cases ethnic origin appears to be the deciding factor. Even if it is assumed that there is no official falsification for the sake of a more balanced nationality picture, it is doubtful whether ethnic origin is a sufficient basis for determining an individual's national identity. It is questionable, for example, whether an individual defined by the official Soviet sources as Ukrainian, on the grounds that his parents were, is in fact Ukrainian, this must be judged not only from an objective standpoint—that is, on the basis of his ethnic origin, but also from a subjective standpoint—that is, in terms of his national allegiance, way of life, his "culture." Official biographers may define his identity accurately according to ethnic criteria but they may easily disregard his subjective, "cultural" nationality. Thus many thoroughly "Russianized" Ukrainians or Estonians, identified according to ethnic criteria, differ little from ethnic Great Russians. The picture presented above may therefore need modification.

The national status of some members of the Soviet elite invites analogy with the position of Russian experts in the satellite countries before the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956. Soviet emissaries not only served as official advisers and experts, but where possible participated as citizens. This was particularly the case with the military. Top positions in the Polish army, navy and air force, for example, were held by Soviet officers who wore Polish uniforms, spoke Polish in public and stressed their alleged Polish origin. In some cases they were in fact of ethnic Polish origin, but had spent their adult lives in the USSR, generally serving in the Red Army, and had been thoroughly assimilated. The Polish population called them "Pelniacy Obowiazki Polaka,"—performing the duties of a Pole. Many non-Russian members of the Soviet elite appear similarly to be playing the role dictated by their official national identity.

It would be simple to ascertain the subjective national status of the non-Russian members of the elite if data in depth were available. Personal information, however, is lacking, and it

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is therefore necessary to rely on less direct and less precise evidence. But sufficient material is available to enable the presentation here of instances in which the stated minority nationality status of individuals is probably without political significance.

"Russianization" is especially pronounced in certain nationalities which are dispersed among the major groups and which enjoy no administrative autonomy, particularly those whose ethnic origin lies outside the Soviet Union. Language is often a crucial mark of national self-identification among minorities exposed to the assimilation efforts of the majority population. Adoption of the language of the majority generally reflects a loss of minority self-identification. The groups under discussion here differ in this respect from the major nationality groups with administrative autonomy; about 87 percent of the Ukrainians, for example, about 88 percent of the Belorussians and about 99 percent of the Uzbeks regard their national language as their mother tongue. In contrast to this, about 50 percent of the Poles in the Soviet Union regard Russian, Ukrainian or Belorussian as their first language. Russian is the adopted language of more than 75 percent of the Finns there. These figures are supported by biographies of many members of the elite who come from minority backgrounds.

Russians All?

Marshall Konstantin Rokossovski may serve as a representative example. It is clear that his father was a Pole, but it is less certain whether he was born in Poland. While he was Commander-in-Chief of the Polish army from 1949 to 1956, both he and Russian official sources stressed that he was born in Wola, a working-class district of Warsaw. In the 1958 edition of the *Politicheski slovar,* however, his place of birth is given as Veliki Luki, a city in Russia proper. It seems that he spent at least part of his youth in Poland, and that he spoke Polish. But from 1914 until the end of World War II he was in the army—first Tsarist, then Soviet—and did not set foot on Polish soil. He was educated in a Russian military academy, was a member of the Russian Communist Party (from age 23 on), spoke only Russian, and was married to a Russian woman. Furthermore, before 1949 there was no mention in the major official biographies of Rokossovski that he had any connection with Poland. In 1956, when as a result of the "Polish October" he returned to the Soviet Union, his nationality assumed a new significance. To pronounce him a Russian national would have been to acknowledge the fact that Russians had been in command of the Polish army since 1949. Since 1956, therefore, official biographers have given his nationality as Polish. In the light of such a background, whatever his ethnic origin, it is misleading not to consider him Russian.

A. Y. Vyshinski's case is similar to Rokossovski's. His father was a Polish notary public, a Roman Catholic, and allegedly had strong national feelings. His son, André, was born in Odessa and was sent to a gymnasium in Baku, from where he entered the Kiev University. At the age of 18, he joined the Kiev branch of the RSDRP, becoming a member of its Menskevik wing after the split of 1903. Expelled from the university for his revolutionary activities, he was sent back to Baku, where he was active in the party organization and during the 1905 revolution spent six months in prison. In Baku he married a Russian girl, a teacher at the local high school. He was later permitted to return to Kiev to continue his law studies and in 1913 he graduated from the university. The years from 1913 to 1917 he spent in Moscow, writing in professional journals, teaching law, and from 1915 practicing as an attorney. During this period he did not participate in politics. But with the February revolution Vyshinski again resumed activity in the Menshevik party. In 1920 he switched allegiance and joined the Bolsheviks. His postrevolutionary career as a prosecutor is well-known. He spent all his life among Russians, his political activity was among them, and in the light of his positions in the Soviet government and his zeal in promoting the national interest of the Soviet Union in its Stalinist version, he too should probably be regarded as Russian, not by ethnic origin but by adoption.

The "Russianization" of the elite members of the Baltic republics is in some respects similar to that of those nationalities, such as the Poles or the Finns, which do not enjoy administrative autonomy. Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia were only incorporated into the USSR in 1940, and while some of the top members of the Baltic Soviet elite are of Estonian, Lithuanian or Latvian origin, most of them had been living in the Soviet Union prior to the absorption of the Baltic states. V. I. Klauson, the Prime Minister of Estonia, and I. G. Kebin, the First Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party, are both of Estonian origin. But, like

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Rokossovski and Vyshinski, they have both become thoroughly Russian.

V. I. Klauson was not born in Estonia, but in the province of Leningrad, in a village about 80 miles south of the city. Because of the region's proximity to Estonia, there have always been Estonians among its inhabitants. Born in 1914, Klauson saw Estonia for the first time at the age of 27 when, from February to August of 1941, after the annexation of the Baltic countries he served as chief mechanic in the construction of Estonian roads and highways. As a youth he went to Russian schools, graduated from a Russian road-building technicum, and entered the Russian Komsomol. Between the ages of 19 and 27 he was a technical leader and sector chief in the construction of highways, railroads, and bridges in Leningrad, Kazakhstan, Chita and Murmansk provinces, and in the Mongolian People's Republic. During the Second World War, after working in Estonia for only six months, he served in the Soviet army and entered the CPSU. It was only after 1944, when he was 30 years old, that he worked continuously in his "native" country.

I. G. Kebin's background is even more markedly Russian. He was born of a peasant family in Estonia in 1905. But in 1910 his family moved to St. Petersburg, where at the age of 18 young Kebin entered the Komsomol and worked as a seasonal agricultural worker in the suburbs. He went to a party school in Leningrad, was chairman of a village Soviet for four years, and was then employed variously as a *partkom* secretary in a Leningrad factory, *raikom* instructor in Leningrad, the head of an Agitprop department in the Omsk province in Siberia and finally, after graduating from the Institute of Red Professors, as a senior lecturer in Marxism-Leninism in the Moscow Oil Institute from 1938 to 1941. From 1941 on, except for a brief period during the war, Kebin has uninterruptedly occupied high positions in the Estonian CP and since March 1950 has been First Secretary of its Central Committee.

It is worth adding that Kebin's first name is the very Russian name Ivan. He was probably known by this name from the age of five, when he moved with his family to St. Petersburg. In the last few years official biographies in Soviet Estonian newspapers have attempted to emphasize his Estonian origin by adding the Estonian name Johannes. But whatever his name, according to one writer, Kebin is "now so assimilated that he speaks Russian without an Estonian accent but Estonian with a very strong Russian accent."[3]

[3] *Ost-Europa* (Stuttgart), No. 2, 1956, p. 116.

Instances of misleading identification are not, moreover, found exclusively among minority groups. They are also found among the major non-Russian nationalities, notably the Ukrainians and Belorussians. S. D. Ignatiev is an example. Ignatiev's Ukrainian origin is cited in the 1959 edition of the Supreme Soviet's biographical dictionary. He was indeed born in the village of Karlovka in the Kirovograd raion of Kirovograd province, some 200 miles southeast of Kiev in the Ukraine. Villages in this area were predominantly Ukrainian at that time, and Ignatiev's father was a poor peasant. But when Ignatiev was eight years old, his father for economic reasons moved to the town of Termez in Uzbekistan, and Ignatiev never again spent any significant length of time in the Ukraine. He entered the Komsomol and the Communist Party in Middle Asia, and he worked in a factory and on the railroad and later in Cheka, in the Komsomol and in the trade unions in Turkestan. He attended the All-Union Industrial Academy in Moscow from 1931 to 1937. After the 1937 purges he rose to become a prominent party worker; in 1939 at the 18th Congress of the CPSU he was elected a member of the Revision Committee, and from 1952 to 1961 was a full member of the Central Committee. During all this time he held high positions in Moscow, Belorussia, Uzzekistan, the Bashkir ASSR, the Ruryat-Mongol ASSR, and the Tartar ASSR—but never in the Ukraine.

Further, except for short periods when he served in an administrative capacity for the Central Committee in Moscow and as national Minister of State Security from December 1951 to March 1953, his whole career was directed towards the "Russianization" and centralization of control of the minority areas in the RSFSR, the republics of Middle Asia and Belorussia. Both under Stalin and under Khrushchev he was one of the foremost agents of the national Russianization drive. While serving in the non-Russian areas he acquired some knowledge of the languages of Middle Asia, but there is no evidence to show that he retained from his childhood days any proficiency in Ukrainian.

It is not the contention here that information about various representatives of national minorities is any substitute for the knowledge about their national feelings and allegiance. An individual with a career such as those discussed above may well, of course, resist the pressure of assimilation and retain his own national allegiance, especially in moments of crisis. The point is that national allegiance is less a matter of ethnic origin than of environment in the formative years, of education and of indoctrination. It is impossible to establish

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even approximately what proportion of the non-Russian elite should be regarded as such from the subjective as well as the objective point of view. The extent of Russian predominance established on objective data should probably be regarded as the minimal variant and the extent of non-Russian participation as the maximal variant of the relation between the two in the Soviet elite.

The Rise of Ukrainians

Since the death of Stalin, the Ukrainians have been the chief beneficiaries of changes in the national composition of the Soviet elite. It is therefore important to examine this phenomenon more closely. The first question to be answered is, to what extent can it be explained in terms either of deliberate policy or of leadership politics? It seems that the easier access of Ukrainians to elite positions is at least partly a matter of policy. The Ukraine is the second most important territory of the Soviet Union. It is more highly developed and more diversified than any other area of equal size or population, and it supplies a high percentage of key industrial and agricultural products. Ukrainians are not only the second largest nationality group in the Union, but the only group which can challenge Russian domination in the higher social and political strata in politically meaningful numbers. Moreover, the proximity of the Ukrainian language, cultural tradition, ethnic origin and characteristics make such a challenge less conspicuous and therefore more acceptable to the Russians. True, this was not the way in which Stalin viewed this challenge: Very likely the very size and cohesiveness of the Ukrainians made him regard them as one of the most dangerous of all the nationality groups in the Soviet Union. So much did Stalin fear them that he always made sure to have a non-Ukrainian occupy the top positions in that republic (Postyshev, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Melnikov)—in contradistinction to other Union Republics, where native officials were at least *officially* in charge. No doubt such discriminatory policies created powerful resentment among the Ukrainian population at large.

With the disappearance of Stalinist terror, however, and with the regime's efforts to redress some of the most glaring injustices of the late dictator's nationality policy, it was almost inevitable that the position of the Ukrainians would rapidly improve. Indeed, there is political logic in the assumption that the safest and most profitable means of achieving a stable nationality balance would be to raise the Ukrainians to a kind of elite partnership with the Russians.

There is, however, a non-policy factor to be considered here. Nikita Sergeievich Khrushchev, who assumed the Soviet leadership shortly after Stalin's death, had spent the major part of his previous career in the Ukraine—from 1938 when he was elected First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, until 1949 when he was transferred to Moscow. There is no doubt that past connections and proven loyalty were of high importance in Khrushchev's bid for Stalin's succession. During the period of collective leadership and the delicate equilibrium immediately following Stalin's death, the amount of support among the elite membership that any contender could muster was of crucial importance. The price to be paid for securing loyalty through fear, as under Stalin's regime, has since that time been considered too high. Therefore even after Khrushchev had established his own position beyond doubt, his comparatively limited and pragmatic power put a high premium on personal loyalty and support.

TABLE IV

Past Connections of Present Elite Members with Khrushchev

(*% of total CC membership*)

	Direct subordination (1)	Indirect subordination (2)	Probability of some contact (3)	1+2+3	No or slight connection
Ukrainians	34.5	13.8	19.0	67.3	32.7
Non-Ukrainians	10.0	2.3	1.9	14.2	85.8

SOURCES: See footnote 2.

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It is thus at least possible that personal connections have played an even greater part in the rise of Ukrainians than have policy considerations. A detailed and accurate analysis of elite cliques is impossible within the confines of this article, but a simple examination of the present Ukrainian membership reveals a high degree of past personal connections with Khrushchev. In Table IV each member of the elite is assigned to one of four categories according to his connections with Khrushchev prior to Stalin's death. The distribution among the four groups of Ukrainians is then compared with non-Ukrainian members.

As the table shows, more than one-third of the Ukrainians were directly subordinate to Khrushchev before he became First Secretary of the CPSU; while more than two-thirds had had some connection with him. The incidence of past association among non-Ukrainians is five times lower. Ukrainians, who comprise 18.5 percent of the present elite, make up 50 percent of all elite members who have discernible connections with Khrushchev during the Stalin era.

If it is true that the present Ukrainian ascendancy can be explained largely in terms of leadership politics, then important conclusions are suggested for the succession struggle which is likely to take place following Khrushchev's death.

First of all, whatever the power of individual Ukrainians, and however strong their cohesion as a group, it is highly improbable that a Ukrainian could attain the Supreme Soviet leadership. The present Ukrainian position is a reflection of Khrushchev's personal power, and without him the Ukrainians are heavily outweighed by the Russians. If they give support to the right man in the succession struggle, their position may change little, though their influence would probably be less pronounced. But if they make a wrong choice, their power is likely to decline considerably for a long time to come. There is also the possibility, which cannot at present be proved one way or the other, that their position under Khrushchev may have created some dissatisfaction among other members of the elite, and that a change in leadership at the top may be the signal for redressing the balance at the expense of the Ukrainians.

The national profile presented here stresses quantitative data. It indicates some of the limits of the representation of nationality groups in the Soviet elite, but it does not accurately reflect the qualitative picture of power distribution. To provide such a qualitative picture one would have to determine, for example, to what extent elite members are restricted to activities in their own national environment and to what extent they circulate freely throughout the country. One would have to examine the distribution of the nationalities between the central authority in Moscow and the local power structures. And finally, one would have to answer the question as to whether non-Russians are relegated to second and third rank positions in the elite, leaving the higher posts to the Russians.

These qualitative measurements would show that except for the Ukrainians the representation of non-Russian nationalities in the central party and government establishment in Moscow has clearly declined during the post-Stalin decade. The absolute number of non-Russian Central Committee members with positions in Moscow is today about one half of what it was in 1952 (again excepting Ukrainians). Non-Russians have improved their position in their national power structures, but their access to positions in other areas, especially Moscow, is relatively more difficult under Khrushchev than it was under Stalin.

The qualitative picture reveals a Russian predominance greater than that implied by quantitative measurements alone. It shows a relatively strong Ukrainian position, and an almost total absence of other nationalities in the power structures not restricted to local and national autonomy. In the USSR under the present regime, it is Great Russians, with the help of a number of Ukrainians with personal ties to Khrushchev, who hold the ultimate responsibility for all-Union decisions and their implementation.

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Singapore's Communist Fronts

By J. M. van der Kroef

In a television broadcast on November 3, 1963, Malaysia's Minister of Internal Security, Dato Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman, named Singapore's Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Organization) as the "principal political party which the Communists use for their united front activities" in Singapore and added that "there has also been heavy Communist infiltration into the labor movement, Nanyang University, and certain schools." Alluding to recent arrests by the Malaysian government of "subversive elements" in both the Barisan Sosialis and Nanyang University, Dato Ismail declared that Communist activity had suffered a "temporary setback," but that "a well-established network of underground cadres exists in Singapore." [1]

[1] *The Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur and Singapore), Nov. 4, 1963.

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The Minister's address, which was in the nature of a year-end summary of internal security conditions in Malaysia, affords a convenient starting point for a survey of Communist front activity in the Singapore area and its implications for the rest of the country as well as for Malaysia's neighbors. Singapore's great importance as a member state of the new Malaysian Federation (though retaining considerable autonomy), as the Federation's principal commercial entrepot and the site of major British and Commonwealth military establishments in the strategic heart of Southeast Asia, clearly warrants such an examination.

Communist activity in Singapore after World War II was originally designed as an extension of the guerrilla warfare waged by the Communists in the jungles of the Malayan mainland during the so-called "Emergency" (1948-55). The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had extensively penetrated the Chinese working-class population of Singapore, but effective government measures taken at the outbreak of the Emergency—including the formal proscription of the MCP and other left-wing organizations and periodic arrests of their leaders—nipped any planned Communist insurrection in Singapore in the bud. Also, the physical characteristics of the island, which is largely built

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up, has good communications even in the rural sections, and is without jungles for rebels to hide in, would have made effective guerrilla resistance impossible.

Infiltration of the Left

After the Communists had accepted defeat in the Malayan jungles in 1955, the underground MCP in the Singapore area, according to a local government report in 1957, began concentrating on "the formation of a Communist-controlled United Front, with the appearance of being led by the workers and supported by other groups, such as students, farmers, women and 'cultural' groups." [2] Promptly exploiting the opportunities created by the new Rendel Constitution, which transferred authority over Singapore to an elected government and thus brought about a quickening of local political life, the MCP infiltrated the newly-formed Political Action Party (PAP) and obtained key posts in the Singapore Factory and Shopworkers' Union. It also began to manipulate the Students' Union of the Singapore Chinese Middle School (*i.e.*, secondary school) by skillfully playing upon the cultural chauvinism of the local Chinese community, its resentment against alleged discrimination in political and economic life, and its fears for its future position. Peasant smallholders, market gardeners, and villagers in the predominantly rural Jurong and Choa Chu Kang districts of Singapore island were organized in a "Farmers' Association," the precursor of the Rural Residents' and Country People's Associations, which later became notorious as Communist-front organizations.

Under Lim Chin Siong, the MCP's principal front leader as Secretary-General of the Factory and Shopworkers' Union, Communist-inspired agitation immediately went into high gear. However, the ensuing labor strikes and student riots at the Chinese Middle School during 1955-56 only led to further repressive government measures, including the arrest of Lim and other MCP cadres in the PAP, and a slowdown of the process of expanding self-government for Singapore. Inevitably the non-Communist leaders of the PAP began gradually to dissociate themselves from their Communist colleagues, but the latter continued to look upon the PAP as their principal political instrument. The government's subsequent dissolution of the Factory and Shopworkers' Union because of "political activity contrary to the organization's announced objectives" only led in 1957 to MCP infiltration of another union, the National Union of General Workers, and Communist exploitation of local Chinese chauvinism meanwhile was instrumental in bringing into being a new fount of Chinese Marxist radicalism in Singapore, *i.e.*, Nanyang University, officially opened in March 1956.

However, the Singapore political Left and its affiliated labor organizations showed an increasingly marked tendency to become polarized along pro- and anti-Communist lines, even though the MCP, as late as March 1958, made overtures to Lee Kuan Yew, the PAP's rising young labor leader (and subsequently premier of Singapore) in an attempt—as Lee has put it—to establish "cooperation between the Communists and non-Communists in the PAP." [3] Lee dexterously fought shy of either formally acknowledging or repudiating the Communist offer of cooperation until after the 1959 Singapore elections, in which the PAP—unquestionably with the backing of the underground MCP and the fellow-traveling unions—scored a resounding victory, winning in 43 of the 51 constituencies of the Singapore Legislative Assembly. Lee had, however, announced during the election campaign that his party, if it won, would assume office only if the British colonial government released Lim Chin Siong and other Communist-front leaders arrested in 1956. On June 4, 1959, Lim and seven of his associates, virtually the high command of the underground MCP in Singapore, stepped out of Changi jail, and fears that Singapore might become the Cuba of Asia mounted rapidly.

The Communists and the PAP

It soon appeared, however, that these fears were exaggerated. In the introduction to an account of his political career, Lee Kuan Yew refers to himself and his colleagues in the PAP as "one of the few groups that have worked in a united front with the Malayan Communist Party and have not been absorbed." [4] Certainly by the end of 1959 Premier Lee and his associates, mostly English-educated Chinese intellectuals, had become convinced—quite apart from ideological considerations—that Britain would never agree to complete independence so

[2] *The Communist Threat in Singapore* (Sessional Paper No. Cmd. 33 of 1957, Singapore Legislative Assembly), Singapore, Government Printing Office, 1957, p. 1.

[3] Lee Kuan Yew, *The Battle for Merger*, Singapore, Government Printing Office, 1961, p. 34.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

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long as there was any real threat of Singapore's becoming an outpost of Peking in the South China Sea.

Although Lim Chin Siong quickly reestablished his hold over most of the Singapore labor movement, and Nanyang University began delivering its first graduates as new blood for the leadership of the radical Left on the island, Lee seized the opportunity to capitalize the appearance of a new dynamic in the political situation, *i.e.*, the proposed merger of Singapore with Malaya as a prelude to independence, a program which Lee heartily endorsed. At the same time he raised no protest against further repressive measures aimed at the more blatant Communist-front trade unions, seeking to place the responsibility for these acts on the Internal Security Council, viewed by the radical Left as a symbol of British "colonial repression."[5] Leftist resentment over an alleged Lee "sellout" to the British mounted and at one point even threatened the continuation of his government. But the MCP's Lim Chin Siong, possibly believing that Lee's complacency was merely a tactic designed to induce the British Colonial Office to grant the island complete independence, and convinced in any case that the MCP underground could not at this time afford a rupture with the principal party of the Left, which not only controlled the government but also provided an invaluable political haven for the Communists, continued to support the Lee regime.

Nevertheless, the breach between the Communists and the non- and anti-Communists widened steadily. In April 1961, the Lee government lost an important by-election in the Hong Lim constituency to Ong Eng Guan, former mayor of Singapore and a onetime PAP stalwart. Ong, though not a member of the MCP underground, had managed to win the support of a sizable segment of the dissatisfied radical left-wing elements in the PAP and was waging a determined campaign to overturn Lee. However, Lim Chin Siong and his MCP activists, recognizing that Ong was not one of their own, were not prepared to side with him and instead hoped to drive the PAP into a more radical position behind Lee. In June 1961 Lim demanded that the PAP, during forthcoming constitutional talks in London, urge the abolition of the Internal Security Council and insist on greater freedom of action for the trade unions, on the release of recently arrested political prisoners, and on more freedom for the press. Lee Kuan Yew, Toh Chin Chye and other non-Communist PAP leaders refused, however, to depart from the principle of first obtaining independence for Singapore through merger with Malaya, regarding Lim's demands as designed to provoke Britain into postponing independence so that the Communists would have a pretext for renewing a militant "anti-colonial struggle."

New Front: The Barisan Sosialis

Despite Lim's stand, it should be noted that the Singapore-Malaya merger as such also had strong Communist approval because the MCP calculated that a "straight union" of the two areas, on a one-man one-vote basis, would produce a Chinese racial preponderance which it could exploit effectively. Even after Lim and his associates formally broke with the PAP in July 1961 and affiliated themselves with a newly-formed political front, the Barisan Sosialis, the Communists continued to call for support of a "democratic merger," based on a "union of nationalities" with full racial equality and free from any vestige of colonial influence.[6] Lee and the PAP, on the other hand, were quite prepared to defer to traditional Malay fears of Chinese domination and endorsed a merger *without* proportional representation and wide areas of local autonomy. After the formation of Malaysia, Barisan spokesmen kept on referring to "Malaya" (*i.e.*, a unification of Singapore and the original Malay Federation), cautiously implying this to be the only legitimate objective of national development and thus excluding the Borneo territories, which the Barisan held were entitled to their own separate independence and sovereignty.

With the defection of the Communists from its ranks, the PAP lost 13 of its deputies in the Singapore Legislative Assembly. The latter identified themselves with the Barisan Sosialis and thus joined the opposition; but the breach did not prove as calamitous for the Lee government and the hard core of its PAP followers as had been expected. This was largely attributable

[5] The Internal Security Council, established in 1957, had three British and three Singapore members, with a seventh member from Malaya having the decisive vote. From 1957 until Singapore became part of the Malaysian Federation on September 16, 1963, the Council ordered all political arrests on the island, including preventive arrests under the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance and related measures.

[6] See Lim Chin Siong *et. al.*, *Tan Chien Sian Chu Do Chien Di Yen Yu* (The Objective of the Present Constitutional Struggle), Singapore, Barisan Sosialis Publication Committee, 1961, pp. 18-19, 21. This volume contains addresses by Lim Chin Siong, Lee Siew Choh, and other Barisan Sosialis leaders delivered at a trade union symposium in Singapore in August 1961.

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to the fact that by the time the break occurred, the idea of a "merger" of Singapore and Malaya had already been overshadowed by the concept of a yet larger unity of British dependencies in Southeast Asia. On May 27, 1961, Malayan Premier Tunku Abdul Rahman, speaking in Singapore, had broached the possibility of bringing not just Singapore, but also North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak, "closer together in political and economic cooperation" with Malaya.

The PAP immediately espoused the idea. "With merger," Lee pointed out, "Communist strength which is scattered in little concentrated pockets in Singapore and in places like Penang will be diluted in a bigger nationalist whole. With Malaysia Communist strength will be diluted even more." [7] But whatever the motivation of Lee's stand, the general support of the Malaysia concept by a wide spectrum of political opinion in Singapore, as well as the cautious amenability of Whitehall to the proposal, served to bolster the Lee government to a position of new strength. On the other hand, communism in Singapore, working through its principal political front, the Barisan Sosialis, was henceforth to have but one major objective: to defeat the creation of Malaysia.

Opposition to Malaysia

In this campaign of opposition during 1962-63, the Barisan and its Communist allies tried a number of different tactics. The Barisan's principal publication continued to voice support for a truly "democratic merger" of Singapore and Malaya "based on equal citizenship rights for all our citizens and on proportional representation"—that is to say, a merger in which the MCP could hope to come to power through the numerical strength, economic preponderance, and greater political consciousness of the Chinese. (Malaya and Singapore combined have a total population of about 9 million, of whom about 4.5 million are Chinese, 3.8 million Malays, and the remainder Indians and lesser groups.) At the same time, the party organs sought to create the impression that there was little or no support for the Malaysia idea in the Borneo territories [8]—a claim that was seemingly supported by the outbreak of the abortive revolt in Brunei in December 1962, by the emergence of A. M. Azahari and his Indonesian-supported "Unitary Government of North Borneo" movement in the adjacent border areas of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak, and by the opposition to Malaysia voiced by the Communist-infiltrated, and largely Chinese, Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP). Lee Kuan Yew accused the Barisan of maintaining liaison with both the Azahari movement and the SUPP.[9]

Early in 1963, the Barisan tersely formulated its opposition to the Malaysia plan in the following terms:

1) The British are imperialists pure and simple. The Malaysia plan is meant to protect British interests in the region.
2) The Federation (of Malaya) plays the part of neo-colonialists, and wants to preserve and protect the interests of the feudalists as well as the interests of the British. Lee Kuan Yew has talked often enough about the communal arithmetic of Malaysia.
3) The PAP is only the collaborator, handmaiden, lackey and stooge of the British. It plays a selfish game and hopes that repressive action against the strong opposition will allow the PAP an opportunity to cling to power. Fat hopes! [10]

It became increasingly evident, however—first in the Singapore referendum of September 1962, and in the subsequent local elections in Sabah and Sarawak—that the Malaysia idea enjoyed the backing of a substantial majority of the populations concerned. Consequently, the Barisan shifted to a new tack and began seeking outside support. In March 1963, Chairman Lee Siew Choh journeyed to London and attended a meeting of the "Movement for Colonial Freedom," at the conclusion of which several Labor Party MP's reportedly expressed sympathy for the Barisan's struggle. Two months later a delegation of three Laborite MP's headed by Fenner Brockway, chairman of the "Move-

[7] Lee Kuan Yew, *op. cit.*, p. 96.
[8] *E.g.*, see "Democracy in Danger" and "Opposition Pressure Mounts," in the Barisan biweekly *Plebeian* (Singapore), April 18, 1962, pp. 1, 4.
[9] On Azahari's rebellion and the role of the SUPP, see the author's "Indonesia, Malaya, and the North Borneo Crisis," *Asian Survey* (University of California), April 1963, pp. 173-81; and "Communism and Chinese Communalism in Sarawak," forthcoming in *The China Quarterly* (London), Oct.-Dec. 1964. On Lim Chin Siong's and the Barisan's contacts with the Sarawak Communist underground and (via the MCP and its Malayan front, the Party Rakyat) with the Indonesian Communists and the Azahari movement, see Lee Kuan Yew, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-5, and *The Straits Times*, Feb. 4 and March 13, 1963.
[10] "Why Arrests?", *Plebeian Express* (Singapore), March 1, 1963. (This small mimeographed biweekly succeeded the Barisan's principal organ, *Plebeian*, which ceased publication early in 1963.)

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ment for Colonial Freedom," visited Singapore and was presented with a lengthy memorandum setting forth the Barisan position. The memorandum took particular exception to the special status of Singapore citizens and the restrictions placed on them under the proposed Malaysian constitution, as well as to the non-application of the principle of proportional representation to the lower house of the projected Malaysian parliament, which would result in Singapore's obtaining only 15 seats for a population of about 1.7 million, while Sarawak, with half as many people, would have 24, and Sabah, with only a quarter as many, would have 16.[11] Brockway subsequently urged his party to oppose the formation of Malaysia since it did not spring from "any expressed wish of the peoples."

On June 6, 1963, Barisan Chairman Lee Siew Choh sought further outside backing by cabling "an urgent cry for justice" to the Foreign Ministers' Conference of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines, then in progress in Manila. The appeal protested the creation of a "neo-colonialist Malaysia" and urged that before Malaysia was formed there should be a "genuine" ascertainment of "the wishes of the people" in Singapore in accordance with United Nations provisions.[12] On July 2, 1963, Lee Siew Choh also cabled the UN "Committee of Twenty-Four on Colonialism," again demanding a "genuine plebiscite" in Singapore and charging that "the United Kingdom government intends to hand sovereignty over Singapore to the Federation of Malaya government in the neo-colonialist Malaysia plan." [13]

A final agreement on the establishment of Malaysia was nevertheless concluded at the London conference in July, and in the ensuing months leading up to the elections of September 1963 the Barisan kept hammering away on the theme of a "sellout" by Premier Lee Kuan Yew. The reduction of Singapore to a status of fiscal dependency on the central Malaysian government, the agreement to hand over 40 percent of its revenues to Kuala Lumpur, and the gradual surrender of Singapore's free-port status as the Malaysian "common market" arrangement took effect were all criticized over and over again in Barisan publications, which also reiterated the usual charges that Malaysia would reduce Singapore citizens to "second-class" status, that the local population would be grievously underrepresented in the central parliament because of the absence of proportional representation, and that the excessive powers given to the central government would enable it to nullify Singapore's autonomous rights at any time.[14]

Exploitation of Racialism

As the self-proclaimed advocate of "democratic unity," the Barisan never once openly raised the explosive issue of communal divisiveness between the Chinese and other population groups. Nevertheless, in portraying the Malaysia agreement as essentially directed against Singapore and as an attempt to quarantine its "progressive" political forces, the Barisan clearly sought to capitalize on the growing antithesis between Chinese radicalism and Malay conservatism, evident throughout Malaysia, and hence, indirectly, on the ancient communal conflict between the two groups. At the same time, in its appeal directed particularly to the younger Chinese elements, many of them conditioned by the cultural chauvinism of the Chinese middle schools and of Nanyang University, it attempted to accentuate these communal differences even further.

Thus, throughout its campaign, the Barisan sought to exploit the complex pattern of sentiment and conviction of the Singapore Chinese: their cultural pride and desire to retain their cultural identity; their fears of discrimination and repression in a politically "quarantined" Singapore; their sympathy and respect for China's new great-power status, even if under a Communist regime, and their appreciation of Peking's recognition—indeed, propagation—of China's ancient cultural grandeur; their concern for and continuing identification with relatives in mainland China, whose Communist government was openly hostile to the Malaysia idea; and finally, their indulgence toward student radicalism in Singapore's Chinese schools, particularly when the radicalism seemed directed against the British colonial regime or,

[11] *Memorandum on Malaysia to the Three Labour MPs from the Barisan Sosialis and the Party Rakyat* (mimeo.), Singapore, May 25, 1963. Concerning the special status of, and restrictions on, Singapore citizens, see *Malaysia: Agreement Concluded Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore*, Cmd. 22 of 1963, Singapore, Government Printing Office, 1963.

[12] Press statement issued by the Barisan Sosialis, June 7, 1963.

[13] Press statement issued by the Barisan Sosialis, July 2, 1963.

[14] *E.g.*, see "Lee Kuan Yew Sells Singapore in Installments," *Plebeian Express*, July 1, 1963, pp. 1, 7; "Facts of the Sellout in London," *ibid.*, July 14, 1963, pp. 1, 6; and "Exposé of the Malaysia Agreement," *ibid.*, Aug. 19, 1963, pp. 4-8.

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after September 16, 1963, against the central Malaysian government in distant Kuala Lumpur.

The Barisan also proved itself adept in using various agitational tactics to win popular sympathy. Early in 1963 it made an issue of the difficulties it was experiencing in getting its materials published, charging the Lee government with applying "pressure" on Singapore printers not to handle Barisan publications. Later the party came out with repeated accusations that the government had refused it permission to stage rallies and "mass protest" meetings. Between July and September, while Premier Lee was making a series of pre-election speeches in every Singapore constituency, the party employed the tactic of organizing small groups of Chinese middle-school youngsters to hoot and heckle him. In April 1963, the arrest of numerous Barisan and other front leaders provided the party with an excuse for new "protest" demonstrations, during one of which, as reported by the party newspaper, *Plebeian Express*, "nearly 100 families of detainees stormed into the Prime Minister's office to protest against the cruel and inhuman treatment of the detainees." [15] The government responded by arresting twelve other Barisan leaders, including Chairman Lee Siew Choh, on charges of attempting to "overawe the government" by a show of force, and the ensuing trial was promptly utilized by the party as another public forum. Although charges against two of the arrested leaders had already been dropped and Lee Siew Choh and one other were acquitted by the court, the remaining eight accused were given seven-week jail sentences—enough to refuel the party's charges that Singapore had become a "police state."

Nanyang University

As the September 1963 elections approached, the Barisan drew additional strength from the Nanyang University Students' Union (NUSU). By mid-1963, the university had a faculty of 146 and a student body of 2,537, the latter mostly graduates of Chinese middle schools. With their limited training in English and an education often inferior to that provided in the government institutions, graduates of Singapore's Chinese schools have long faced special employment obstacles, and Communist efforts to capitalize on their frustration go back to before World War II. Among Nanyang's founders were the rubber magnate Tan Lark Sye, who presumably has had a considerable interest in business dealings with Peking, and other Chinese financiers motivated by a combination of Chinese cultural pride and a conviction of Peking's eventual hegemony in Southeast Asia. Since the university's establishment, government committees of inquiry have repeatedly criticized its operations, and Nanyang's degrees have not been recognized by the regular state universities in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. The resulting bitterness has tended to augment the radicalism of Nanyang's students, to whom British influence—whether in education or in a political construct like the new Malaysia—is anathema, and who have therefore been ready allies of the Barisan.[16]

Through the NUSU and Nanyang's Guild of Graduates, the Barisan and hence the MCP underground came to command the support of hundreds of youthful enthusiasts—many of them already working as teachers in private schools, as petty officials, or as shop assistants —who could direct various front organizations. Of these fronts mention has already been made of the Singapore Rural Residents' Association and the Singapore Country People's Association, both active in the rural Jurong district (where Nanyang University is located), in Choa Chu Kang and Sembawang districts, and the adjacent village areas. These organizations have sought to mobilize the country folk of Singapore, who until recent years frequently lacked urban amenities, including electricity, water, schools and medical care, as well as agencies concerned with their needs. At first, the two associations, which had some 1,400 members by mid-1963 seemed mainly concerned with social welfare and economic self-improvement projects. However, through the indoctrinational work of Barisan and NUSU activists, according to the Singapore government, they subsequently came to operate more and more "as recruiting and training centres for Communist cadres in the rural areas" [17] and began denouncing the idea of Malaysia, favoring the Brunei rebels, and so on. A similar development characterized three hawkers' organizations formed by the Barisan during 1962 and claiming some 6,000 members. Concerned at first with working for reductions of marketing and licensing fees, with providing legal assistance and "household improvement" courses, these organizations

[15] *Ibid.*, April 5, 1963, p. 1.

[16] On Nanyang University, see the author's article, "Nanyang University and the Dilemma of Overseas Chinese Education," forthcoming in *The China Quarterly* (London), Oct.-Dec. 1964.

[17] *Malayan Times* (Petaling Jaya), Oct. 4, 1963.

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also gradually became vehicles for political agitation. Both the rural associations and the hawkers' organizations were eventually dissolved by order of the Singapore government on October 3, 1963, on the ground that they had become agencies of the covert Communist apparatus.

Shortly before, on August 28, 1963, the government had likewise ordered seven trade unions, all affiliates of the Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU) and having a combined membership of 60,000, to show cause why they should not be dissolved because of their Communist-front activity. A week later the bank accounts of three SATU affiliates had been frozen on grounds of the improper use of funds by pro-Communist union officials. Although these and earlier measures demonstrated the government's readiness to attack a major Communist stronghold, the MCP underground nevertheless appeared to have become particularly well entrenched in a major segment of organized labor in Singapore already by the middle of 1962, with the SATU leadership closely interlocked with that of the Barisan Sosialis.

Toward the close of 1962, coincidentally with the Brunei revolt, the entire Communist-front complex in Singapore stepped up its campaign against the Malaysia project in the hope of sweeping the Barisan into office on a wave of popular agitation. However, the collapse of the revolt nipped this expectation in the bud, and on February 2, 1963, the security agencies arrested 107 political, labor and student leaders of the radical Left, among them Lim Chin Siong, two NUSU vice-presidents, and a number of leaders of the Rural Residents' Association. Those arrested were accused of supporting the Brunei revolt and its leaders, and of conspiring to establish a Communist state in Singapore.[18]

September 1963 Elections

The arrests probably forestalled an outbreak of violence, but the Communist front apparatus in Singapore was far from destroyed. Almost at once the Barisan under Lee Siew Choh opened a campaign to win sympathy for its detainees, and subsequently the entire front complex began focussing its activities on the September 1963 elections. With the SATU unions under tightened official surveillance, the Barisan now leaned more heavily on the hawkers' and rural residents' associations and also expanded its activities among the NUSU and Chinese middle-school student groups. Ten Nanyang University graduates, including the secretary-general of the Guild of Graduates, announced themselves as candidates for the Singapore Legislative Assembly on the Barisan Sosialis ticket, and busloads of Nanyang students nightly attended Barisan election rallies or went to meetings of the opposing parties in order to heckle the speakers.

In addition to the PAP and the Barisan, two other parties participated in the election campaign: the conservative Singapore Alliance and Ong Eng Guan's minuscule United People's Party (UPP); but they were completely overshadowed by the two major contestants. The PAP stressed two main campaign themes: first, the material achievements of the government, *e.g.*, the 22,000 low-cost apartments built by the state, the construction of new schools at a rate of one "every three weeks," and the more than 200 miles of roads built since 1959; and second, the Communist danger threatening Singapore from the Barisan and its underground allies. The Barisan presented a program of 18 points, the most important of which reiterated opposition to the London agreement and "second-class citizenship" for the people of Singapore, demanded a "democratic Malaysia free from colonialism," as well as a "Socialist Malaya" with proportional representation in its central parliament, and called for the revocation of "colonial laws" (meaning abolition of the Internal Security Council) and of "outmoded labor legislation," for a "neutral" foreign policy, and for recognition of Nanyang University degrees.[19]

On September 21, 1963, five days after Malaysia officially came into being, more than 587,000 voters out of Singapore's total electorate of 617,000 cast their ballots for 210 candidates, including a small number of independents, running for the 51 seats at stake in the Singapore Legislative Assembly. The PAP won 37 seats (as compared with the 25 it had held in the previous Assembly after the defection of some of its members, including those who went over to the Barisan Sosialis); the Barisan Sosialis, 13 (14 in the previous Assembly); the Singapore Alliance, 1 (7), the UPP, 1 (2); and independents, 0 (2). But the PAP, polling only 47.7 percent of the total votes cast, had clearly benefited from the split of votes among its three opponents, and the party had actually won abso-

[18] *The Sunday Times* (Singapore and Kuala Lumpur), Feb. 3, 1963; *The Straits Times*, Feb. 4, 1963.

[19] *Election Manifesto of the Barisan Sosialis, Sept. 1, 1963* (mimeo.): broadcast over Radio Singapore, Sept. 19, 1963. See also *The Straits Times*, Sept. 13, 1963.

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lute majorities in only 20 of the 51 constituencies. Perhaps most significant was the fact that, despite the arrests of its top leaders and those of its allied fronts, and despite continuous government surveillance, the Barisan had still been able to retain the hard core of its supporters, giving up only one Assembly seat.

Anti-Communist Offensive

Nevertheless, both the Lee government in Singapore and the new central Malaysian government in Kuala Lumpur felt strong enough to launch a new drive against the Communists. On September 22, 1963, the Singapore government started proceedings to cancel the Singapore (and hence the Malaysian) citizenship of Tan Lark Sye, chairman and chief policy-maker of the Nanyang University Council; and four days later security police arrested five NUSU leaders on the university campus as hundreds of undergraduates battled the arresting officers. In other parts of Singapore, six Nanyang graduates, three of them unsuccessful Barisan candidates, were also arrested. Tan was accused of "blatantly" intervening in the recent election on behalf of Communists in the Barisan, while Internal Security Minister Ismail justified the Nanyang arrests as necessary to curb "Communist-directed subversive activities" at the university and among other Chinese students.[20] Shortly thereafter, the Singapore government began discussions with Nanyang officials concerning a "reorganization" of the university.

In a further move, the Singapore Home Affairs Ministry on October 3, 1963, ordered the dissolution of the earlier-mentioned rural residents' and hawkers' associations on the ground that they were acting as Communist fronts. That same night thousands of SATU members assembled at the Nanyang University campus to "show solidarity" with the NUSU, which had declared a three-day student "strike." Meanwhile, Barisan spokesmen and publications intensified their tirades against Malaysia and alleged "semi-fascist conditions" in Singapore.[21]

While the government warned that the Communists, having failed "to capture power constitutionally in the recent election," were now preparing to resort "to more direct and violent forms of struggle," the SATU mobilized for a final test of strength. On October 8, about 100,000 workers belonging to SATU's "big seven" affiliates struck some 100 firms and bus companies in Singapore. However, within hours after the walkout began, serious dissension broke out among the strike leaders, non-SATU union members filled emergency assignments, and by the end of the day some of the striking unions had started a major move to dissociate themselves from the strike. Leaders of a score of smaller, nominally SATU-affiliated unions which had been expected to join the strike on October 9 now made it known that they would not take part in the action. Meanwhile, several prominent SATU leaders, among them three Barisan Sosialis members of the Legislative Assembly, had been arrested by the authorities, and four more wanted SATU officials had disappeared from sight.

In Kuala Lumpur, Minister of Internal Security Dato Ismail declared that the arrest of "some 15 leaders of the Communist united front" had been ordered because "they were responsible" for planning "acts of violence against the government" in furtherance of a plot to seize power "by creating disorder and chaos." Although the NUSU called a sympathy walkout and demonstration on October 9, the SATU leaders terminated the abortive strike action, warning however that if the government failed to heed their future demands it would face "the anger of the people." [22] The warning made no impression, and on October 31, 1963, the Singapore government formally dissolved the principal SATU-affiliated unions. Almost at once, a score of lesser unions which had hitherto been more or less in SATU's orbit switched allegiance and joined the new PAP-led anti-Communist National Trade Union Congress.

Although these developments dealt the Communists a temporary setback, they were followed by a lull in the anti-Communist drive which gave the impression that both the Singapore and Malaysian governments were hesitant to proceed with "a campaign of total destruction against Communist subversion." It was recalled in this connection that Premier Lee Kuan Yew had himself been the friend of many of the Barisan-SATU activists now behind bars. Moreover, although Lee had long known the identity of the MCP underground's emissary in Singapore (whom he called "the Plen"—short

[20] *Malayan Times*, Sept. 23 and 27, 1963. Shortly before the election, Tan Lark Sye had publicly urged the Singapore electorate to vote for Nanyang graduates, the bulk of whom were running as Barisan Sosialis candidates. This appeal earned him a rebuke from Singapore's Minister of Culture, S. Rajaratnam, who accused Tan of making a "racialist" and communalist appeal. *The Straits Times*, Sept. 15, 1963.

[21] *The Straits Times*, Oct. 4, 1963. *Cheng Sen Pau* (Barisan Sosialis Publications Committee, Singapore), Sept. 26 and Oct. 8, 1963.

[22] *The Straits Times*, Oct. 9, 1963.

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for "plenipotentiary") and had in fact met with him repeatedly in the course of 1959, he had never ordered any action against him in all the succeeding years, and indeed had gone so far, at the beginning of the anti-Communist drive following the September 1963 election, as to publicly warn him to get out of the country "within two weeks." [23]

Another complication was added by a jurisdictional conflict between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur over the formulation of security policy. Under the new Malaysian constitution, Singapore was entitled to autonomy in labor and educational matters, and the question arose whether this autonomy transcended Kuala Lumpur's security powers. The issue was raised with new sharpness as political relations between Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysian Premier Tunku Abdul Rahman noticeably cooled as a result of the disastrous defeat sustained in the election by Rahman's followers in the Singapore Alliance.

Developments in 1964

It was not until the sweeping victory of Premier Rahman's Alliance Party in the April 1964 parliamentary elections in the Malay states, which indicated both a repudiation of the non-Communist Chinese communal Left (*i.e.*, Lee Kuan Yew's PAP) and the continued strength of the conservative Malayan Chinese Association, that the Rahman government once again felt strong enough to undertake a determined drive against the remnants of the Communist front complex in Singapore. Early in June, an agreement was reached regarding the reorganization of Nanyang University, including the terms of financial assistance to be extended to the university by the Singapore government, and when the radicals in the NUSU protested against the agreement, 54 of the ringleaders were arrested by the police and security forces on June 30 on grounds of "Communist activity." Shortly afterwards 102 undergraduates were expelled from the university because their presence was held to be "not in the interests of higher education."

The June 30 arrests undoubtedly forestalled a new wave of Communist-instigated demonstrations in Singapore. Meanwhile, Rahman's election victory had already produced a serious rift in the ranks of the Singapore radical Left. On May 4, 1964, Lee Siew Choh and eight of his lieutenants broke away from the Barisan Sosialis, their secession signalling a split between a moderate wing led by some of the party's Nanyang intellectuals, who favored a moderation of the party's stand against Malaysia in view of the election results, and a militant "pro-Peking" faction headed by Lee himself.

At the same time, Indonesia's continuing policy of "confrontation" towards Malaysia—a policy pursued within the framework of a new Peking-Djakarta axis [24] and reflecting the driving force of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)—has invested the militancy of Lee Siew Choh and the Communist underground in Singapore with a broader and more far-reaching significance. Indonesia not only supports Azahari's rebels in North Borneo and the Chinese Communist guerrillas and underground in Sarawak, but also has provided a political haven for MCP activists who eluded police arrest in Singapore and escaped to Indonesia after the collapse of the abortive SATU strike last October.[25] The small, radical-Marxist "Socialist Front" in Malaya, whose leader, Ahmad Boestamam, was recently described in the Indonesian press as heading a new underground "Republic of Malaya," has also been reported receiving assistance from the PKI.[26]

The interlocking of the "Socialist Front"—a continuing target of Malaysian security measures—and the Communist undergrounds in Singapore and Sarawak suggests a broadly-based pattern of Communist-engineered revolutionary resistance to Malaysia. It is a development which, in the context of Peking's close support for Indonesia's anti-Malaysia campaign and Communist China's advocacy of a militant policy in the underdeveloped countries generally, is not likely to be overlooked by the Singapore Chinese.

[23] *Ibid.*, Oct. 15-16, 1963; see also Lee Kuan Yew, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-6, 44-7.

[24] See the author's "The Sino-Indonesian Partnership —Its Origins and Implications," *Orbis* (University of Pennsylvania), Summer 1964.

[25] See the author's "Communism and the Guerrilla War in Sarawak," *The World Today* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London), February 1964, pp. 50-60; and *The Malay Mail* (Singapore), Oct. 16, 1963.

[26] *Berita Indonesia* (Djakarta), Oct. 20, 1963; *The Straits Times*, March 13 and Oct. 21, 1963.

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Colonialism—Old and New

STEWART C. EASTON: *The Rise and Fall of Western Colonialism.* New York, Praeger, 1963.
WALTER KOLARZ: *Communism and Colonialism.* New York, St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1964.
MANFRED HALPERN: *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa.* Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1963.
DAVID MORISON: *The USSR and Africa.* London, Oxford University Press, 1964.
LEOPOLD SEDAR SENGHOR: *On African Socialism.* New York, Praeger, 1964.
MICHAEL BRECHER: *The New States of Asia: A Political Analysis.* London, Oxford University Press, 1963.

Reviewed by G. S. Bhargava

WESTERN OBSERVERS are baffled by what they regard as Asian-African "double-think" on colonialism. Since World War II, the Western empires have fallen or are in dissolution, but simultaneously a new empire, that of the Communists, has risen. Yet very few Asian and African leaders give tongue to this phenomenon. They turn the spotlight on the mote of the last vestiges of Western imperialism, such as the Portuguese possessions in Asia and Africa, but overlook the beam in the Communist eye.

The Bandung Conference in 1955 provided an instructive illustration. To quote Brecher:

India, Burma and Indonesia, among others, expected unanimity on a vague condemnation of colonialism, by which they meant Western control in Asia and Africa. But this line was dramatically challenged by Ceylon's [Sir John] Kotelawala who pressed for "opposition to all forms of colonialism, . . . to Soviet colonialism as much as to Western imperialism.

After much haggling an Indian compromise was accepted, referring to "colonialism in all its manifestations."

Today the situation, insofar as reluctance to point an accusing finger at Moscow is concerned, is worse than in 1955. Ceylon has of course moved far away from Sir John's position, and it is doubtful how many Asian-African countries, including Pakistan which is a member of SEATO and CENTO, would now adopt such a stance. Significantly, any attitude of apportioning guilt evenly between the East and the West is not regarded as neutralism but as pro-Westernism.

In line, with this sentiment, a competition is on between the

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sponsors of a second conference of non-aligned nations on one hand, and Chinese and Indonesian protagonists of a second "Bandung" on the other, to see who can take the most militant approach to colonialism. The Chinese and their backers have not forgotten the lukewarmness of African reaction to the late Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru's stress, at the Belgrade Conference of 1961, on the need for reducing international tension even to the relative neglect of the struggle against colonialism. Thus the Chinese press has been saying that while the proposed non-aligned conference (to be held in Cairo) would concentrate attention on the task of maintaining world peace, the second Bandung would be "primarily anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist." Silence in the face of such Chinese propaganda would lead to a loss of face in the Asian-African community. So the Yugoslavs, among the sponsors of the Cairo conference, have come out with a declaration that "liquidation of colonialism is one of the most urgent tasks of the policy of non-alignment." Obviously the Soviet variety of colonialism is excluded from this condemnation, despite Yugoslavia's own experience with Moscow's sustained attempt to crush its independence.

Paralleling the Yugoslav resistance to Soviet pressure, such non-aligned countries as India, the United Arab Republic, and Ghana have not hesitated to take stringent steps against Communist subversion when their national interest demanded it. Yet this has not interfered with their predisposition to single out Western colonialism for attack. Nor is this attitude an exclusive attribute of neutralism. Even Western allies like Pakistan feel it will be in their national interest to join the Peking chorus against colonialism at the proposed second conference of the Bandung states.

NONE OF THE BOOKS under review directly unravels the enigma of the Asian-African attitude on colonialism. But the impact of postwar developments on the Asian-African scene has been so thoroughly analyzed by the authors that several explanations of the apparent double standard emerge. The likely repercussions of this attitude in terms of the two continents' receptivity to communism have also been assessed, especially by Halpern. Coupled with Easton's historical survey of the emergence and decay of the Western empires in Asia and Africa, Halpern's work, though confined to the area from Morocco to Pakistan, provides a panoramic view of the old and new colonialisms, shedding light on the totalitarian threat implicit in the latter.

Linked to the Asian-African "double standard" in judging Western and Russian colonialisms is the Soviet Union's own hypocritical approach to the right of self-determination of peoples. In brief, the USSR demands for others the freedoms which it denies to its "own subject peoples." Edward Crankshaw, in his foreword to the collection of the late Mr. Kolarz's broadcast scripts, points out that the Russians' attitude "to what they call imperialism . . . is an example of political humbug." Kolarz's essays expose the Soviet deception in a bold and lucid sweep. Still, Communist professions of support in the struggle against colonialism are accepted at their face value by millions of Asians and Africans. Why? Is it because of an innate preference for the Communist system or the Soviet bloc?

THE AUTHORS of the books under review do not take such an alarmist view. They have other explanations, including on one side the effectiveness of Communist propaganda, the Communists' aptitude in preaching one thing and practicing another, and the opportunities afforded them in the sphere of pure power politics. Easton points to the example of Soviet behavior in the United Nations, stating:

. . . it is only necessary to read a few of the thousands of speeches made by the Soviet representatives . . . to recognize how effective [the USSR's] skeptical pin-pricks could be. . . . Any petitioner [from a colonial area] with a grievance against the administering Power knew he would always receive a sympathetic hearing from the Soviet delegate, whether it was in the Trusteeship Council, the Fourth Committee, the General Assembly or even the Security Council. . . . The petitioner neither knew nor cared what the motives of the Soviet delegate were.

On the other side of the coin, the Western powers, including the United States which long ago gave up its only colony of the Philippines, have not been able to match the Soviet Union in bandying the charge of imperialism because of their own vulnerability. As Easton puts it, despite the rate at which they have relinquished former dependencies, "there were always other colonies which had not yet received [self-government] . . . where they could be accused of moving too slowly." The US has shared in this vulnerability by agreeing that in some cases its allies "could not simply withdraw and leave the colonies to themselves"—in particular where the threat of Communist expansion was great.

From the Western point of view this argument is undoubtedly plausible, but it does not carry conviction with the colonial and ex-colonial peoples. No less a person than Mahatma Gandhi had asked Britain to leave India to God in the thick of the war against Japan. The

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Asians and Africans feel that any inhibitions qualifying the Western stand on colonialism should naturally be suspect in their eyes.

Moreover, the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa have suffered under Western imperialism, whereas the plight of the people under Communist hegemony is relatively unknown to them. Brecher pinpoints the difference when he illustrates the "inconsistent" Indian response in the Suez and Hungarian episodes. It was simply easier for Indians to identify themselves with Egyptians than with Hungarians: "To most Asian and African leaders violence between Whites and other Whites is bad but violence of Whites against non-Whites is infinitely worse." In the context of two centuries of European domination over Asia and Africa it is not unnatural that such a racial reaction should have developed.

The Communist advantage is not confined to propaganda. In the case of countries which have achieved independence through insurrections both Moscow and Peking have lent material and moral support. A Western power, however sympathetic it may be to colonial peoples (*e.g.*, the Tunisians), is hamstrung both by political alliances with other (until recently colonial) powers, as well as by its natural disinclination to adopt the same means and methods as the Communists.

THE SOVIET and later Chinese identification with the colonial peoples' struggles has not, however, contributed much to the strength of local Communist parties. In the balance sheet drawn by Halpern, the disadvantage to these parties of shaping policy in line with Soviet rather than local requirements has offset the reflected glory of Russian support for the nationalist cause. In the cases of India, Pakistan and Burma, the twists and turns in Communist policy under Stalin's dictates left the Communists isolated from the mainstream of nationalism. Even in Indonesia, the nationalists and the socialists led by Soetan Sjahrir outshone the Communists during the freedom struggle.

In the Middle East the USSR came on the scene rather late in the day. It was only from 1955 on that Moscow began to offer arms, economic aid and diplomatic support first to Egypt and later to other countries. The same year of 1955 marked Chou En-lai's triumph at Bandung. Prior to that, international communism, notwithstanding its general support to the struggles of the colonial peoples, had been inhibited in its approach by its ideological distrust of "bourgeois nationalism." Morison points out that as late as 1954 D. A. Olderogge and I. I. Potekhin, authors of the first major Soviet work on Africa, *The Peoples of Africa*, were questioning the motives of "bourgeois nationalist" leaders like Dr. Azikiwe of Nigeria and Dr. Nkrumah of Ghana. Thus in some cases nationalist sympathy was alienated on ideological grounds, to the detriment of the local Communist movements.

In other cases, Moscow's tactics have done outright damage to its local supporters. In Iran, first in 1921 and again in 1946, the Tudeh Party was abandoned by Moscow at the cost of many Communist lives, when the USSR found it unprofitable to protect the separatist regional movements which the Communists had established as springboards for revolutionary action. In 1953, Moscow again prevented the Communists from seizing power when Dr. Mossadegh was overthrown by conservative elements. Obviously the Soviet leaders were not then prepared for a showdown with the West in the region—a consideration which is still significant today.

The Asian and African leaders have been quick to see through the local Communists' efforts to cash in on Russian and Chinese professions of support to their cause. The USSR, India and Ghana offer notable examples of this. Furthermore, the sharp exchanges between Moscow and Cairo during 1958-59 showed that when the USSR poked its nose into Arab internecine quarrels, like the Western powers in the past, its special luster began to wane. In this context, Halpern states:

Few, if any, Middle Eastern leaders have doubts about the discipline that ties Communist parties as such to Moscow. A few politicians, misled by earlier Middle Eastern perspectives, have tried to use the Communist Party as a broker for securing the support of the USSR for their own political careers. (This may well have been the gambit attempted by Deputy Premier Khalid al-Azm of Syria in his drive for the Syrian presidency just before others cut the ground under him by joining Syria to Egypt.)

THE BALANCE SHEET of Communist successes and failures is further examined in David Morison's *The USSR and Africa*, a useful review of the upsurge of Russian interest in the once-dark continent in the shape of diplomatic contacts, trade relations, economic aid and cultural relations. Morison voices his agreement with Professor J. S. Berliner that whatever the political motives of Soviet aid, the appearance of Soviet Russia on the African scene has not been unwholesome. "States which might otherwise have had no choice but to accept Western aid, and perhaps to accept it grudgingly, can now weigh the comparative advantages of Western and Soviet bloc aid. . . ."—an argument re-

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flecting the viewpoint of many Westerners that the best way of buttressing Asian-African nationalism against communism is through liberal economic aid to the developing countries.

As Morison helps to show, the political strings attached to Soviet aid have been modified in recent years. Possibly Moscow has come to realize that peoples who have spurned Western tutelage will not turn around and embrace the Soviet variety—notwithstanding their mental reservations about bracketing the two overtly. Or perhaps the Soviet leaders feared the isolation that would have followed the USSR's failure to match Western efforts to help the developing countries. The political aim of Soviet aid is hardly as disinterested, of course, as some spokesmen suggest—consider the following statement by a Soviet writer, B. Pichugin:

In its relations with the capitalist countries the Soviet Union utilizes economic contacts principally as an important lever for strengthening peaceful relations and establishing the desired confidence between states with different social systems.

A franker voice would have admitted that this "important lever" has been aimed mainly at helping to neutralize Asia and Africa and at preventing the countries of the area from entering into Western-sponsored defense pacts. In any event, since the majority of these countries were already inclined to be neutral and to stay away from Western military alliances, the "lever" of aid has at best only strengthened a prevailing trend.

Where a regime was not so disposed, as in Pakistan, no amount of Soviet threats and cajolings could bring about a change of its policy. In 1961-62 Moscow openly told Pakistan that to be entitled to economic aid on a par with India, the country would have to walk out of SEATO and CENTO. But Pakistan did not fall for the bait. On the other hand, China did not overtly attack Pakistan's participation in the Western military alliances—and so developed the Rawalpindi-Peking entente.

On the whole, Morison concedes that "Soviet state interests and not concern for the fortunes of communism are the deciding factor" in the extension of aid to the African countries. So it is in the case of the Asian and Arab states. The question of the Sino-Soviet ideological rift aside, it is difficult to find a theoretical explanation for either Soviet or Chinese policies in the different parts of Asia and Africa—except perhaps in terms of the basic, ultimate Communist objective of world conquest. By supporting an anti-Communist semi-military regime in Pakistan, China has virtually written off the Communist movement in that country. Similarly, by consistently siding with India in Indo-Pakistan disputes like Kashmir, irrespective of Communist theories, the Soviet Union has shown a singular lack of concern for the local Communists.

THE SINO-SOVIET conflict has not been considered in detail in any of these books, obviously because it had not erupted into the open when they were being written. The lack of this perspective is unfortunate since the rift is apt to have an immense impact on the course of communism in Asia and Africa. Intermittently, however, the authors offer some relevant observations. Halpern, for example, discussing the early signs of Middle Eastern reaction to the emergent struggle, quotes the Moroccan leader Mehdi Ben Barka's remark that there seemed to be a great distinction arising in the Communist world, with the USSR representing the "communism of the rich" and China the "communism of the poor." Halpern goes on to state that "China appears to have several political and social attractions that the USSR either no longer or else never possessed for some Middle Easterners." There is truth in this assertion, though in the reviewer's opinion Halpern oversimplifies both the advantages and the disadvantages of the Chinese position. On one hand, he misjudges the Asian-African mentality if he thinks that people will be repelled by the relative Russian affluence in the Communist world. Power and pelf have as much attraction for the populace of the underdeveloped areas as they have for the inhabitants of the industrialized countries. On the other side of the coin, the "alarm" which Halpern says the Chinese attack on India has raised among Arabs consists in part of awe at China's show of superior military might. In the case of some Asians and Africans, this feeling of awe has outweighed the sympathy felt for India as the victim of deceit and aggression.

The long-range effect of the Sino-Soviet dispute on Asian-African opinion will depend to a great extent on the postures struck by Moscow and Peking—and these are the great unknowns of the future. Will Moscow attempt to compete with Peking in anti-Western militancy or will it play a more responsible role in Asian and African affairs, consistent with its present position on peaceful coexistence? Following the Moscow-Peking rift fissures have arisen in all the Communist parties of Asia and Africa; but except in the case of India, both the USSR and China are pursuing the same strategy of overtly wooing the "bourgeois nationalist" leaders in control of the Asian and African states. Will Peking continue on this course or will it switch over to a tough line of militant opposition to the nationalist regimes in these

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countries, as the pro-Chinese Communists seem to be doing in India? In that case, will the Soviet Union and the Communists under its tutelage lend support to the nationalist governments against the Peking-inspired attacks?

These are questions to which time alone can provide the answers. In India at least, a pattern of Chinese hostility in contrast to Soviet support for the governing regime has been emerging. Should this pattern spread elsewhere in the Asian-African world, Peking might well start attacking Moscow as an imperialist and colonialist power, and might then take up cudgels on behalf of the peoples subjugated by Great Russian chauvinism. Moscow in that case would undoubtedly return the compliment by pointing an accusing finger at Tibet and North Vietnam. Whatever other mischief such exchanges might lead to, they might have the beneficial effect of opening Asian and African eyes to the fallacy of the double standard on colonialism.

THE COURSE of the Sino-Soviet struggle should prove especially interesting in Africa. During the last two years China has rushed onto the African scene at full steam. It is too early to assess the results of the rise of Chinese influence, but of one thing there is no doubt—Peking has no intention of leaving the field free for Moscow to exploit. In short, the quest for influence is no longer a two-way race between the West and the Soviet Union, but a three-cornered contest. With France out of tune with the Western alliance there is a possibility of a fourth dimension also developing, foreshadowed in the commercial transactions finalized between France, China and the former "French territories" in Africa following Paris' recognition of the Peking regime.

Hitherto, the African states of the French Community have been the most invulnerable to communism on the continent, in theory as well as in practice. They are a more homogeneous group of states, judging by their foreign and domestic policies, than the members of the British Commonwealth. The European concept of individual liberty has entered African thinking in these countries. The African road to socialism, as unfolded by the President of Senegal in his *On African Socialism*, is a clear negation of so-called scientific socialism as conceived by Marx and practiced by Lenin and Stalin. It centers around the concept of Nation which Senghor feels is the living reality of the 20th century.

An ethical bias which even European social democracy often lacks is evident in the African approach to socialism. As in India and Burma (before the advent of Gen. Ne Win), the Socialists in Africa put great stress on building a society of people who are not merely well-fed, well-clothed and well-housed but spiritually rich as well. In India and Burma a blend was sought between egalitarianism and the respective principal religions of Hinduism and Buddhism. Senghor's African socialism seeks a similar meld with Christianity. In his book he seconds the view of a Senegalese visitor to Russia who remarked that "the Soviet Union has succeeded in building socialism but at the sacrifice of religion, of the soul."

What will be the impact of the Chinese thrust, in terms of trade and cultural contacts, on such thinking? Given the very low living standards in Africa and the slow pace of growth, will the Chinese "leap forward" attract the Socialist camp away from the democratic and gradualist path? Already, many leaders of the states in the French Community are being attacked as "dark-skinned Europeans" by the more militant leaders of North Africa, a charge to which they cannot be insensitive.

IN THIS CONFUSING mosaic of conflicting ideological, racial and political currents the basic force of nationalism stands out. It is essentially the nationalist urge that has sparked the freedom struggles in Asia and Africa. Neutralism or non-alignment is a kind of nationalism in international affairs. Having disowned the West, the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa are hardly likely to walk into the Communist parlor. In the words of the editor of a leading Cairo daily, the Asian and African leaders say: "The Communists did good service in the struggle against imperialism; but now the struggle is over, or almost over and they should shut up."

In discussing the Asian-African future, Walter Kolarz speaks in his essays of two possible long-range alternatives. Either communism will penetrate the Asian-African world and cause the decline of nationalism, or vice versa—as he puts it, "Afro-Asian nationalism will make ideological conquests in the Soviet Union and bring about its decolonization." Kolarz' view is oversimplified in that the main target of his attack is Soviet colonialism and he seems to think only in terms of the Soviet brand of communism, an attitude that has become obsolete with the emergence of Maoism. Yet even when communism is distinguished in its Soviet and Chinese varieties, it is hard to imagine either winning out against the force of nationalism, which today has the single, most powerful hold on Asian and African minds. Indeed, if the contest must be stated in penultimate terms, Kolarz' second alternative —the conquest of communism by nationalism—seems far the more likely.

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The Asian Scene

A. DOAK BARNETT, Ed.: *Communist Strategies in Asia: A Comparative Analysis of Governments and Parties.* New York, Praeger, 1963.
ROBERT A. SCALAPINO, Ed.: *North Korea Today.* New York, Praeger, 1963.
BERNARD B. FALL: *The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis.* New York, Praeger, 1963.
HOANG VAN CHI: *From Colonialism to Communism: A Case History of North Vietnam.* New York, Praeger, 1963.

Reviewed by Joseph C. Kun

SOME TIME AGO an interesting rumor circulated in Eastern Europe. Nobody knew its origin, but it was likely to have come from Moscow. The gist of it was that in exchange for agreeing to the convocation of a new international conference of Communist parties, Peking had asked for a distribution of voting strength at the conference based on the size of the membership of the parties represented.

It was an unfounded rumor and was soon forgotten. But what made it even fleetingly significant is the fact that the combined membership of the Chinese Communist Party and the four most important pro-Chinese parties in Asia constitutes roughly half of the total membership of all Communist parties in the world.

The crucial role of the major Asian Communist parties in present (and future) world affairs is quite clear. The information available on them in the West, however, remains extremely scarce. Thus any effort to explain the character of these parties and to show their position within the wider perspective of Communist interrelations is particularly welcome. *Communist Strategies in Asia*, edited by A. Doak Barnett of Columbia University, represents an attempt to do just that. The volume is made up of eight papers originally presented in briefer form for a symposium on communism in Asia, held during the 1962 annual meeting of the Association of Asian Studies. The work presents a comparative analysis of six Asian Communist organizations: the Communist parties of Japan, India, and Indonesia, and the ruling party regimes of North Korea, North Vietnam, and Mongolia.

There are many ways of comparing parties and governments in Asia or in any other part of the world. The authors' approach in this case is to examine the impact on the six parties created by the Sino-Soviet conflict and by the emergence of two Communist models, the Soviet and the Chinese.

IN AN EXCELLENT short essay that forms chapter one of the volume, Donald S. Zagoria demonstrates to what extent the Chinese themselves have been influenced by and benefited from the Soviet model, and to what extent they have departed from it. He examines the main differ-

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ences between the Chinese and Soviet experiences with respect to the roads the two regimes traversed to achieve power, the timing of their civil wars, and the respective stages of social and economic development they have reached. Whether the Soviet or the Chinese experience is the more relevant as a model for underdeveloped areas is, of course, one of the major sources of disagreement between the two principal Communist powers.

In a second essay, Robert C. North examines the two different world outlooks that have been promoted by Moscow and Peking—and in this context, the two different approaches toward the national bourgeoisie that have been taken by Communist parties operating in underdeveloped countries. He goes on to discuss various questions concerning the origin and development of Chinese and Soviet views on revolution and peaceful coexistence.

The individual party studies presented in the remaining six chapters offer an interesting complex of parallels and contrasts. Of the six parties, three are struggling for predominant influence (the Japanese, Indonesian and Indian), while the other three are already in power (the North Korean, North Vietnamese and Mongolian). Four of the parties belong to countries immediately bordering on China, while two (the Japanese and Indonesian) are separated from the Chinese mainland by sea. A different four of the six are run by pro-Chinese leaderships while two (the Indian and Mongolian) stand behind the Soviet Union.

With respect to the parties' positions in the Sino-Soviet dispute, it must be noted that the essays in the volume, though revised and updated after initial presentation, end with developments that took place more than a year ago. Many of the events of 1963 and early 1964 had important bearing on the alignment of the parties with Moscow and Peking. These developments could not, of course, be taken into account.

Thus, Mr. Paul F. Langer in his otherwise excellent essay on the Japanese CP, stated that "in examining the Japanese Communists' position on the Moscow-Peking spectrum, the term 'developing affinity' seems to describe best their present relationship to the Chinese Communists" (p. 84). This "developing affinity" has, since the beginning of last year, become something more concrete. Last fall, the party made a sharp turn toward Peking. Since then the JCP has taken a clear stand against the Moscow test-ban treaty, a development which was recently dramatized by the expulsion from the party of two of its seven deputies to the Japanese Parliament for their support of the treaty.

THE SAME TREND seems evident in the Indonesian Communist Party which, influenced by certain events late last year, particularly by Aidit's trip to the Soviet Union and China, turned sharply in Peking's direction. In her essay on the PKI, Miss McVey expressed the opinion that Indonesian Communist reaction to the Sino-Soviet conflict had been determined by the party's stand on domestic affairs and not the other way around (p. 188). This, however, no longer seems to be the case. The Indonesian party—caught like other Communist parties in the dilemma of having to choose sides—apparently made its final decision in favor of Peking after a futile attempt by Aidit to mediate between the Soviet and Chinese parties. Within the limits of this basic alignment, the Indonesian party seems bent on playing something of an independent role in the conflict. This effort is illustrated by the PKI's recently proclaimed doctrine on four categories of Communist parties in the international movement—surely one of the most curious ideological innovations in recent years. Such qualifications notwithstanding, in the reviewer's opinion the Japanese and Indonesian parties can at this moment be safely counted on the Chinese side.

Mr. Harry Gelman's excellent outline of the thorny path traveled by the Communist Party of India since 1956 seems to have been least affected by the time gap between the appearance of the volume and the present. Mr. Gelman's conclusion that the Indian party has found itself "incapable of non-alignment insofar as it involves neutrality on policy issues disputed by the two bloc leaders" (p. 141) holds as true today as it did a year ago. Since the spring of 1963 the CPI has continued to be a Sino-Soviet battleground. The leading members of the party's Chinese faction, recently suspended, have now announced plans to call a new party congress and eventually to form their own central committee, steps similar to the course of events that took place in Ceylon.

THE SITUATION is no less interesting in the case of the three ruling parties examined in the volume. Since early 1963 the Mongolian Communists have gone farther in siding with the Russians in the Sino-Soviet rift. The latest dramatic example of this alliance was the MPR's virtual expulsion of all Chinese workers, ridding Mongolia of what Robert A. Rupen in his essay had called "the most effective tool the Chinese possess" in that country—manpower.

At the same time, the two pro-Chinese ruling parties in North Vietnam and North Korea have leaned farther towards Peking. By refusing to sign the Moscow test ban treaty, the Vietnamese Communists climbed off the

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fence they had long been riding so successfully. Their alliance with the Communist Chinese, in the opinion of this reviewer, became complete following Ho Chi Min's unsuccessful mediation attempt in Moscow early this year. The North Koreans, too, have increasingly underscored their allegiance to the Chinese. Thus, by now two of the ruling Communist parties in Asia have become Peking's allies in the power struggle between China and the Soviet Union.

While the alignment of the various Asian Communist parties has become clear, it is not as easy to ascertain the extent to which they will attempt to emulate the Chinese or Soviet models of development. The likelihood is that instead of consistently imitating either model, the various parties under discussion will develop their own formulas for the road to power and for the "building of socialism," trying at the same time to profit from both Soviet and Chinese experience. Today ideological alliance does not necessarily compel complete subordination to one particular model as far as either economics or politics is concerned.

THE REMAINING three volumes under review deal with North Korea and the two Vietnams. *North Korea Today* is a collection of scholarly articles which first appeared in a special issue of the *China Quarterly* in the spring of 1963. The nine articles in the volume cover a broad range of subjects, including politics (domestic and foreign), agriculture, industry, administration, education, and the army. Much of the material presented is still as useful as when it was first published.

One qualifying criticism seems in order concerning Mr. Scalapino's excellent piece on North Korean foreign relations. Mr. Scalapino (who is also the editor of the volume) states in his article that North Korea has succeeded in maintaining a position of neutralism in the Sino-Soviet conflict, while at the same time favoring Peking's hard-line policies. In the reviewer's opinion, by the end of 1962 North Korea's alliance with the Chinese Communists was practically complete. Then and ever since the North Korean leaders have sided with Peking on all important ideological and political issues of the Sino-Soviet debate, including the rejection of the Moscow test ban treaty. The fact that the North Koreans have refrained from personal attacks on Khrushchev and other leaders of the CPSU cannot be taken as a sign that they are neutral or only partially committed to Peking in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

OF THE TWO MONOGRAPHS on Vietnam, Bernard B. Fall's work is the more ambitious in scope. He starts out by reviewing the history of Vietnam, the road that led to the revolution in the North, and the separation of the country along the 17th parallel. He then comments perceptively on North Vietnam's communization and finally on the growing problems of South Vietnam. Although much of what is in this volume is new and well told, the reviewer profited most from an essay on Ho Chi Min (chapter 6), which is the first biography of the Vietnamese leader available in English. The Ho Chi Min that emerges from Mr. Fall's description is not the gentle scholar portrayed in Communist or pro-Communist literature, but rather an iron-fisted organizer who, without adding anything essential to the body of Marxist-Leninist theory, has for the past forty years led Vietnamese communism from success to success.

Mr. Hoang Van Chi's book is of a somewhat different nature. The author is not a historian but has been an active participant in much of what he describes in his book. A non-Communist nationalist, Hoang Van Chi took part in his country's armed resistance against the French and left North Vietnam for Saigon after the division of Vietnam along the 17th parallel.

Perhaps the most interesting section of the book is the author's description of the Vietnamese Communist application of thought reform. The regime's so-called correctional training course for party cadres, government personnel, and intellectuals is discussed in two chapters, complete with details on the methods and the curriculum used. The picture that emerges is of a ruthless system of "re-education" which has much in common with the practices of the Chinese Communists.

Together, the studies of Vietnam provide invaluable background on the divided country that has today become one of the major trouble spots on the globe.

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NOTES & VIEWS

Economic Integration in the Soviet Bloc

By George Kemeny

Recent endeavors to achieve a higher form of economic integration in the Soviet orbit are opposed by forces drawing on a peculiar combination of political currents and prejudices, some of them rooted in the Stalinist past. Economic nationalism, which had been firmly embedded in the spirit of East Central Europe's bourgeois or semi-feudal regimes of the interwar period, witnessed a strange revival after World War II under Stalin's scepter. Tyrannical as the dictator's rule over his newly established empire was, it fostered nationalism in the economic field by imposing comprehensive industrialization programs on the dominated countries. The Stalinist economic model was readily accepted by the Communist parties in the satellite countries and put into operation by the bureaucracies in charge of the new planning offices that were created. These bureaucracies were generally headed by Communists who had descended on their respective countries in the wake of the Soviet occupation armies. They had a more or less thorough training in Marxist economics but were hardly aware of up-to-date theory on foreign trade.

In the economically less advanced regions of the Danube basin, Communist planners were faced with a problem that had been a major worry to the governments of the interwar period. From the early 1920's on the flow of surplus labor from the agricultural areas to the United States had ceased, and unemployment had become widespread. There was no real way to attack this problem within national boundaries, since the only alternative to idle manpower was the establishment of high-cost industries the countries could ill afford. Yet the interwar regimes were inhibited by prevailing conditions and their own attitudes from seeking relief on a regional scale; certainly they gave little thought to the subtleties of the theory of comparative costs, upon which the logic of international trading is based.

This autarchic outlook was assimilated by the Communist politicians and planners and intermingled with the Stalinist idea of all-round industrialization. The odd mixture that resulted is reminiscent of 17th-century mercantilism, which counted any substitution of home-produced goods for imports as an advantage. Yet for all their disposition toward autarchy, the small economies of Eastern Europe were not able to attain anything approaching self-sufficiency. What the postwar regimes achieved by their policies was the shift of imports from semimanufactured and manufactured products to certain raw materials. A pattern of intra-bloc trade thus evolved, based on the exchange of raw materials produced in Russia for industrial products of the dependent countries. This pattern would not necessarily in itself have constituted a disadvantage for the nations of Eastern Europe; what harmed them was the irrational industrial structure created by Stalinist dogmatism.

At the start, the economies of the dependent countries were geared to Soviet reconstruction requirements, and exchanges with Russia were imposed on the satellite nations as

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a matter of top priority. Residual items only, not wanted by the USSR, were available first for trading among the satellites and second and last for trade in Western markets. It was a trading system of a radial bilateralism, with the Soviet Union symbolizing the hub and the dependent countries the spokes. This system resulted at best in the neglect, at worst in the obstruction, of the development of closer economic ties among the people of the Danube basin.[1]

Stalin's heirs recognized the immense waste inherent in the Stalinist method of intra-bloc relations, and they were determined to replace this economic insanity with a rational program of cooperation. They called for a balanced growth of the bloc's extracting and processing industries in order to avoid bottlenecks, advocated the coordination of investment projects to eliminate duplication, and pleaded for industrial specialization to secure the advantages of large-scale economy. Prior to the turmoil of 1956, there was already talk of creating a master plan which would encompass the economy of the entire bloc.

Actual developments took a far slower and pragmatic course. The vehicle chosen for the promotion of cooperative efforts was the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance—referred to in short as Comecon or CEMA—a bloc organization that had been formed in 1949 as a countermove to the Marshall Plan but had remained dormant during Stalin's reign. As a start, resolutions were passed and agreements concluded within Comecon in support of industrial specialization. The first tentative steps toward a closer bloc system were made in 1958, when a summit meeting of the Comecon countries issued directives calling for the coordination of economic planning and for the drawing up of perspective plans stretching over two decades, from 1961 to 1980.

The decision to coordinate economic plans did not appear at first to affect the concept of voluntary cooperation that prevailed in Comecon proceedings. This concept was given official emphasis in the Comecon Statute of 1960, which characterized the organization as one operated by sovereign states on the principle of equal rights. While "sovereign" and "equal" are relative terms in the Communist lexicon, the changing relations within the Communist world in the post-Stalin era have given them greater meaning. The same terms dominated at the Moscow Communist World Congress held in 1960, where equality was declared to be the leading principle governing dealings among Communist parties and governments, and where homage was also paid to the principles of national sovereignty and independence.

In the conduct of Comecon affairs, stress had been laid on the achievement of voluntary economic cooperation mainly through the method of bilateral negotiation. But as soon as plan coordination on a bloc-wide scale became a task for serious consideration, the clumsy bilateral procedures practiced in Comecon were bound to prove ineffective.

At a Comecon summit meeting convened in Moscow in June 1962 a preliminary attempt was made to create an organizational structure which could be adapted to the requirements of supranational planning. An Executive Committee was formed, with the vice-premiers responsible for economic development in the respective countries as its members. A Planning Board was established as well. No decision was announced on the exact powers and functions of these bodies. However, it became clear in succeeding months that the proponents of integration—and in the first instance Nikita Khrushchev—wanted to give the new structure power enough to override the hampering restrictions of voluntarism.

In supporting Comecon's reorganization, Khrushchev recognized that nationalism in Eastern Europe was an active force obstructing full-scale integration. In an attempt to overcome this difficulty he revealed, somewhat belatedly (in August 1962), that he was willing to renounce the development of Soviet industry along autarchic lines and to pledge Soviet participation in Comecon schemes aimed at a sensible division of labor: "The Soviet Union is ready to cut down even the production of some types of manufactured goods if it should turn out to be more expedient to produce them in other Comecon countries." [2] In an article published in September 1962,[3] and two months later in a speech delivered to the CPSU Central Committee, he put forward proposals calling for the formation of a planning body which could become a central authority for selecting investment projects and allocating resources.

The new Executive Committee of Comecon met at Bucharest in December 1962, but in its report released to the public it did not refer to the suggestions of the Soviet Premier; instead, it reaffirmed the principle of national sovereignty. And at another Moscow summit meeting of the Comecon countries in July 1963, it became clear that the members were so divided over the issues of economic integration and supranational planning that it was impossible to reach any agreement on the revision of the Comecon statute.

Thus while the new Comecon bodies continue to exist, they do not enjoy formal statutory recognition. Decisions of the Executive Committee are binding only if they are accepted unanimously. The Planning Board, instead of developing

[1] See this author's "Eastern Europe: Developments in Social and Economic Structure," *World Politics*, Vol. VI, No. 1, October 1953.

[2] *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, August 1962.

[3] *World Marxist Review*, September 1962.

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into a common planning agency, is limited to the function of coordinating national plans *ex post*. And the basic system of bilateral negotiation persists with only slight modification. Under this system, the perspective plans drawn up in each country are examined bilaterally in search of possibilities of a division of labor. The findings, classified by industrial branches, are then submitted to Comecon's standing committees, which conduct a similar examination on a bloc-wide basis. If and when committee proposals are unanimously acted upon by the Executive Committee, they are passed on to the governments concerned and become valid only after ratification by those governments.

It was primarily the dogged resistance of the Rumanian party leadership that brought about the defeat of the supranational concept. The Rumanian Central Committee had reaffirmed, in a session of March 1963, its adherence to the aforementioned 1960 Moscow declaration. At the same time the party's official paper *Scinteia* had emphasized that bilateral methods should continue to prevail in the field of plan coordination.

Obviously full-scale integration would be of paramount advantage to the Soviet leadership. Achieving a system of supranational control would constitute a double victory at one blow, leading to a more effective utilization of resources within the bloc and also to the imposition of institutional bonds on the dependent nations as a means of stricter political domination. Yet encroachment on a hitherto jealously guarded sphere of activity of the national governments is a delicate problem. During Stalin's reign the satellite regimes were left to themselves to draw up their plans, the sole condition being that they give priority stress to heavy industrial investment. Moscow did not try to dictate what other industries were to be developed, and investment programs were thus determined on national lines. Supranational planning would therefore deprive the governments of Eastern Europe of powers they had wielded even under the rigid conditions of Stalinism. Such a system would, in its consequences, also run counter to the post-Stalin trend toward "equality" of rights that has allowed them relative freedom of action.

No doubt mixed feelings about the possible outcome of bloc-wide planning exist not only in Bucharest but in the other East European capitals, even while overt opposition has been left to the Rumanians. There has long been evidence of suspicion, for example, that the drive for industrial specialization—carried on through Comecon since as far back as 1956—has been aimed at retarding industrialization in the less advanced Comecon countries. This line of thinking might conceivably align the industrial late-comers—notably Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland—in common opposition against further integration plans. The stand taken by the different countries is, however, determined by complex factors that warrant some examination.

At one pole, East Germany stands as the most fervent supporter of the Soviet concept of close cooperation. Its political and economic position is so precarious, its dependence on Soviet raw materials so desperate, that any further tightening of the ties within the orbit might be welcomed by the Ulbricht regime. Czechoslovakia is on the same side of the fence as East Germany. Both of these highly industrialized countries have engineering industries which depend to a great extent on exports, and thus any move toward promoting foreign trade suits their interest. Moreover, the acute difficulties of the Czechoslovak regime in the area of economic planning and in the political field, coupled with Novotny's personally precarious position due to his Stalinist past, might overcome any disposition in Prague to oppose Moscow.

The attitude exhibited by Poland is a different story. Far from displaying the distrust of further integration that might have been expected from the leader of a country that is among the newcomers in the field of industrialization, Gomulka sided with Khrushchev in the latter's proposals to build up Comecon as a supranational planning agency. It is true that Gomulka's conformity was qualified. He repeatedly stressed the necessity of coordinating capital investment—in effect putting in a claim for capital contribution if Poland was to undertake an expansion of her mining industry within the framework of an intra-bloc division of labor. There may be other reasons, too, which caused the Polish party chief to avoid opposition to Moscow. Nonrecognition of the Oder-Neisse line by the West worries the Poles and makes them lean heavily on the Soviet Union. In addition, their account is "debited" in Moscow by a farm policy—unique in the orbit—that has resisted wholesale collectivization in favor of the system of individual peasant holdings.

In Hungary, Kadar seems to support, or at any rate not to oppose, Moscow's Comecon concept. This may be a price paid in exchange for tolerance of his comparatively independent domestic policy.

There is in Rumania's position one distinctive feature that renders this country more independent in shaping its economic policy than any of the other bloc countries—namely, its rich endowment in natural resources, including oil, timber, hard coal, and to a lesser extent, other minerals. The flow of Soviet raw materials is not of vital importance to Rumania; at the same time its abundant natural assets give it a wide potential choice of trading partners, including the Western countries at one end and China at the other. This greater freedom of movement pays its dividends in the dispute with Moscow over Rumania's policy of industrialization. To enforce its position, the Soviet Union apparently has refused to deliver heavy industrial equipment in the quantities Bucharest wants. Thus the Rumanians are seeking to secure such equipment

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by expanding trade relations with countries outside the bloc. Activity toward this end has been lively and conspicuous. High-level delegations were sent this spring to the United States and to France, where the exploratory talks that took place underlined Bucharest's pursual of a policy independent of Moscow. In June Rumania signed an agreement with Italy on scientific and technical cooperation in the industrial field.

The coordination of the activities of Soviet-type economies is fraught with limitations inherent in the system itself. The Communists' efforts at integration simply do not stand comparison with the degree of integration achieved by the Common Market economies. The fundamental differences are naturally blurred in the propaganda diffused from Moscow on the progress achieved in Comecon. One such difference is the fact that the Communists exclude a free flow of labor among the participating countries. While in Western Europe, many hundreds of thousands of foreign workers are attracted by higher wages to West German or French industries, it would be difficult for the Communists to solve the problem, for example, of the acute labor shortage in Czechoslovakia by an absorption of unemployed labor from adjacent districts in Poland. Certainly the migration of workers on any mass scale from one country to another is, for the time being, unthinkable in the Soviet orbit.

Capital movements between the Comecon countries are not prohibited *per se*. It would, however, be a gross overstatement to label the occasional loans granted by the Soviet Union or by other industrially advanced member states as "mobility" of capital. Investment in the much publicized joint enterprises, established mainly in Poland and Rumania for the purpose of more intensive exploitation of raw material resources, should of course be included under the heading of capital export. Yet the status of these common enterprises has been a matter of great controversy. Khrushchev intended the joint enterprises to become common property of the participating governments, under Comecon management. To Rumania this notion was unacceptable. As it is, the joint enterprises remain the property of the government of the country on whose territory they are located. Capital participation from outside is regarded as a loan to be repaid in kind by deliveries of the enterprises' products.

The worst impediment to any progress toward a unified bloc economy is the system of bilateral barter that governs East European trade relations. As early as 1957 an attempt was made to loosen intra-bloc trade from this straitjacket when an agreement designed to promote multilateral settlements was signed in Warsaw. Yet the ingrained system of bilateralism, the variations from country to country in the real value of the ruble (which was to be used as a unit of account in international settlements), and last but not least, the government monopoly of foreign trade, proved to be too powerful obstacles. They blocked practically all chances of using accumulated credit balances for the purchase of goods in the debtor countries.

A second start towards multilateralism was undertaken through an agreement concluded last year, establishing a Comecon Bank as a separate agency for trade settlements. The Bank, which went into operation in January 1964, opened transferable ruble accounts for Comecon members amounting to five percent of the foreign trade value of each country. Thus an

A RUMANIAN VETO

Rumania feels that cooperation and mutual assistance between the socialist countries within CEMA [COMECON] make an important contribution to the economic and technical progress of each. This cooperation is carried through in forms unanimously established by the member states. The principal form of this cooperation is the coordination of economic plans on the basis of bilateral and multilateral agreements.

As you know, in recent years, contrary to the principles laid down in the rules of CEMA, forms and measures were proposed tending to create organisms with a supernational character. The Rumanian People's Republic did not and does not agree with these proposals. Our reasons have been clearly presented in the statement of the enlarged plenum of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers Party—April 1964—which is a document defining our general policy. We feel that such forms of cooperation are incompatible with the essential principles underlying the relations between the socialist countries, namely the observance of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of countries. . . .

Rumania, just as the other countries, is fully aware of the need to cooperate closely with the other socialist countries. In our opinion it is important to stress at the same time that cooperation within CEMA does not mean isolation of the socialist countries from the world economy as a whole. Consequently, Rumania develops its relations with countries having different social and economic systems, as our state is convinced that this serves the national interest of every country and is at the same time an important peace factor.

—Rumanian Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer, in Paris interview with AFP. Agerpress, Aug. 3, 1964

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island of multilateralism has been created within a sea of bilateral exchanges.

This time an effort was also made to create a base for the new financial superstructure in the commodity sphere. The agreement provided that following the conclusion of bilateral trade agreements, a second round of negotiations would be conducted to collate any demand still unsatisfied in the bloc with the supplies and capacities still available. The main aim is to work within the multilateral framework to ferret out unutilized capacities which could meet "surprise" demand—*i.e.*, demand arising outside the economic plans of the Comecon partners.

It remains to be seen whether all these expedients will be effective enough to overcome the hurdles on the path leading to multilateralism. Now as before, the inconsistency of prices and costs in the different countries represents a formidable obstacle to multilateral exchanges. All of the bloc economies are battling their way through the thicket of Marxist impedimenta towards a rational price system based on properly calculated costs. But to date no real progress is discernible toward the establishment of compatible prices and costs on an international basis.

So far this paper has dwelt on the limitations of the process of economic integration in the Soviet bloc. There is, however, another side of the story. If results are poor measured by the possibilities open to market economies, they do represent an advance compared to the Stalinist period. In particular, progress has been made toward the establishment of a comprehensive fuel and power balance for the entire bloc area. The USSR's readiness to supply iron ore on a rapidly increasing scale indicates that Soviet investment plans are to be geared to bloc requirements in this important sector.

Cooperative fuel and power ventures have also resulted in greater economy. The construction of the "friendship pipeline," connecting oil fields in the Kuibyshev district with Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and—in the immediate future—East Germany, provides for the transport of oil at low cost, permitting the expansion of petroleum processing industries all over the orbit. The order of the savings achieved through this project is illustrated by the claim that the cost of crude oil piped to Hungary will be less than one quarter of the railway-freight charge.

A power grid interconnecting the power systems of the West Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany marks an important step in the rationalization of energy supplies. Soon Rumania and Bulgaria will be linked with the system. Such achievements help to augment the economic potential of all the bloc countries. Unavoidably they also increase the dependence of Eastern Europe on Soviet Russia.

Intra-bloc cooperation has improved somewhat with respect to other endeavors where the economic benefit to the participants is obvious without having to be exactly calculated. Theoretically the large-scale economy that can be achieved through industrial specialization is bound to result in a reduction of costs for all countries, whether or not the extent of such a reduction can be precisely figured through existing methods. There are indications, however, that as a consequence of national apprehensions and rivalries, specialization agreements are implemented reluctantly and tardily.

The fact remains that for the time being, the individual national plans come first and their coordination takes place only as a secondary effort. A semblance of multilateralism, should it be realized within the framework of the agreement of 1963, would not bring about a change in this fundamental situation.

Developments might be speeded up should the leading power decide to accelerate investment in Eastern Europe through capital export aimed at encouraging closer integration. Such an undertaking would amount to a "coordination" of investment in the sense advocated by Gomulka. This, however, is the last thing to be expected. The Soviet Union is itself in urgent need of capital to implement its vast chemical expansion program. Moreover, current Soviet policy appears to give greater priority to the assistance of the underdeveloped neutralist nations than to the provision of capital for Communist countries.

Nonetheless it would be rash to conclude the Moscow has relinquished its aim of engineering a higher form of bloc integration. Since any present advance toward supranational planning within Comecon has been blocked, it appears that a new attempt is being made to promote integration through bilateral channels outside Comecon. In this connection, a number of agreements were signed in Moscow last February between the USSR and the East European governments, supplementing the existing network of bilateral pacts. In the past such pacts have been implemented by intergovernmental committees operating in accordance with the principles and under the directives of Comecon. There are signs, however, that the new series of pacts concluded by Moscow may envision alternative lines of action. A speech delivered in February by Antal Apro, Hungary's representative on the Comecon Executive Committee, included two notable statements in this respect. First Apro remarked that cooperation within the framework of the bilateral agreements might be "extended to fields beyond the activities of Comecon." Second, he referred to the possibility of establishing associations or trusts of specific industries, or even mergers of entire branches of industries, on a bilateral—and possibly trilateral—basis.

Nicolai Fadeiev, Secretary General of Comecon, provided another hint of a redirection of efforts at

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— Tu ma być huta?... Prędzej mi włosy na dłoni wyrosną!...



rys. Jerzy Flisak

— Mój Boże, jaki tu był piękny krajobraz!...

IN THE PAST

This is where the steel-mill is to be? Before that happens, hair will grow on the palm of my hand!

TODAY

My God, what a beautiful view there was here once!

—From Szpilki (Warsaw), June 14, 1964.

the April session of the Executive Committee. He denied plans to transform Comecon into a supranational institution, yet spoke at the same time of the necessity of achieving a higher degree of integration.

All this indicates that a scheme has been devised to bypass Comecon and to embark on a more cumbersome program of piecemeal integration, since the battle to transform Comecon into a central planning agency has been lost. Obviously the new concept is a poor substitute for supranational planning, at least from Moscow's point of view.

The failure of Khrushchev's offensive to effect a fundamental change of the Comecon statute provides telling evidence of how far political interrelations in the Soviet bloc have drifted from the rigid domination exerted in Stalin's day. In view of the shortcomings inherent in bilateral negotiation as a tool to achieve genuine integration in the whole region, it is conceivable that Moscow regards its new course as an experimental, transitory tactic, pursued in the hope that the benefits of a more advanced division of labor will in time become evident enough to attract even the heretics in Rumania. If this is the case, Moscow may still look forward to remodeling Comecon under more promising prospects at a later date. Alternatively, the circumvention of Comecon could eventually result in the reduction of its functions to essentially technical tasks, while issues charged with politics would be relegated to inter-governmental committees.

Essentially, it is the Communist parties and governments of Eastern Europe that will determine whether or not the Kremlin's hopes of economic integration can be materialized through a more modest, piecemeal approach. The political leaders of the respective countries will have to weigh the promised and presumably real economic benefits of joint ventures against their fear that growing dependence on Moscow will jeopardize the measure of political autonomy they have thus far attained. In the course of coming discussions the heads of the respective parties and governments will no doubt keep their eyes on Rumania. Before committing themselves they will want to ascertain what measure of success the Bucharest regime is realizing in its separatist program of industrialization.

It goes without saying that no new agreement on economic cooperation has been signed between the Soviet Union and Rumania. Having shelved the project of centralized bloc planning, the Rumanians followed up with a public denunciation of Moscow's new approach to integration. In a statement published in *Scinteia* on April 26, 1964,

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the party Central Committee reiterated its insistence that planning the development of the national economy is an inalienable function of the sovereign socialist state. The statement also underscored Rumania's rejection of any plan to set up enterprises owned and operated commonly by two or more countries, defending its stand on the basis that the national economic plan is "one and indivisible."

If Rumania's defiance constitutes a grave danger for the coherence of the Communist bloc, so too does the increase of friendly relations between certain of the bloc countries and Yugoslavia. These rapprochements demonstrate in a tangible way the acceptance of the principle that different roads can lead to socialism. It is worth noting in this context that Hungary and Yugoslavia have concluded a treaty of economic cooperation apparently similar to those which are in force between the various bloc countries.

Behind all the tensions and stresses in the Soviet bloc looms the conflict between Peking and Moscow—and the split in the world Communist movement in general. Without this discord the independent stand taken by the Rumanians against centralizing pressures would be inconceivable. As long as the conflict persists it will encourage polycentrism and at the same time force the Kremlin to continue on a course of persuasion and compromise rather than to attempt a reversion to strong-arm tactics in its efforts to reshape the economic structure of the orbit.

The Minimum Wage in the USSR

By Janet Chapman

In mid-July of this year, Khrushchev announced that by the end of 1965 over 18 million workers in education health, housing and other public services would receive pay increases and a minimum monthly wage of 40-45 rubles.[1] Originally this goal was set for the end of 1962, and a minimum monthly wage of 50-60 rubles for all wage earners and salaried employees was to have been achieved by the end of 1965. It is now clear that worker incomes are rising less rapidly than planned and that the goal of a 50-60 ruble minimum wage for all has been shelved for the time being. According to Khrushchev, the delay in extending the wage reform and the 40-45 ruble minimum wage is due to increased defense expenditures and to the accelerated development of the chemical industry.[2]

To evaluate the implications of this development, it may be helpful to clarify the situation in regard to minimum wages in Soviet law and practice. Although the majority of Soviet wage earners and salaried employees do in fact already receive at least 40 rubles per month, there are sizable groups whose wages are below this level and for whom there are as yet no minimum-wage provisions.

The term "wage earners and salaried employees" covers virtually the entire non-agricultural labor force as well as workers on state farms and in other state agricultural institutions; but it excludes collective farmers, who constitute the bulk of the agricultural labor force. A minimum monthly wage of 40-45 rubles compares with an average actual monthly-earnings level of about 85 rubles for all Soviet wage earners and salaried employees.

In terms of purchasing power for consumer goods, one ruble can be taken as very roughly equivalent to one US dollar. A monthly wage of 40 rubles would, then, buy about as much as 40 dollars, which is somewhat less than the minimum weekly wage in the US. The Soviet

[1] *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, July 14, 1964.

[2] At least one Soviet writer has attributed the postponement of minimum-wage goals to the slowdown in agricultural output during 1959-61, that is, before the exceptionally bad harvest of 1963. See V. F. Maier, *Zarabotnaia plata v period perekhoda k kommunizmu* (Wages during the Period of Transition to Communism), Moscow, 1963, pp. 100-01.

A consultant to the RAND Corporation, Mrs. Chapman is a well-known authority on Soviet wages and author of Real Wages in Soviet Russia Since 1928 *(Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963).*

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worker spends a smaller share of his pay on rent than an American because of artificially low Soviet rental rates and very limited housing space, and he also has no expenses for medical care. On the other hand, the prices of many other consumer services as well as goods are relatively higher in the Soviet Union.

The minimum-wage targets of 40-45 rubles monthly by the end of 1962, and 50-60 rubles by the end of 1965, were set by the 21st Congress of the CPSU (January-February 1959) as part of the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65). The minimum rates were to apply to all wage earners and salaried employees in all branches of the economy. This represented a significant departure in Soviet policy as previous minimum-wage legislation had covered only certain groups of workers. A decree enacted in September 1956 and put into effect in January 1957 had established minimum pay rates of 27-35 rubles for wage earners and salaried employees in industry, construction, transportation and communications: the minimum was fixed at 30-35 rubles for those directly engaged in "production," while for other categories of workers in these same branches the minimum rates were set at 30 rubles in urban areas and 27 rubles in rural areas.[3] About 55 percent of all Soviet wage earners and salaried employees were in the branches of the economy covered by the 1956 minimum-wage legislation.

Although the 40-45 ruble minimum was to apply to all wage earners and salaried employees, it was to be introduced industry by industry and branch by branch during the years 1959-62. All evidence indicates that by the end of 1961 it had been put into effect for workers in industry, construction, transportation and communications—*i.e.*, the same groups covered by the 1956 legislation—and, in addition, for workers in state agricultural institutions. About two-thirds of all wage earners and salaried employees are in these branches. Even the lowest-paid categories of workers within these branches—*e.g.*, custodial personnel, manual laborers on state farms, and grade-1 wage earners in small (primarily rural) food processing plants—are now entitled to a monthly wage of at least 40 rubles. The actual grade-1 wage rate most often runs between 48 and 51 rubles in light industry and is usually (but not always) higher in heavy industry, ranging up to 62 rubles in underground mining and 69 rubles in oil drilling; in construction, the grade-1 rate is 56 rubles.[4] According to Khrushchev, over 50 million workers, or three-quarters of all wage earners and salaried employees are now on reformed wage scales.[5]

It is the remaining one-third of Soviet wage earners and salaried workers—those in the so-called "non-productive" spheres of education, health, housing, municipal services, trade, etc.—who have been affected by the decision to postpone the full application of the 40-45 ruble minimum wage. Whereas the 1959 time schedule called for the introduction of this minimum in all branches by the end of 1962,[6] the current plan envisages its extension to workers in education, health, culture, housing, municipal services, and other branches linked with service to the public only during 1964-65.[7] These branches embrace some of the highest-paid workers in the Soviet Union, such as university professors with monthly salaries of 400-600 rubles, but they also include the lowest-paid.

Information on wages in these spheres, though limited, is sufficient to indicate that various categories of workers receive substantially less than the proposed 40-45 ruble minimum. In education, for example, the monthly salary of secretary-typists, electricians, and custodial personnel working in urban schools, and of children's nurses, cooks, watchmen and doormen employed in kindergartens serving 100 children, is only 30 rubles. Lower-grade medical personnel (*i.e.*, nurses and hospital orderlies) in 25-bed district hospitals receive 35 rubles per month. Accountants working for village soviets in villages with a population of 4,000 or more are paid 28.50 to 31 rubles.[8] In municipal water and sewage plants in the RSFSR (exclusive of Moscow and Leningrad), the basic pay rate for grade-1 employees is 18.25-21.90 rubles per month (the basic rate exceeds 40 rubles only in the case of the highest-paid group, *i.e.*, grade-7 pieceworkers in the most important cities, whose basic

[3] Decree of September 8, 1956, *Direktivy KPSS i Sovetskovo pravitelstva po khoziaistvennim voprosam* (Directives of the CPSU and the Soviet Government on Economic Matters), Vol. 4 (1953-57), Moscow, 1958, pp. 648-49. This decree was the first new minimum-wage legislation since that of 1937, which had covered only wage earners and salaried employees in state industry and water and rail transport, providing for a minimum monthly wage of 11 rubles for time-workers and 11.50 rubles for piece-workers. (All ruble values in this paper are in terms of the "new" ruble in effect since January 1, 1961. One "new" ruble is equivalent to ten "old" rubles.)

[4] Maier, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-44; A. Dolgopolova and A. Shakhmagon, *Oplata truda na predpriiatiiakh pishchevoi i rybnoi promyshlennosti* (The Payment of Labor in Enterprises of the Food and Fish Industry), Moscow, 1963, pp. 27-32.

[5] *Pravda*, July 14, 1964.

[6] *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, Sept. 20, 1959, translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (New York), Vol. XI, No. 38, pp. 14-15.

[7] *Ibid.*, Dec. 13, 1963, translated in *Current Digest . . .*, Vol. XV, No. 50, p. 12. The wage reform is to be completed at the end of this year for workers in the service branches in the Far North and for all workers in health and education, and will be put into effect during the second half of 1965 for other service workers.

[8] P. Ivanitski, *Osnovy smetnovo finansirovaniia* (Principles of Estimated Financing), Moscow, 1961, pp. 38-9, 45, 49, 56.

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wage is 42.92 rubles).[9] Earnings may, of course, exceed basic wage and salary rates, but in these sectors generally the possibility of earning more than the basic rates through piecework or bonus provisions appears to be very limited.

Legally, the Soviet minimum wage is a minimum rate of pay and not a guarantee of minimum earnings, so that even where the 40-45 ruble minimum rate is in force some workers may actually earn less. The text of the 21st Congress decision did indeed refer to a "minimum wage" (*zarabotnaia plata*) rather than a minimum wage rate (as in the 1956 decree), but it has been interpreted to mean merely that the minimum rate of pay should be 40-45 rubles.[10] The rules covering workers' pay in cases of underfulfillment of norms and work stoppages are still based on legislation dating from the early 1930's.

Where failure to fulfill the output norm, or the production of substandard products or rejects, is the fault of the worker, there is no guaranteed wage and the worker is paid according to his actual output —*e.g.*, he would receive no pay if he turned out nothing but rejects. Similarly, when a work stoppage is the worker's fault, he receives no pay. However, when the worker is not at fault, he is guaranteed two-thirds of his basic wage rate in case of under-fulfillment of the output norm, and one-half (in some industries, two-thirds) of the basic wage rate of timeworkers of the same grade in case of work stoppage or defective output. Thus, a worker entitled to a "minimum wage" of 40 rubles per month may at times earn as little as 20 rubles. Data for the RSFSR indicate that the proportion of wage earners working a full month but receiving wages of less than 40 rubles was 0.15 percent of the total in the coal industry and 0.9 percent in the oil industry—both high-paying industries—and 2.3 percent in bread baking.[11]

The introduction of the 40-45 ruble minimum pay rate is part of a general reform of the entire Soviet wage and salary system that was begun in 1956 and is still continuing. One of the major aims of the reform was to reduce the very wide wage and salary differentials which had developed. Although these had served a useful purpose in the earlier stage of Soviet development when skilled labor had been scarce and unskilled labor abundant, they were now considered inappropriate since skilled labor had become less scarce and the unskilled were relatively less abundant and also better qualified. The intent of the reform was to reduce wage differentials not only within a given industry but also as between different industries and branches. In general, the lowest-paid wage earners were to receive rather large increases in pay, those in the middle ranges more modest increases, and those in the upper brackets little or no increase.

Implementation of the reform to date has undoubtedly brought about some narrowing of wage and salary differentials, although these are still wide by Western standards. Top salary rates have not been raised, and stricter limits on bonuses may mean that the actual earnings of some of the best-paid

[9] A. I. Fainberg *et al.*, *Metodika sostavleniia plana zhilishchno-kommunalnovo khoziaistva* (Methods of Drawing up the Plan for Housing and the Municipal Economy), 3rd revised edition, Moscow, 1963, pp. 90-1.

[10] Maier, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-11.

[11] No date is given, but the data probably refer to 1961. *Otvety na voprosy trudiashchikhsia* (Answers to Workers' Questions), No. 5 (138), 1962, p. 31, cited in Maier, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-11.

WHEN THE WAGE IS *NOT* MINIMUM



Полюбила с первого взгляда...

Рисунок Ю. ЧЕРЕПАНОВА

She fell in love with him at first sight . . . .

—From *Krokodil* (Moscow), December 30, 1963.

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have been reduced. Plant managers' basic salaries vary widely depending on the importance of the industry and the size of the plant, ranging from 180-200 rubles in the food industry to 350-400 in the steel industry and somewhat higher in the coal industry.[12] In addition to his basic salary, a manager may earn a bonus of up to 60 percent of his salary in heavy industry and up to 40 percent in other branches. Among wage earners, the highest basic wage rate—paid to the top grade of workers in underground coal mining—remains at the 1957 level of 230 rubles a month,[13] while the minimum rate in those branches where the 1959 program has been put into effect has been raised from 27-35 rubles to 40-45 rubles.

The present plan to extend the 40-45 ruble minimum wage to the service branches by the end of 1965 will mean a substantial increase in income for the poorest paid workers in the USSR. The increase, in general, is to be larger for those in the lower than for those in the highest pay ranks and is to average 21 percent in the service branches. The wage increases already effected in the sphere of material production have averaged 13 to 25 percent in the main branches, according to Khrushchev. This suggests that the relation between average levels of pay in the service and those in the material production spheres may not differ greatly from that prevailing prior to the reform. Once completed, however, the reform will undoubtedly produce a generally narrower spread of incomes. Yet it is obvious that inequalities will continue to be much larger than would have been the case had the original goal of a universal minimum wage of 50-60 rubles by 1965 been adhered to.

It is not yet clear whether wage schedules in the other branches will remain fixed until the reform is completed in the service branches, or whether the second phase of the reform, originally scheduled for 1962-65 and involving the raising of the minimum wage to 50-60 rubles, will soon begin to be implemented. True, a 50-60 ruble grade-1 wage rate has already been introduced in some Soviet industries. Yet in others—notably in some of the most important heavy industries, where the wage reform was introduced earliest—the grade 1 rate is below 50 rubles. Perhaps there will be some raise in these industries before the end of 1965. An across the board minimum wage of 50 rubles for all, however, now appears to be a vague promise for the indefinite future.

[12] Leonid Kostin, *Wages in the USSR*, Moscow, 1960, pp. 60-1.

[13] S. A. Ivanov and M. D. Mezentsev, *Ekonomika ugolnoi promyshlennosti* (The Economics of the Coal Industry), Moscow, 1960, p. 93.

Correspondence

EDITORS' NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington 25, D.C. (Please note: Subscription orders or inquiries should be addressed according to instructions on the front inside cover.)*

On Revolutionaries

TO THE EDITORS: About Ronald Hingley's flaying of Victor Serge ("The Revolutionary: On the Persistence of Myths and Mystiques") in your May-June issue. Of course revolutionists are absurd, from a rationalistic point of view, because they are only interested in part of life and are bored by talk of "bicycles and girls." They are monomaniacs, like some artists and scholars.

The trouble with the revolutionary monomaniac is that he aspires to power, and that he bases himself on the assumption that if he is to make men happy they must first be miserable. From which it follows that if men are happy without his services the revolutionist himself will feel miserable, as Serge did in that magnificent passage quoted by Mr. Hingley on working-class affluence in Belgium.

But then, how would any religious person feel if he went to heaven and found it inhabited by sinners? Isn't it unjust to say that this reflects the "manipulatory attitude" of the revolutionary who regards mankind as pawns on a chessboard? Isn't it instead an apt commentary on the irony of history?

I wonder if Serge is a good example of a revolutionary at all, in the sense of being somebody who organizes the conflict. He engaged in revolutionary activity the way other people engage in peace marches or third-rank trade union activities; he was one of those who crank the printing press and carry messages down the line. He made revolution his literary subject and poetized about it most effectively and tragically, but his musings can hardly be identified with the hard, practical fanaticism of Lenin, Trotsky and others. Somebody ought to write a book on the varieties of revolutionary experience.

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Editorial Notes

From Russia *sans* Love

In our last issue we published a part of the second of two letters we had sent to Academician Anushavan Arzumanian, Director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations in Moscow, inviting him to participate in a symposium on the progress of Soviet consumers' welfare. We had received no acknowledgment for either letter and had to go ahead with the symposium without his participation. A few days after we had gone to press the long-awaited reply arrived. It is reproduced below:

I have received your letters of March 19 and May 19 of this year, as well as the copy of the journal Problems of Communism, *No. 6, 1963. I am not able to accept your invitation to write an essay for the above-mentioned publication.*

Indeed, the journal Problems of Communism *is very well known as an organ of the "cold war," specializing in negative anti-Communist propaganda in the spirit of psychological warfare. The materials published in it are selected and presented exclusively in order to arouse distrust, fear, and suspicion not only towards the social system, but also towards the peoples of the socialist countries.*

Soviet scholars as well as social and political leaders do not refuse to appear in the pages of Western journals and to publish interviews in them. They fully realize that these journals may not agree with communism, with its philosophy as well as with the organization of public life. However, your journal avoids objectivity as well as academic standards. Its "credo" is the struggle against communism, which your contributors are panically afraid of, and do not understand.

The considerations presented above make it clear why I cannot agree to appear in an organ of this type.

(signed by)
Academician A. A. Arzumanian

Needless to say, we regret the content as well as the tone of this letter, and, indeed, we are surprised that Academician Arzumanian should have consented to affix his signature to an intemperate diatribe such as this one. Little would be gained by entering into an argument over the merits of his statements; we merely urge our readers to read the symposium to which we had hoped Academician Arzumanian would contribute (*Problems of Communism*, July-August 1964, p. 61), and to judge for themselves whether the discussion reveals any lack of objectivity and academic standards, or any panic fear of communism. Those who are familiar with our journal should not be surprised to find that the scholars participating in the discussion freely disagree with each other and that some of them indeed take a position with which Academician Arzumanian himself might well sympathize.

Another of our recent symposiums has evoked a somewhat more loquacious response. One June 16, one day before Academician Arzumanian signed his letter, an article appeared in the Moscow *Literaturnaia gazeta*, entitled "Provocateurs in Professorial Cloaks." Its author was our dedicated critic, Mr. Harry Freeman, whom some readers may remember for an earlier "report" of his reprinted in translation in our March-April 1963 issue. Mr. Freeman's latest effort—which pretends to be a critique of the symposium "Soviet Colonialism: Does it Exist?" (*Problems of Communism*, January-February 1964)—is so weak that this time we shall suppress the temptation to reprint it. The piece is an artless fabrication from beginning to end and makes very poor reading.

It may be remembered that this symposium consisted of three articles and four commentaries, including discussions by respected Asian and African scholars. Mr. Freeman chose to hinge his story on one of the articles (by Professor Pipes); he referred in passing to another (by Professor Seton-Watson); and he did not so much as mention the rest, including the article by Professor Rywkin, which contains much of the basic data for the entire symposium. So much for Mr. Freeman's success in remaining true to his style. Should the editors of *Literaturnaia gazeta* wish to give wider publicity to their New York correspondent, we should be glad to reprint even this latest piece of Mr. Freeman's—but only in return for equivalent space for a rejoinder in their own pages.

—The Editors

ERRATUM

In Mr. C. Linden's communication on the subject of "Khrushchev's Power" (July-August issue, p. 74), the following sentence appeared:

The activity of the "anti-party group" and the disputes over resource allocation were offered as prime cases in point.

This should have read:

The "anti-party group" and resource allocation issues were offered as prime cases in point.

We regret the error.

—The Editors

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IN FUTURE ISSUES

How Heavy Is the Curtain?
Report on contacts with Soviet citizens,
by Jane Moody
on the availability and reliability
of economic statistics,
by Leon Herman
on literary censorship,
by Maurice Friedberg
Soviet Books on Religion, *by Harry Willetts*

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